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Abstract 
Until recently entry mode studies focused largely on the choices made by North American and 
European firms and entry mode choices of firms from developing countries were largely neglected.  
In recent years the focus of entry mode research has attempted to remedy this neglect in large part 
because of the rapid economic growth that has taken place in several emerging economies and, 
increasingly, the rapid increase in their direct investments in foreign markets.  China is perhaps the 
most frequently investigated case.  However, although there are now a limited number of studies 
looking at the investment motivations and entry mode choices of Chinese investors and their 
determinants, there has been no detailed study of Chinese OFDI and entry mode choices in regard to 
Australian markets.  This is despite the fact that Australia is a major recipient of Chinese OFDI and 
has been so for some thirty years.  Hence the goal of this study is to remedy this deficiency and, in 
addition, to throw further light on the determinants of entry mode choice by firms from emerging 
economies.  
The study adopts no single theoretical or conceptual framework, given that each has a number of 
limitations. Instead, it draws upon a range of frameworks, notably Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm on 
firms‟ internationalisation process (1980 & 1988), the institutional framework (for example, North, 
1990; Scott, 1995; Peng, 2002), and the resource-based perspective (for example, Barney, 1991).   
The thesis, based on a series of case studies, found that Chinese firms invest in Australia for a variety 
of reasons, including market-seeking, resource-seeking, asset-seeking, as well as a newly identified 
permanent residency or welfare-seeking motivations.  It also found that larger Chinese MNEs with 
previous international experience preferred to have full control in their Australian affiliates, while 
those who perceive a high level of scrutiny and constraints imposed by the Australian government 
upon their investments were prone to choose a shared control mode. 
The findings of this thesis suggest that a single theoretical perspective is not comprehensive enough to 
explain OFDI initiated from China into a developed country such as Australia.  On a practical level, it 
may provide some guidance on the internationalisation decisions of those Chinese MNEs who intend 
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to conduct OFDI.  In addition, the significant effect government can bring upon towards Chinese 
MNEs‟ entry mode decisions as found in this study also signals that thesis is of value to policy makers. 
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Chapter 1: Introduction 
1.1 Introduction  
The primary aim of this thesis is to examine the entry mode choices of Chinese firms entering the 
Australian market. It also examines the factors influencing their decision to internationalise, drawing 
upon the Australian experience.  
The implementation of the Open Door policy by the Chinese Communist Party (CCP) after the Third 
Plenary Session of the 11th Central Committee of CCP in 1978 marked perhaps the most significant 
event in its economic development since the founding of the People‟s Republic of China.  It resulted 
in a dramatic acceleration in economic growth and radical changes to the structure of its economy, 
changes that are still unfolding.  From that year, the planned economy structure of the country was 
transformed into a socialist market economic structure where competition was gradually encouraged 
and a free market is under formation.  It was introduced by Deng Xiaoping, who was then the General 
Secretary of the Communist Party of China.  The Open Door policy, together with the development of 
associated rules and incentives for attracting foreign funds, triggered a tide of incoming investments, 
and therefore, faster economic development in China.  Appendix 1 provides a selection of the major 
policies, regulations and circulars since the Open Door policy was introduced, illustrating their 
important influence on the internationalisation of Chinese firms.  
Not surprisingly, before the government decided to open the trading door and abandon its policy of 
economic autarky, inward foreign direct investment (FDI),  and outward foreign direct investment 
(OFDI), was essentially zero (Yang, 2003).  The definition of FDI provided by the Organisation for 
Economic Co-operation and Development (OECD) is that used in this study.  It is,  
“[A] category of investment that reflects the objective of establishing a lasting interest by a 
resident enterprise in one economy in an enterprise that is resident in an economy other than 
that of the direct investor… The direct or indirect ownership of 10% or more of the voting 
power of an enterprise resident in one economy by an investor resident in another economy is 
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evidence of such a relationship.” (OECD, Glossary of foreign direct investment terms and 
definitions, 2012: 7) 
China has been a recipient of large amounts of FDI for more than twenty years.  The economic 
reforms in the late 1970s dramatically increased the inward FDI at an average annual growth rate of 
15 per cent from 1978 to 2008 (MOFCOM, 2009).  By 2009, the total number of FDI projects 
approved by the Chinese government had exceeded 660,000, with an accumulated foreign investment 
of USD870 billion.  This has positioned the nation as the largest host country for inward FDI among 
the developing countries since 1992 and second only to the US as a host country for FDI (UNCTAD, 
2005; and MOFCOM, 2010). 
Somewhat less well known until recent years, is the fact that China‟s OFDI has also been developing 
rapidly.  However, unlike inward FDI, the nation‟s OFDI only started to experience exponential 
growth from the beginning of the new millennium, after the formal adoption of the Go Global strategy 
through the Third Plenary Session of the 9
th
 National People‟s Congress in early 2000.  It has since 
become an “integral part of the country‟s overall strategy of economic openness” (OECD, 2006: 210).  
Its aim is to promote the international operations of Chinese firms with a view to improving resource 
allocation and enhancing the global competitiveness of Chinese multi-national enterprises (MNEs).  
The broad Go Global strategy has been accompanied by a number of policies aimed at stimulating 
OFDI, such as the “Comprehensive external investment results evaluation procedures”, released by 
the Ministry of Commerce (hereafter MOFCOM) to clarify standards and procedures for evaluating 
OFDI applications in 2002 (see Appendix 1 for a list of key OFDI regulations from 1984 to 2007).  As 
a result, by the end of 2010 the number of OFDI projects initiated by domestic enterprises and 
approved by the Chinese government was over 13,000, and the number of foreign affiliates thus 
established exceeded 16,000 in 178 countries (MOFCOM, 2011).  Also by 2010, Chinese OFDI 
reached USD68.81 billion, an increase of 21.7 per cent compared to the previous year (MOFCOM, 
2011).  Note should be taken when interpreting statistics from the Chinese government sources 
(including MOFCOM and the State Administration of Foreign Exchange-SAFE), because financial 
sector FDI was not included in official statistics from 2002 to 2005, so the extent of  Chinese OFDI in 
15 
 
official sources is underestimated (Buckley, Cross, Tan, Xin & Voss, 2008).  To conclude, as a 
developing country with a very short history of OFDI, China‟s achievements have been remarkable. 
 
1.2 Research Rationale 
While China‟s flourishing inward FDI development has already attracted much attention from 
researchers, its impressive OFDI performance remains relatively under investigated, though research 
is growing rapidly, largely because it has only achieved significant progress in the last ten years.  As 
Fan, Zhu and Nyland concluded, perhaps “Chinese multinationals operating in advanced economies 
have not existed long enough to attract a large body of research” (2012: 6).  Berning and Holtbrugge, 
for example, identified only 62 articles in fifteen peer-reviewed journals for the period 1986 to 2012 
that investigated Chinese OFDI activities (Berning & Holtbrugge, 2012: 169).   
The primary focus to date of studies of China‟s OFDI activities has been the factors driving such 
investments.  Moreover, in examining motivation and determinants, the studies, for the most part, 
have been looking at the investment patterns of Chinese MNEs into unspecified or various destination 
countries at the national, aggregate level of analysis (see, for example, Buckley, Clegg, Cross, Liu, 
Voss & Zheng, 2007; & Voss, 2010).  Among the 62 studies Berning and Holtbrugge (2012) have 
identified examining Chinese OFDI motivations and determinants, only five specified the exact 
destination country of the Chinese investments involved in their studies.  As a result, the bulk of 
existing studies concerning Chinese OFDI only provide a general picture of the overall OFDI 
activities (for example, see Cheng & Ma, 2008).   
The number of studies of market entry for foreign firms entering the Chinese market has grown 
rapidly (for example, Teng, 2004; Gaba, Pan & Ungson, 2002; Tse, Pan & Au, 1997; and Pan & Tse, 
2000).  However, while growing, the number of market entry studies of Chinese firms engaged in 
OFDI is still limited, especially in contrast to the large number of market entry studies published over 
several decades ago for firms of other countries entering other markets (see for example, Erramilli & 
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Rao, 1993; and Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992).  According to Berning and Hultbrugge (2012), out of 
the 62 studies concerning Chinese OFDI activities since 1986, only a limited number examined their 
entry mode choices (for example, Cui & Jiang, 2009; Voss, Buckley & Cross, 2010; Quer, Claver & 
Rienda, 2012; and Xu, Hu & Fan, 2011).  Hence, we have only a limited understanding of trends in 
the market entry characteristics of Chinese firms engaging in OFDI.  There is some understanding that, 
compared to firms from more developed countries, whose OFDI is driven largely by cost efficiency or 
natural resource endowment factors, firms from developing countries such as China may be 
characterised by different, or additional factors (for example, Buckley et al, 2007; Duanmu, 2012; 
Klossek, Linke & Nippa, 2012; Ramasamy, Yeung & Laforet, 2012; and Alon, Child, Li & McIntyre, 
2011).  In particular, there has been a growing concern as to the validity and usefulness of established 
theoretical frameworks in explaining the internationalisation process of Chinese firms (Berning & 
Holtbrugge, 2012).   
In light of the above analysis, this thesis will look at Chinese MNEs‟ entry mode choices and the 
factors influencing such choices when entering into a single country, Australia.  Australia has been 
one of the major destinations for Chinese outbound direct investments since the beginning of the 
Open Door era.  According to MOFCOM, China had established direct investments in twenty-three 
countries by the end of 1982, the main destinations being the US, Japan, Canada, Australia and Spain 
in terms of investment value (MOFCOM, 1982).  In 2010, Australia ranked as the first on the list of 
destination countries which had attracted the highest level of FDI flow, excluding Hong Kong, the 
British Virgin Islands and the Cayman Islands (MOFCOM, 2011).  The ongoing importance of 
Australia as one of the major destination countries of China‟s OFDI makes this study strategically 
valuable. 
In the 1980s, British academic John Dunning synthesised the main streams of discussion in theoretical 
studies of firms‟ FDI decisions, including the ownership and internalisation perspectives adopted by 
Hymer (1960) and Buckley and Casson (1976), as well as the location aspect analysed by Vernon 
(1966), developing what is described as an eclectic paradigm.  He claimed that firms‟ decisions to 
engage in FDI activities are a combined effect of three main factors: their ownership advantage, 
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internalisation advantage, and location advantage, frequently abbreviated as the OLI model (1981).  
Due to its relative inclusiveness and broadness, this eclectic paradigm possesses strong explanatory 
power in many cases, and therefore was recognised as a “classical” FDI theoretical understanding 
(Buckley, et al., 2007: 501).   However, as the extent of globalisation deepened and studies of FDI 
from or to different countries accumulated, the classical eclectic paradigm has come under increased 
challenge, especially as regards its applicability to developing countries.  
The eclectic paradigm and most of earlier FDI theories were generated based largely on studies of 
developed countries that started to engage in FDI long before most developing countries.  Therefore, 
it is argued that, in comparison, developed countries and emerging countries may have very different 
motivators to conduct FDI.  They may have different comparative advantages, and the relative 
importance of the OLI factors might be different.  Hence, this study, with its focus on a major 
developing country, China, might throw further light on the adequacy of existing theory.  
 
1.3 Research Questions 
As noted above, until recently entry mode studies focused largely on the choices made by North 
American and European firms; entry mode choices of firms from developing countries were largely 
neglected.  In recent years the focus of entry mode research has attempted to remedy this neglect in 
large part because of the rapid economic growth that has taken place in several emerging economies 
and, increasingly, the rapid increase in their direct investments in foreign markets.  China is perhaps 
the most frequently investigated case.  However, although there are now a limited number of studies 
looking at the FDI motivations and entry mode choices of Chinese investors and their determinants, 
there has been no detailed study of Chinese FDI and entry mode choice in regard to Australian 
markets.  This is despite the fact that Chinese FDI is one of the largest foreign investors in Australia, 
and Australia has been a major recipient of Chinese FDI for some thirty years.  Hence another goal of 
this study is to remedy this deficiency and, in addition, to throw further light on the determinants of 
entry mode choice by firms from emerging economies.  
18 
 
In order to achieve these aims the study focuses on two research questions: 
1. Why have Chinese firms chosen to invest in Australia? 
2. What factors have influenced their choices of entry modes for Australia? 
In addition, as indicated in Chapter 3 Literature Review, a number of research propositions are 
generated in order to systematically guide thesis and provide material that will enable detailed 
answers to the two research questions. 
 
1.4 Research Methodology 
A qualitative, case study approach has been used throughout the study, based on eight case studies of 
individual Chinese firms.  It is, essentially, an exploratory study that will generate provisional 
findings that can provide the basis for further research.   Many scholars (e.g., Marschan-Piekkari and 
Welch, 2004; Werner, 2002) have argued it is necessary to bring qualitative methods back into the 
mainstream of international business research for several reasons.  In particular, as described by Yin 
(2003), the case study is “an empirical enquiry that investigates a contemporary phenomenon within 
its real-life context” (p.13).  It can be extremely useful for exploring new processes and behaviours, 
for example when there is a lack of previous knowledge and understanding regarding an issue, where 
the details or the extent of the problems concerned is largely unknown to the researcher (Yin, 1994).  
This is largely the case for this thesis, as it explores an issue which has received very little previous 
study, the factors determining the selection of the Australian market for investment by Chinese firms, 
as well as those determining their entry mode choices.  At the commencement of this study, for 
example, no existing study was found that examined these factors in the Australian context.  
Eight Chinese MNEs who have OFDI in Australia were contacted and agreed to be the subject of 
research.  These eight companies were selected from a list of 445 Chinese MNEs made available on 
the MOFCOM online database, who have had direct investments in Australia since the 1980s 
(MOFCOM, 2013a).  The eight cases were selected in order to cover firms of various sizes, ownership 
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types, duration of Australian operations, industries and entry mode choices.  For each company, a 
number of one to three senior managers, or owners in the case of smaller enterprises, who were either 
directly responsible for, or had sufficient knowledge about the issues relating to their entry mode 
choices were interviewed.  In addition, two government officials, one each from China and Australia, 
were contacted to provide a rather different perspective towards the issue of Chinese investments in 
Australia in contrast to the findings from the corporate level.  Most of the interviews lasted 
approximately one hour.  In addition to the interviews, a range of company reports and other 
corporate documents were examined, where available, in order to better understand the firms‟ 
operational strategy and performance across time. 
 
1.5 Summary of Findings 
The findings indicate that Chinese firms have a variety of reasons for investing in Australia, often 
more than one, and that they have been rather different from those reported as driving their 
investments in other countries by existing studies.   In particular, resource-seeking, market-seeking 
and strategic asset-seeking motivations have been identified as the most common, including firms in 
different industries.  In addition, unusually, a “permanent residency”, or “welfare-seeking”, 
motivation was identified as important for the owners of small private enterprises.  This is a factor 
that has hardly been addressed in the existing literature, and it is believed that it may have significant 
influence for individual Chinese investors in Australia, and, possibly, small Chinese firms in a range 
of developed countries.   
The research also found that most Chinese firms, regardless of their actual choice of entry mode for 
Australia, would have preferred to establish firms over which they had full control, the wholly-owned 
subsidiary (hereafter WOS) mode.  However, in practice, a variety of factors sometimes led their final 
selection of entry mode choice to vary, with five out of eight chosen the joint venture (hereafter JV) 
mode, and the rest selecting the WOS mode.  The major factors influencing the final choice of mode 
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included corporate size, previous international investment experience and the Australian regulatory 
environment.  
In regard to existing theoretical and conceptual frameworks, this thesis found that all had at least some 
value in suggesting and explaining internationalisation and entry mode decisions, but that all were 
somewhat limited, confirming the decision to use a range of frameworks to guide and inform the 
study.  
 
1.6 The Structure of the Thesis 
This thesis is structured into seven chapters, including this introduction.  Chapter 2 provides a 
contextual description and assessment of the development of China‟s OFDI, which is characterised 
chronologically into three broad stages. Attention is primarily focused on the period from 2002 to 
2012, where Chinese MNEs‟ internationalisation activity had been the most active.   
Chapter 3 reviews the relevant literature and its theoretical underpinnings as regards the thesis.  As 
explained, the thesis draws most heavily on Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm, the institutional perspective 
and the resource-based perspective to provide a broad framework that guides the study. 
Chapter 4 outlines the research methodology implemented in the study.  The use of the case study 
method is justified, as is the use of interviews as the dominant research technique.  It also explains 
how the cases were selected and the supporting, secondary information drawn upon.  
Chapter 5 provides the results of the research and an analysis based on the eight cases.   
Chapter 6 further elaborates on the research findings and their implications for the existing literature, 
systematically assessing each of the research propositions in regard to existing findings in the 
literature.   
Chapter 7 provides a short, concluding chapter. 
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Chapter 2: Background: China’s OFDI Development 
The purpose of this chapter is to provide some background context for the more detailed analysis of 
Chinese entry mode choice regarding the Australian market.  It starts with a brief overview of Chinese 
economic policy development in Section 2.1.  Then it analyses Chinese OFDI activities during the 
past 30 years by breaking them down into three development phases in Section 2.2.  Detailed 
discussion of the geographical distribution of China‟s OFDI, the industry sectors they cover, 
distribution of firm types, and entry modes adopted by those Chinese firms are given relating to the 
latest and most important period of development, namely from 2002 to 2011.  A discussion of how 
Chinese enterprises have penetrated the Australian market is provided in Section 2.3, which links the 
two subjects studied in this thesis together: Chinese MNEs and the Australian market.  The chapter 
concludes in Section 2.4. 
 
2.1 The Economic and Policy Development of China  
China, as the largest emerging country has attracted much attention from both the business and 
academic world.  As Child and Tse (2001: 5) describe, the country is the “most singular of the 
transition economies”, not only because of its vast landscape and huge population, but also because it 
has managed to achieve the most outstanding economic development in the past thirty years.   
Table 2-1 compares China‟s GDP in 1978 and 2012.  The two years represent the beginning of the 
implementation of the Open Door policy and the most recent figures available some thirty years later.  
As the table indicates, China‟s GDP has undergone an impressive growth, rising from USD148 billion 
in 1978 to USD7.91 trillion in 2012.  Table 2-1 also provides a horizontal comparison of GDP 
increases in a number of different countries across the same period of time, which includes large 
developed nations and other emerging countries, further demonstrating China‟s outstanding 
performance.   
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Table 2-1: Increase of GDP from 1978 to 2012 in developed and developing countries 
Year 
GDP (USD, Trillion) 
China 
Developed Countries BRIC Countries (except China) 
the US UK Australia France Japan India Brazil Russia 
1978 0.148 2.28 0.325 0.116 0.502 0.968 0.135 0.201 N/A 
2012 7.906 14.991 2.445 1.379 2.773 5.867 1.851 2.477 1.858 
GDP 
increase 
(times) 
53 7 8 12 6 6 14 12 N/A 
(Source: World Bank, 2012) 
While the Open Door policy was designed primarily to stimulate domestic economic development and 
attract foreign investments, the Go Global strategy introduced in late 1999 was designed to encourage 
Chinese firms to look for opportunities in other markets, both for sales and as sources of supply for 
raw materials in short supply domestically.  Both the Open Door and Go Global strategies were 
supplemented by a related range of new and modified policies and regulations in the years following 
their introduction (see Appendix 1for a list of the associated, later policies). 
As indicated in two of the important documents released regarding the implementation of the Go 
Global strategy, “Suggestions on the making of national economy and social development for the 10th 
five-year-plan” (CPC Central Government, 2001) and “Suggestions on the making of national 
economy and social development plan for the 11
th
 five-year-plan” (CPC Central Government, 2005), 
the significance of the Go Global strategy was three-fold: 
 With the country being admitted into the World Trade Organisation (WTO) in early 2000, 
there is a growing desire by domestic companies to compete with foreign corporations in 
foreign markets; an open posture of both Chinese corporations and government towards 
overseas investments can help the country gain foreign market shares and therefore gain more 
power in the global economy; 
 The ongoing industrialisation process of China calls for great demand for various resources, 
both tangible and intangible.  The former include: financial and natural resources; and the 
latter type include: technology, human resource, research ability, and managerial skills.  
Going global makes it possible for domestic companies to gain access to those resources that 
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is relatively abundant in other countries as compare to their domestic reserve and production; 
and 
 China has accumulated massive foreign exchange reserve since 1978, and there has been 
growing pressure from the international community for it to abolish the pegged exchange rate 
system for RMB.  Investing abroad is a way to utilise the excessive amount of foreign 
exchange reserve through the purchasing of overseas assets, thereby balancing the country‟s 
foreign exchange reserve. 
In part, the Go Global strategy was designed to prepare Chinese firms for the increased competition 
they would face once China gained membership of the WTO in 2001.  The Membership required 
changes to a number of domestic policies and regulations.  In addition, the US-China agreement also 
required major regulatory changes, which were implemented in the following areas (Barshefsky, 
2000): 
 The granting of trading rights to foreign firms; 
 Reduction of state control over the internal distribution of goods; 
 Lowering of trade barriers, such as tariffs; 
 The opening up of more industries (such as information industry) to foreign participation; and 
 Reforms to FDI policy and other industrial policies. 
 
2.2 Chinese OFDI Activities 
In this section, an overview of the rapid growth in Chinese OFDI over the last thirty years is provided.  
The analysis of the development trends is broken down into several periods.  The development of 
Chinese OFDI in Australia across time is then examined.  
China has been a recipient of large amounts of FDI for more than thirty years.  More recently Chinese 
firms have started to invest in overseas markets.  Figure 2-1 depicts China‟s OFDI flow and stock 
24 
 
from 1980 to 2007.  As Figure 2-1 illustrates, China‟s history of OFDI falls into three distinct periods.  
The first period ranges from late 1970 to 1991, the early years of China as a more open, increasingly 
market-based economy in which levels of OFDI grew slowly.  The second period spans from 1992 to 
2001, during which China underwent a rapid liberalisation of its domestic market and OFDI flows and 
stocks grew rapidly.  The third period is from 2002 to 2008, a period in which China took up 
membership in the WTO and became increasingly subjected to its regulations and agreements 
regarding international trade.  As Figure 2-1 demonstrates, with the exception of the 2003-04 down 
turn that was brought about as a result of government policy aimed at controlling illegal capital 
movements and speculative capital flows, the period was one of a very rapid expansion in both the 
flows and stock of OFDI.  This stage-classification has been applied widely in the literature, including 
Buckley et al. (2010), Buckley et al. (2008), Buckley et al. (2007), UNCTAD (2006), and Yang 
(2003), and it will be used to structure the discussion of the key aspects during each stage.  In the next 
three sections major trends in the above periods are outlined in more depth.   
Figure 2-1: OFDI from China 
 
(Source: Buckley et al., 2010, as extracted from UNCTAD FDI database) 
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2.2.1 1978 to 1991: the beginning of a new era 
China‟s MOFCOM published its first Almanac of China‟s Foreign Economic Relations and Trade in 
1980 (MOFCOM, 1980).  According to the first Almanac, in November 1979, the Beijing Friendship 
Business Service Company established a joint venture named “JingHe Co., Ltd” with Maruyichi 
Business Co., Ltd in Tokyo, Japan.  This marks the start of Chinese OFDI activities in the following 
thirty years.  Other early Chinese enterprises engaged in overseas investments include: in March 1980, 
the China Shipbuilding Industry Corporation and China National Chartering Corporation established 
the International United Shipping Co. Ltd with the Hong Kong Global Shipping Group in Bermuda; 
in July 1980, the Bank of China joined with the First National Bank of Chicago, Industrial Bank of 
Japan, China Resources Group Ltd (Hong Kong) and established CCIC Finance Co., Ltd in Hong 
Kong.  The above examples, aside from non-Chinese partners, were largely state-owned Chinese 
foreign trade and financial companies that had accumulated relatively greater experience in 
conducting foreign business, and with monopolistic advantages in importing and exporting goods and 
services.  However, the number of Chinese companies involved in OFDI was very limited in this 
period, not only in terms of the number of projects, but also as reflected in the small investment scales 
and limited industries these investments covered.  Tan (2011) noted that investments during the period 
were mainly concentrated in sectors such as shipping services, finance and insurance, and catering.  
Table 2-2 and Figure 2-2 show the yearly situation of China‟s non-trade enterprises and their FDI 
from 1979 to 1991. 
Table 2-2: China‟s non-trade enterprises and their foreign direct investments from 1979 to 1991 
Year 
No. overseas 
enterprises 
Total investment 
(US$m) 
Average 
value (US$m) 
1979 4 0.53 0.13 
1980 13 30.9 2.38 
1981 13 2.6 0.20 
1982 13 3.2 0.25 
1983 18 8.7 0.48 
1984 47 80.9 1.72 
1985 77 50.5 0.66 
1986 92 75.5 0.82 
1987 124 350 2.82 
1988 169 153 0.91 
1989 119 230 1.93 
1990 157 74.7 0.48 
1991 207 367 1.77 
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 (Source: Foreign economic cooperation of contemporary China, China Social Science Press, 1989, 
MOFCOM, 1980-1991)  
Figure 2-2: Number of China‟s non-trade enterprises, yearly OFDI flow, and average investment size 
from 1979 to 1991 
 
 
A number of characteristics are evident from Table 2-2 and Figure 2-2: 
 In general, during this period, the annual number of enterprises established overseas increased 
gradually (except for 1989).  The figure increased more than fifty fold from 4 in 1979 to 207 
in 1991; 
 The trend for total annual investment is non-linear (as was that for average size), nevertheless, 
by the end of this period, the amount invested annually had increased significantly to USD361 
million as compared to USD0.53 million in 1979; 
 China‟s cumulative OFDI for the period was USD1427.53 million, and the total number of 
enterprises established overseas reached 1053.  On average, 81 JVs or WOSs were set up 
every year; and 
 The annual average investment varied during the period, for example, it increased abruptly 
from USD0.48 million per investment in 1983 to USD1.72 million per investment in 1984, 
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and decreased to USD0.66 million per investment the following year. The fact that some large 
investments approved in a year can significantly affect the average investment size in that 
particular year clearly reflects that the total number of investments each year was relatively 
small compare to later periods. 
By the end of this period, Chinese OFDI had resulted in the establishment of 1053 non-trade 
enterprises scattered in over 80 countries.  Among them, the US, Japan, Germany, Australia, and 
Canada attracted nearly 40 per cent of the population; and another 20 per cent was established in what 
was then British Hong Kong and Portuguese Macau (MOFCOM, 1991). 
 
2.2.2 1992 to 2001: experience accumulating continuously 
Table 2-3 and Figure 2-3 provide statistics for new, non-trading enterprises and yearly OFDI flow 
from 1992 to 2001.   
Table 2-3: China‟s non-trade enterprises and foreign direct investment, 1992 to 2001 
Year 
No. overseas 
enterprises 
Total investment 
(US$m) 
Average value 
(US$m) 
1992 355 195 0.55 
1993 295 96 0.33 
1994 106 71 0.67 
1995 119 106 0.89 
1996 103 294 2.85 
1997 158 196 1.24 
1998 266 259 0.97 
1999 220 590 2.68 
2000 243 551 2.27 
2001 232 708 3.05 
 (Source: MOFCOM, 1992-2001) 
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Figure 2-3: Number of China‟s non-trade enterprises, yearly OFDI flow, and average investment size 
from 1992 to 2001 
 
 
In comparison to the 1979 to 1991 period a number of trends can be identified: 
 The number of overseas enterprises established during this period initially continued the 
expansion experienced in 1979-1991, with 355 new enterprises in 1992 but then decreased 
sharply to a trough in 1996 of 103.  It then picked up and remained at around 220 to 240 
enterprises per year from 1999 to 2001.  The trough was attributable to the concerns about 
loss of control over state assets, which led to a tightening of approval procedures in that year 
(Buckley, et al., 2007: 504); 
 Annual investment commenced with USD195 million in 1992, but fell back sharply  to 
USD71 million in 1994, and then gradually picked up in the following years and reached 
USD708 million in 2001; 
 The yearly average size of investment in this period is not as volatile as it was during the last 
period as Table 2-2 demonstrates.  Although variation does occur from time to time (for 
example, the figure for 1996 was USD2.85 million, up from USD0.89 million in 1995, before 
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observable, which grew from USD0.55 million in 1992 to USD3.05 million in 2001.  This 
indicates that although the number of Chinese non-trade OFDIs may not have experienced an 
increase on a yearly basis during this period, the value per investment did increase gradually;  
 Both the number of overseas enterprises established and the total investment increased quite 
dramatically during the 1997 to 1999 period.  In part this resulted from the Asian Financial 
Crisis in 1997, which gave many state-owned Chinese enterprises good opportunities to 
expand abroad with bargain prices (Tang, 2006: 95).  
 
By the end of this period, a total of 3150 (1053 plus 2097) non-trade enterprises had been set up 
overseas, located in more than 160 countries.  The top four countries which had attracted the most 
Chinese OFDI flow by 2001 were: Hong Kong – USD3,522 million; the US – USD649 million; 
Canada – USD432 million, and Australia – USD378 million (MOFCOM, 2001).  Generally speaking, 
with respect to geographical distribution, other than increased global coverage, this period displayed 
no significant shift in terms of the most attractive destination countries.  Developed countries still 
dominate the list. 
 
2.2.3 2002 to current: the “Go Global” accelerator 
In the third, 2002 to 2011 period, the country‟s OFDI stock increased dramatically, as indicated in 
Figure 2-1.  It was driven by a combination of factors, including: one, further market liberalisation; 
two,  following admission to the WTO, the reduction of barriers to overseas market entry by Chinese 
firms (see discussion in Section 2.1); and three, the implementation of the Go Global strategy as well 
as its associated regulations and incentives.  Table 2-4 and Figure 2-4 provide statistics for newly set 
up enterprises and yearly OFDI flow from 2002 to 2011.   
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Table 2-4: China‟s non-trade enterprises and their foreign direct investments from 2002 to 2011 
Year 
No. overseas 
enterprises 
Total investment 
(US$m) 
Average 
value (US$m) 
2002 350 983 2.81 
2003 510 2087 4.09 
2004 829 5504 6.64 
2005 1067 12263 11.49 
2006 1226 17635 14.38 
2007 1376 24843 18.05 
2008 1766 41860 23.70 
2009 2373 47804 20.14 
2010 3263 60178 18.44 
2011 3934 68582 17.43 
(Source: MOFCOM, 2002-2011.) 
Figure 2-4: Number of China‟s non-trade enterprises, yearly OFDI flow, and average investment size 
from 2002 to 2011 
 
 
A number of trends can be identified in the above table and figure: 
 During this period, the number of Chinese enterprises established overseas increased 
dramatically from 350 in 2002 to 3934 in 2011.  The total amount of investments (OFDI flow) 
also increased dramatically, from USD983 million to USD68,582 million;   
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which it then gradually decreased to USD17.43 million per investment in 2011.  However, the 
number of individual enterprises increased sharply, possibly as a result of opportunities 
offered by the global financial crisis, combined with the strong and continuing support from 
the Chinese governments at all levels (Larum & Qian, 2012:3). 
 
2.2.3.1 Geographical distribution of China’s OFDI 
The aim of this section is to describe and explain the major trends in the geographical distribution of 
China‟s OFDI from 2002 onwards.  The significance of the Australian market during this period is 
also reviewed.   
Table 2-5 shows the top 10 largest host countries for Chinese OFDI from 2003 to 2010.  Across the 
eight years, Hong Kong ranked the most popular destination for six years, with its relative 
significance as represented by percentage of total OFDI flow ranging from 40 per cent in 2003 to a 
peak of 69 per cent in 2008.  However, recent research shows that these figures do not accurately 
reflect the investment situation in Hong Kong.  Many Chinese firms, for example, remit funds to 
Hong Kong and then have their Hong Kong affiliates reinvest the funds back into China in order to 
take advantage of, for example, lower corporate tax rates (Larum & Qian, 2012).  This is the so-called 
round-tripping investment, described as “the channelling by direct investors of local funds to special 
purpose entities abroad and the subsequent return of the fund to the local economy in the form of 
direct investment” (Patterson, Montanjees, Motala & Cardillo, 2004: 70).  UNCTAD has suggested 
that round-tripped investments via Hong Kong accounted for 25 to 50 per cent of total Hong Kong-
related OFDI (UNCTAD 2006: 45, Xiao, 2004). 
The Cayman Islands, British Virgin Islands and Luxembourg, three world-renowned tax havens 
remained at or near the top of the list for most years.  Their combined percentage of China‟s total 
OFDI flow fluctuated from as high as 52 per cent in 2005 to as low as 6 per cent in 2008.  Though the 
significance of tax havens in terms of Chinese OFDI activities is beyond the scope of this thesis, 
possible explanations for the fluctuation are: one, the global economic downturn in 2008 slows down 
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the overall internationalisation activities of Chinese MNEs, especially those with illicit purposes 
(Yang, 2012: 13); two, the government has long realised the significance of loss of capital, and has 
since 2004 put in place more stringent policies monitoring capital flows (Chen & Yin, 2004).   
Australia is the only other country to have remained on the list for the past eight years.  It ranked as 
the
 
tenth largest in 2003, and reached third place in 2009, with a peak of 4.3 per cent of Chinese OFDI.  
However, it should be noted that official (both Australian and Chinese) data is affected by the 
widespread practice of Chinese investors “sending their funds to Australia via third countries”, so the 
actual figures are very likely to be higher than that published (Larum & Qian, 2012: 5).  Although 
Australia‟s rank does fluctuate slightly over time according to Table 2-5, it is one of the largest and 
perhaps most popular host country for Chinese OFDI other than the tax havens.   
 
2.2.3.2 China’s OFDI by host country industry 
This section describes and assesses the different host country industrial sectors that receive Chinese 
OFDI.  Since China only started to publish relevant data in 2004, it does not cover the first two years 
of this final period of OFDI growth.   
In general, the investment focuses of Chinese OFDI are diverse.  According to SAFE, Mining, 
Manufacturers, Transport, Banking, and Business Services have attracted the most Chinese OFDI in 
recent years, as indicated in Table 2-6.  However, OFDI flows in some industries such as mining are 
very volatile, largely because mining related investments usually involve major expenditures in the 
development phase.  
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Table 2-5: Top 10 largest host countries (regions) of Chinese OFDI flow from 2003 to 2010 
Rank 2003 % 2004 % 2005 % 2006 % 2007 % 2008 % 2009 % 2010 % 
1 Hong Kong 40.3 Hong Kong 47.8 Cayman Is. 42.1 Cayman Is. 44.4 Hong Kong 51.8 Hong Kong 69.1 Hong Kong 63.0 Hong Kong 56.0 
2 Cayman Is. 28.3 Cayman Is. 23.4 Hong Kong 27.9 Hong Kong 39.3 Cayman Is. 9.8 South Africa 8.6 Cayman Is. 9.5 Br. Virgin Is. 8.9 
3 Br. Virgin Is. 7.3 Br. Virgin Is. 7.0 Br. Virgin Is. 10.0 Br. Virgin Is. 3.1 Br. Virgin Is. 7.1 Br. Virgin Is. 3.8 Australia 4.3 Cayman Is. 5.1 
4 Korea Rep 5.4 Sudan 2.7 Korea Rep 4.8 Russia 2.6 Canada 3.9 Australia 3.4 Luxemburg 4.0 Luxemburg 4.7 
5 Denmark 2.6 Australia 2.3 US 1.9 US 1.1 Pakistan 3.4 Cayman Is. 2.7 Br. Virgin Is. 2.9 Australia 2.3 
6 US 2.3 US 2.2 Russia 1.6 Singapore 0.7 UK 2.1 Singapore 2.8 Singapore 2.5 Sweden 2 
7 Thailand 2 Russia 1.4 Australia 1.6 UAE 0.6 Australia 2.0 Macau 1.2 US 1.6 US 2 
8 Macau 1.1 Indonesia 1.1 Germany 1.0 Algeria 0.6 Russia 1.8 Kazakhstan 0.9 Canada 1.1 Canada 1.7 
9 Russia 1.1 Singapore 0.9 Sudan 0.8 Australia 0.5 South Africa 1.7 US 0.8 Macau 0.8 Singapore 1.6 
10 Australia 1.1 Nigeria 0.8 Kazakhstan 0.8 Mongolia 0.5 Singapore 1.5 Russia 0.7 Myanmar 0.7 Myanmar 1.3 
    91.5   89.6   92.5   93.4   85.1   94.0   90.4   85.6 
 (Source: MOFCOM, 2003-2010) 
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Table 2-6: China‟s OFDI flow by sector from 2004 to 2010 (millions of US$) 
Industry 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
Total OFDI 5498 % 12261 % 21164 % 26506 % 55907 % 56529 % 68811 % 
Mining 1800 33 1675 14 8540 40 4063 16 5824 10 13343 24 5715 8 
Manufacture 756 14 2280 19 907 4 2127 8 1766 3 2241 4 4664 7 
Transport & Post 829 15 577 5 1376 7 4065 15 2656 5 2068 4 5655 8 
Banking -- -- -- -- 3530 17 1667 6 14048 25 8733 15 8627 13 
Business Services 749 14 4942 40 4522 21 5607 21 21717 39 20474 36 30280 44 
Retailing 800 15 2260 18 1114 5 6604 25 6514 12 6136 11 6729 10 
Utility 78 1 8 0 119 1 151 1 1313 2 468 1 1006 1 
Real Estate 9 0 116 1 384 2 909 3 339 1 938 2 1613 2 
    92   97   97   95   97   97   93 
(Source: MOFCOM, various years) 
According to the table, China‟s OFDI has concentrated on a few industries including Mining, 
Manufacturing, Transport, Retailing and Business Services in recent years.  However, their 
dominant position in total overseas investments seems to be decreasing across time.  Since 
most of the firms engaged in mining, transport, and utility services are state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), their decrease in shares signals, to some extent, that more non-
government based investments have been initiated by corporations and private firms recently.  
This may be a combined result of maturing domestic markets and, of course, the continuing 
incentives offered for OFDI by the Go Global strategy.  
 
2.2.3.4 China’s OFDI by firm ownership type 
This section examines the composition of China‟s OFDI by firms‟ ownership type.  As noted 
above, in the early stage of China‟s internationalisation process SOEs were the dominant type 
engaged in OFDI (Zhang & Ebbers, 2010).  This situation started to change during the latest 
period of the country‟s OFDI development, as indicated in Table 2-7.   
The classification of firm ownership types in Chinese official documents is slightly different 
from that of western countries such as Australia and is outlined in Appendix 2.  For example, 
as Appendix 2 indicates, Chinese companies with limited liability and companies limited by 
shares are differentiated by the number of shareholders (companies with 50 shareholders or 
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less are classified as limited liability companies, and companies with more than 50 
shareholders are limited by shares).  In contrast, in Australia there are no shareholder 
restrictions imposed upon companies limited by shares or guarantees or even with unlimited 
liabilities, with only the 50 non-member employee criterion differentiating between 
proprietary and public companies (Corporations Act, 2001).   
Table 2-7: Firm ownership type distribution by number of corporations from 2004 to 2010  
Registration Type 
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
% % % % % % % 
 
Company with limited liability   30 32 33 43 50 58 57 
 
State owned enterprises   35 29 26 20 16 13 10 
 
Private enterprises   12 13 12 11 9 8 8 
 
Company limited by shares   10 12 11 10 9 7 7 
 
Cooperative equity enterprises   3 4 9 8 7 5 5 
 
Foreign-funded enterprises   5 5 4 4 4 3 3 
 
Hong Kong, Macau, Taiwan funded enterprises   2 2 2 2 2 2 2 
 
Collective enterprises   1 1 1 1 2 1 1 
  Others   2 2 2 1 2 3 7 
(Source: MOFCOM, various years) 
Figure 2-5: Relative weights of different ownership types of companies engaging in OFDI 
from 2002 to 2011 
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As indicated in Table 2-7, Chinese OFDI has involved every business type.  The dominant 
type of ownership from 2005 to 2010 was the company with limited liability, which 
accounted for nearly 60 per cent of the total number of corporations in 2010, up from 30 per 
cent in 2004.  In contrast, SOEs, which was the most common type in 2004, at 35 per cent, 
had fallen to 10 per cent in 2010.  The third most common type in 2010 was private 
enterprises, with 8 per cent of the total, though this had declined slowly from 12 per cent in 
2004.  Figure 2-5 presents graphically the changing weights of the three most important 
company types during the period. 
Based on Table 2-7, it is speculated that the investment activities of limited liability 
companies will continue to grow and that for SOEs will continue to weaken.  Regarding 
private enterprises, Keller and Zhou (2003) and Taylor (2002) suggested that after China‟s 
accession into the WTO, growing domestic competition would force many Chinese privately-
owned enterprises to search for new markets abroad, as they do not possess the level of 
monopolistic power or political advantages (such as easy access to financial assistance) as do 
their state-owned counterparts.  Despite that, because of the large monetary inputs which are 
usually involved in SOE-initiated projects, SOEs still plays a significant role in Chinese 
OFDI (MOFCOM, 2008). 
 
2.2.3.5 China’s Overseas Entry Mode Choices and Approaches 
The purpose of this section is to view the entry mode choices made by Chinese firms.  The 
concept of entry mode choice refers to the decision as to the type of firm ownership selected 
when entering a foreign market (Pan & Tse, 2000).  The most commonly used classification 
in the FDI literature is two-fold: JV and WOS. Somewhat confusingly, the term WOS is also 
applied to firms which are not wholly owned, but effectively controlled by the parent body, as 
in the OECD‟s definition below. This two-fold classification is also used, for example, by 
both the Chinese authorities and UNCTAD (Liu, Liu & Wei, 2004).  
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As defined by OECD (2008), a joint venture: 
“… is a contractual agreement between two or more parties for the purpose of 
executing a business undertaking in which the parties agree to share in the profits 
and losses of the enterprise as well as the capital formation and contribution of 
operating inputs or costs.” 
A direct investment enterprise, or wholly owned subsidiary involves the following two 
criteria being: 
“(i) in which an investor owns more than 50% of its voting power i.e., it is controlled 
by the investor; 
(ii) Where an investor and its subsidiaries combined own more than 50% of the 
voting power of another enterprise, this enterprise is also regarded as a subsidiary of 
the investor for FDI purposes.” 
When China permitted domestic companies to invest overseas from the early 1980s, JVs were 
the initial, dominant entry mode choice (Nicolas, 2010).  It was not until recently that the use 
of and number of Chinese WOSs set up overseas has increased significantly, a trend similar to 
that experienced by other developing countries and regions such as Taiwan (Tsai & Cheng, 
2002).  As Table 2-8 indicates the distribution of JVs and WOS in Chinese OFDI from 2004 
to 2010 has not varied significantly, with the number of WOS substantially exceeding those 
of JVs.   
Table 2-8: Percentage distribution of JV and WOS in Chinese OFDI from 2004 to 2010 
Firm Type 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 
JV 3.4 3.9 5.0 5.0 4.0 4.9 4.7 
WOS 96.6 96.1 95.0 95.0 96.0 95.1 95.3 
(Source: MOFCOM, various years) 
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2.3 The Australian Market 
Australia was among the earliest recipients of Chinese OFDI after the introduction of the 
Open Door policy (MOFCOM, 1982), and it has remained as China‟s top OFDI destination 
since the start of the Go Global era (Larum & Qian, 2012: 4).  Table 2-5, above, clearly 
demonstrates Australia‟s relative importance among major destinations for Chinese OFDI. 
The industrial sector distribution of Chinese MNEs in Australia differs from that of their 
global distribution.  Using the MOFCOM database available online, the author has identified 
445 Chinese companies which have had overseas direct investments in Australia from 
January 1980 till July 2011 (MOFCOM, 2013a).  It includes those that later withdrew from 
the market.  Based on that list, Table 2-9 indicates the distribution of the firms by industrial 
sector.  Twenty-one per cent of Chinese OFDI was in the general import and export sector 
and 16 per cent was in the mining and resources extracting sector.  The third largest 
percentage was in the finance category, accounted for 13 per cent of total Chinese OFDI into 
Australia.  The manufacturing and the service sectors each accounted for 10 per cent, real 
estate for 8 per cent, wholesaling and retailing for 7 per cent and agricultural for 6 per cent.  
The “others” at the bottom includes, but is not limited to, pilot training, sports training and 
publishing.  Table 2-9 also breaks down the number of firms in each sector according to their 
year of entry approval, which corresponds to the classification of Chinese OFDI development 
stages as discussed earlier in this chapter.  Figure 2-6 is thus generated to represent the 
sectoral distribution of Chinese MNEs in Australia in a year-of-approval manner. 
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Table 2-9: The sector distribution of Chinese MNEs in Australia by 2011 
Industries No. firms % 
Year of approval 
1980-1991 1992-2001 2001-2011 
Import/ Export 93 21% 2 7 84 
Mining and Resources 72 16% 1 3 68 
Finance 56 13% 5 12 39 
Manufactory 46 10% 0 3 43 
Service 46 10% 1 5 40 
Real Estate 35 8% 0 2 33 
Wholesaling and Retailing 30 7% 0 3 27 
Agricultural 28 6% 0 2 26 
Pharmaceutical 9 2% 0 0 9 
Transport, Storage and Post 7 2% 0 2 5 
Utility 5 1% 0 1 4 
Education 4 1% 0 0 4 
Construction 4 1% 1 1 2 
Others 10 2% 0 2 8 
Total  445 100 10 43 392 
(Source: compiled from information available on MOFCOM.com; MOFCOM, 2013a) 
Figure 2-6: The sector distribution of Chinese MNEs in Australia across time 
 
 
Similar to the overall development of Chinese OFDI, the country‟s OFDI in Australia has 
witnessed a rapid rise in the latest stage from 2002 onwards, with a total of 392 firms (or over 
88 per cent of total approvals) being granted permission by MOFCOM to carry out their 
investments.  The corresponding number for the period 1980 to 1991 and 1992 to 2001 was a 
mere 10 and 43 respectively. 
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Trading companies were pioneers of Chinese OFDI in Australia, which accounted for over 60 
per cent of companies set up from 1980 to 1991.  It is still the area in which most Chinese 
MNEs are engaged in during the latest period.  In contrast, the number of firms in the mining 
and resource industry remained low until the most recent period, 2002 to 2011, when it started 
to grow rapidly.   Sixty-eight resource-oriented enterprises have been established in Australia 
since 2002, or 94 per cent of the total approved for that sector.  The booming number of 
mining and resource firms recently is related, in large part, to the high priority given to the 
sector by the Chinese government, the increasing Chinese domestic demand, limited domestic 
supplies and the rocketing prices of those raw materials in the global market during the period.  
For instance, the per ton price of iron ore in August 2006 was USD33.45; five years later, in 
August 2011, the price had soared to USD177.45 per ton, representing a 530 per cent increase; 
its price as at February 2013 was USD154.64 (International Monetary Fund, 2013).  As a 
result, more Chinese MNEs, nearly all of them SOEs, have invested in resource abundant 
countries like Australia, Canada and Brazil so as to secure the long-term supply of those 
resources and to influence price movements in their favour.  
From the Australian market perspective, Table 2-10 shows the top seven countries ranked by 
number of investments approved by the Australian Foreign Investment Review Board (FIRB) 
from 2003 to 2011.  China first appeared on the list in the year 2004-2005 with 206 
investments; the figure more than doubled in the following year (437), then fell to 258 in the 
year 2006-2007.  Significant increases in approved investments occurred in 2007-2008, when 
the number rose sharply to 1761.  As a result of the global financial crisis in 2009, the number 
of investments approved by FIRB shrank to a fraction of that of the previous year; however, 
as both Australia and China were two of the countries least impacted by the crisis, the growth 
in the number of approved Chinese investments soon recovered, reached a historic height of 
5033 in 2010-2011. 
In terms of total Australian FDI inflow, the US was still the largest source of proposed foreign 
investments in 2010-2011, as it has been for the past eight years (FIRB annual reports, 2003-
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2011).  China contributed a total of AU$14,976 million FDI inflow, the third highest among 
all countries in 2010-2011, and roughly half of the US‟s amount of AU$27,590 million (FIRB, 
2011). 
With the rapid growth of Chinese investments in recent years, increasing media attention, 
both positive and negative, has been cast upon them.  The negative media attention is perhaps 
strongly associated with the fact that most of the largest Chinese investing firms are state 
owned, especially in the mining and resource industry.  The natural resources of a country, 
such as mining deposits and utility infrastructure, are usually deemed of national importance 
to sustainable development.   
The negative attention is a result of at least three factors. First of all, as indicated in the 
OECD‟s “State owned enterprises in China: Reviewing the Evidence”, one of the goals of 
“going global” – to exploit natural resources abroad – “is done solely by large scale SOEs” 
(OECD 2009: 8).  In addition, Morck, Yeung and Zhao (2008) have also reported that the 
biggest companies in China by their OFDI are those highly profitable SOEs with an officially 
sanctioned monopoly in some major industries.  It is thus understandable that both 
governments and investors are concerned at the control of  important resources being placed 
in the hands of foreign governments, especially when those enterprises are from a country 
whose newly reformed “Socialist Market Economy” is often considered to be immature, 
inefficient, bureaucratic, and perhaps being lax in promoting fair trading (Lee, 2009; Zeng & 
William, 2003).   
Second, again as noted in the OECD paper (2009), the reform of Chinese SOEs since the mid-
1990s has filtered out several uncompetitive and redundant smaller SOEs through aggressive 
buy-outs or allowing bankruptcy, and, as a result, the remaining larger SOEs are even more 
dominant and better resourced, further exacerbating concerns.  In 2007, for example, of the 
ten largest companies by capitalisation on the Shanghai Stock Exchange, eight were SOEs, 
accounting for almost 50% of market capitalisation on the Exchange.  
42 
 
 Table 2-10: FIRB approvals by country of investing company from 2003 to 2011  
(Source: FIRB annual reports, 2003 to 2011)  
 
 
 
 
 
Rank 
2003-2004 2004-2005 2005-2006 2006-2007 2007-2008 2008-2009 2009-2010 2010-2011 
Country No. aprvl Country No. aprvl Country No. aprvl Country No. aprvl Country No. aprvl Country No. aprvl Country No. aprvl Country No. aprvl 
1 UK 1980 UK 2027 UK 2204 US 4790 UK 2547 US 95 China 1766 China 5033 
2 US 361 US 302 China 437 Singapore 1927 China 1761 UK 72 Malaysia 524 UK 1004 
3 Singapore 252 China 206 US 307 Germany 945 South Africa 459 China 57 UK 410 Malaysia 896 
4 Malaysia 210 Singapore 182 South Africa 278 Netherlands 944 Malaysia 356 Germany 49 Singapore 320 Singapore 536 
5 Japan 149 Malaysia 128 Singapore 213 UK 848 US 316 Japan 46 South Africa 149 India 320 
6 Germany 111 Germany 117 Canada 114 Switzerland 467 India 287 France 30 US 142 US 189 
7 Canada 82 Japan 93 Germany 109 China 258 Singapore 246 Switzerland 27 Germany 74 Germany 126 
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Third, these SOEs are provided with government subsidies and tax incentives, giving them a distinct 
advantage in competing overseas with privately owned firms that for the most part do not have the 
benefit of such subsidies and incentives (Long, 2009).   
The extent of concerns can be seen in the cases of Chinalco‟s attempted purchase of a controlling 
share in Rio Tinto and Shenhua Watermark Coal‟s purchase of coal-rich agricultural land, both in 
Australia.  In Chinalco‟s case, in February 2009 it attempted to purchase 18% of Rio‟s equity for a 
sum estimated at USD$19.5 billion, the largest ever purchase by a Chinese company (having already 
purchased 9.3%, Anand, 2009).  It was an offer that would have given Chinalco a greater security of 
iron ore supply and, possibly, the opportunity to influence its prices in a favourable direction. The 
offer was rejected by Rio, in favour of a joint enterprise with one of its major rivals, BHP Billiton, so 
that the FIRB did not have to offer a judgement as to the merits of the proposed investment.  While no 
formal announcement was made by FIRB, there is little doubt that the Government welcomed Rio‟s 
decision. Australia‟s concerns were made evident, for example, by Mr Miles, a former member of 
FIRB, who stated that “Virtually every company that does invest in Australia out of China really is 
controlled by the Communist Party…that is always a concern” (Madden & Ryan, 2011).  
More recently, Chinese mining giant Shenhua Watermark Coal bought large areas of coal-rich 
farmland in the Liverpool Plains area in northern New South Wales, stirring up another round of 
debates.  Greens leader Bob Brown, for example, accused the Australian government of putting coal 
sales ahead of food security by allowing foreign miners to buy agricultural land: “It would be better to 
knock down the Sydney Opera House to build a mine than to give up prime agricultural land” 
(Franklin & Kelly, 2011).  Liberal Senator Hefferman, who attacked FIRB‟s approval of the project, 
said that the national interest test was not being properly applied when it came to the country‟s most 
precious resources (Madden & Ryan, 2011). As one of the contacts in the confidential discussion held 
by Larum indicated (2011: 3), it was understandable that the existence of FIRB is necessary to protect 
Australia‟s national interest; it is just that the Australia government should have “the right mix 
between process transparency and flexibility” (Larum, 2011: 22). 
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2.4 Conclusion 
This chapter has provided a general overview of Chinese OFDI.  It identified three major stages in its 
development, with discussion focused on the most recent period, from 2002 to 2011.  It focused on 
the geographical distribution of its OFDI, the major host countries and the major ownership types 
selected.  In particular, the chapter provided a summary of Chinese investment trends in Australia, 
noting that it has been a major host country for Chinese investment for over two decades, focusing on 
the industries concerned. While the rapid growth of OFDI in the last decade is the most outstanding 
feature, the Chinese government has played a major role in promoting and sustaining OFDI, both in 
terms of changes to policy and, indirectly, in supporting large scale OFDI by SOEs.  It is the 
combination of the rapidly increased scale of Chinese investments, plus the extent of SOE 
investments, that have stimulated increasing concerns in Australia, a concern that will be identified in 
several of the eight cases studied in later chapters. 
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Chapter 3: Literature Review 
The aim of this chapter is to describe and assess what the existing literature can contribute to 
understanding the entry mode choices of Chinese firms in entering Australian markets and develop a 
number of research propositions based on that assessment.   
The basic concepts used in the study are defined in Section 3.1.  Section 3.2 provides an assessment of 
the relevant theoretical literature.  Three major perspectives are assessed and used in this thesis, 
Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm regarding MNEs‟ internationalisation activities, the resource-based view 
in the formation of organisational competitive advantage, and the institutional perspective.  Research 
questions and propositions are developed in Section 3.3.  The chapter concludes in Section 3.4. 
 
3.1 Definition of Key Concepts 
While a number of concepts are used in this study, those most frequently used are institution, strategy 
and resources. As is often the case, a wide number of meanings have been attributed to the three 
concepts and this section briefly indicates the way in which they were interpreted in thesis. 
 
3.1.1 Institution  
Most of theoretical approaches drawn upon for this thesis refer to institution as a social custom, 
tradition, social norm or general behavioural tendencies or traits.  North (1990: 3), for example 
suggests that institutions are “the rules of the game in a society or, more formally, are the humanly 
devised constraints that shape human interaction”.  In a similar fashion, Scott (1995: 33) describes 
institutions as “cognitive, normative, and regulative structures and activities that provide stability and 
meaning to social behaviour”.  The essence of these two definitions is the same, in that institution is 
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abstract, it can be implied or explicitly regulated, and it shapes people‟s behaviour in the society.  It is 
this definition that will be used in this study. 
 
3.1.2 Strategy  
The term strategy is used extensively in the business literature but it is rarely defined with any degree 
of precision (see for example, Kendall, 1992; Ghemawat, 2003; and Peng, Wang & Jiang, 2008).  It is 
therefore necessary to articulate the exact meaning of this word in the context of this study in order to 
avoid any confusion. 
Henry Mintzberg (1987: 14) purports that strategy could be about anything, “products and processes, 
customers and citizens, social responsibilities and self interest” as long as they can help the firm 
realise some competitive advantages and achieve its operational goals.  Porter (1990) argued that 
technology, skills, labour, equipment, and physical objects can all be of strategic value so long as they 
demonstrate firm-specific competitive advantages.  In a more recent attempt, Hill (2000: 506) defines 
a firm‟s strategy as “the actions managers take to attain the goals of the firm”.  Hill‟s definition (2000) 
perhaps is more relevant to this study, which recognises the fact that strategy is critical in helping the 
firm to realise its long-term goals, be that as market conquering or obtaining control over some 
production assets.  Therefore, in the context of this thesis, Hill‟s definition for “strategy” is adopted. 
 
3.1.3 Resources 
There are numerous possible ways to interpret resources in different situations (Thompson & 
Strickland, 1987).  This thesis considers resources only in the context of business operations.  
According to Daft (1983: 540), firm resources include all assets, capabilities, organisational processes, 
firm attributes, information and knowledge,  controlled by a firm that enable the firm to create value 
and continue its ongoing production. 
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Although the concept of firm resources includes a wide range of items, they can be conveniently 
classified into three types: physical capital resources (Williamson, 1975: 31), human capital resources 
(Becker, 1964: 10), and organisational capital resources (Tomer, 1987: 24).  Physical capital resources 
refer to all those objects that physically exist, including  a firm‟s plant and equipment, office buildings, 
materials, goods produced, and even such trivial items as a pen and a rubber (Williamson, 1975: 31).  
Human capital resources, usually abbreviated as human resources,  includes all of  the people working 
in the firm, their experience, intelligence and capability, as well as the invisible inter-personal 
networks (social capital) established between the members of the firm (Becker, 1964: 10).  
Organisational capital resources refer to the systems and structures within a firm.  They comprise, for 
example, a firm‟s reporting structure, its internal control structure, planning and coordinating systems 
and its system of authority (Tomer, 1987: 24). 
Barney (1986) points out that not all types of firm resources necessarily contribute to a firm‟s 
operational efficiency and effectiveness.  In the language of the author, some resources may even 
“prevent a firm from conceiving of and implementing valuable strategies” (Barney, 1991: 102).  For 
example, a complicated and overly hierarchical management structure may result in unnecessary 
discussions and prolonged decision making, thereby promoting bureaucracy rather than efficiency.  
For the purpose of this thesis, firm resources refer to those that enable a firm to conceive of and 
implement strategies for better operations.   
 
3.2 Theories in FDI 
The aim of this section is to examine dominant theories related to firms‟ internationalisation and 
market entry modes.  Four bodies of theory are focused upon: transaction cost theory, Dunning‟s 
eclectic paradigm, the institutional perspective, and the resource-based perspective.  While all four 
have been subject to criticisms, they are generally regarded as having considerable explanatory power 
towards firms‟ internationalisation decisions (Berning & Holtbrugge, 2012: 175), particularly entry 
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mode decisions (Davis, Desai & Francis, 2000: 240).  Subsection 3.2.1 provides a general overview of 
theories.  It is followed by subsection 3.2.2, which examines the application of theories in recent 
international business and particularly entry mode studies. 
 
3.2.1 An Overview 
Sections 3.2.1.1 to 3.2.1.4 provide a brief summary of the four major theories identified in the field of 
international business. They are followed by a more detailed description of studies that have drawn 
upon and been guided by each of theories. 
 
3.2.1.1 Transaction Cost Theory 
Transaction cost theory was first developed by Coase (1937), who argued that firms are formed when 
the transaction cost of coordinating production through market exchanges, given imperfect markets, is 
greater than within the firm.  Later researchers such as Williamson (1975), Buckley and Casson 
(1976), and Hennart (1982) started to use this theory to explain firms‟ FDI activities.  Specifically, 
they argued that firms internationalise through FDI because it was more cost efficient to operate and 
produce overseas than doing so through market exchange (such as exports).  In this sense, transaction 
cost theory indicates the importance of cost minimisation and, as a result, the search for overseas 
markets for production when the transaction cost associated with market exchange is high.   
Advanced technology, managerial skills, and organisational capabilities are important for ongoing 
successful business production, but they are often intangible and hard to be traded through arm-length 
markets (Yang, 2003).  Therefore, because of their intangible property, they may result in high 
transaction costs when they are traded through market exchange, if it is possible or practicable to do 
so.  However, through FDI, the technology, managerial skills, and organisational capabilities can all 
be relatively easily transferred within the same companies to its own overseas affiliates, and there will 
be noticeably less or no bargaining or negotiation associated, which may significantly lower the 
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possible transaction costs.  Its firm-specific characteristic suggests that transaction cost theory is 
related to what was later described by Dunning as internalisation, or „an ownership perspective‟ 
(1980), which examines firms‟ internationalisation decisions through analysing the transaction costs 
involved in their production; and if those transaction costs could be lowered through 
internationalisation, then it provides an explanation for firms‟ FDI activities. 
In the context of the entry mode literature, transaction cost theory served as the underlying framework 
for many studies, particularly regarding earlier work as is discussed in the following subsection 3.2.2 
„The research on internationalisation and entry mode selection‟ (for example, see Anderson & 
Gatignon, 1986; Gomes-Casseres, 1989; and Hennart, 1988).  Transaction cost theory has been one of 
the fundamental frameworks used in the international business literature (Buckley, et al., 2007: 500).  
Most of the criticisms, when applied in the market entry literature, relate to the fact that it overlooks 
the effect of the external environment that firms operate in on shaping their FDI decisions, both in the 
home and host countries (see, for example, Meyer, 2001; Brouthers, 2002; and Yiu & Makino, 2002).  
Also, transaction cost theory has received extensive discussion in the context of developed MNEs 
making investments in developed country markets, which may provide only limited applicability 
when examining FDI initiated by developing country MNEs, given their distinct institutions.  These 
points will, again, receive further discussion in subsection 3.2.2 „The research on internationalisation 
and entry mode selection‟.  
 
3.2.1.2 Eclectic Paradigm 
Based in part on then existing literature, including that of transaction costs, Dunning (1980) proposed 
an eclectic paradigm, which aimed to provide a systematic framework for understanding firms‟ 
internationalisation activities.  The paradigm has become the dominant approach in later FDI studies 
(Amighini, Sanfilippo & Rabellotti, 2009).  In summary, it helps explain who, where and how of 
international operation are determined by three broad sets of factors (Dunning, 1980 & 1988).  They 
are:  
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 Ownership advantage, which is the firm‟s specific resources or assets that can be exploited 
externally, providing it with a competitive advantage, such as capital, technology, market 
access, management and organisational skills, economies of scale, trademarks, products.  It is 
related to who will engage in internationalisation activities; 
 Location advantage, which refers to the characteristics of a host country that attract foreign 
investment by enabling firms to minimise costs, such as natural resource endowment, labour 
costs, material costs, positive government policy, markets; and 
 Internalisation advantage, which is the ability of a firm to reduce transaction costs by 
undertaking one or more operations internally, within the firm, rather than contracting them 
out to other firms.  The ability of a firm to internalise suggests what entry mode they can 
choose in the foreign market: from pure exporting and contracting where the internalisation 
level is low, to FDI where the firm can fully internalise its production. 
Dunning also studied in depth the motivations driving internationalisation and suggested that four 
categories of incentives drove firms to invest abroad (1993 & 2009): 
 Foreign market-seeking; 
 Efficiency (cost reduction) seeking;  
 Resource-seeking; and 
 Strategic asset-seeking (sometimes the latter two are categorised into one subset: Buckley et 
al., 2007: 501) 
Foreign market-seeking FDI is undertaken when the domestic market is close to saturation, with little 
opportunity to expand a firm‟s market share, or there are lucrative market demands available in 
foreign markets.  Efficiency-seeking FDI will take place when an overseas market displays the 
potential for achieving lower costs, especially as regards lower labour costs (Dunning, 2009).  It 
explains why so many US and other developed country-based MNEs established production facilities 
in less developed regions such as China, Vietnam, and Malaysia where the benefits brought by lower 
labour costs outweigh the expenses of setting up new factories abroad.  Resource-seeking FDI focuses 
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on acquiring tangible natural resources such as oil and coal and intangible assets such as technology 
and managerial skills, in foreign markets.  In China‟s case, for example, the largest OFDI activities in 
terms of capital involved in recent years have been largely resource-seeking in nature, especially 
regarding raw materials and energy sources (see MOFCOM, various years) as China‟s domestic 
production of those materials fell far short of domestic demand.  In 2009, for example, Chinese 
market demand for petroleum was 398 million tons, but domestic production could satisfy only 48 per 
cent of the total (Sinopec Group, 2010).  Last but not least, strategic asset-seeking FDI may be 
conducted in pursue of intangible assets such as R&D capacity, design facilities and brand names that 
are embedded in successful firms (Dunning, 1993, 2000 & 2001).  This strategic asset-seeking 
incentive is classified as one aspect of resource-seeking FDI by a number of other authors (for 
example, Buckley et al., 2007: 501). 
Transaction cost theory and the eclectic paradigm are, arguably, the most commonly accepted and 
utilised bodies of theory in the international business literature (Buckley et al., 2007: 500).  The major 
criticism of the eclectic paradigm, which is also recognised by Dunning himself (see Dunning, 2001; 
and Dunning & Lundan, 2008), is that it ignores the institutional factors that may have influenced 
firms‟ internationalisation decisions, as does transaction cost theory (see, for example, Meyer, 2001; 
Brouthers, 2002; and Yiu and Makino, 2002).  Also, the development of this framework was based 
exclusively on the experience of developed country MNEs, mostly on their investments into other 
developed or developing regions, which may not be valid in the context of developing country MNEs 
making FDI in developed countries.  Details regarding the application and limitation of this 
framework will be given in the following subsection 3.2.2 „The research on internationalisation and 
entry mode selection‟. 
 
3.2.1.3 Institutional Perspective 
As noted above, North defines institution as “the humanly devised constraints that structure human 
interaction” (1990: 3).  Similarly, Scott (1995: 33) defines institutions as “regulative, normative, and 
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cognitive structures and activities that provide stability and meaning to social behaviour”.  Hence, 
institutions represent the rules of the game established by societies through long social practice, and 
they have constraining power towards every entity operating in such societies.  As found by North 
(1990) and later reviewed by Cui, Wang and Jiang (2008), institutions can be broadly classified as 
formal or informal and consequently, institutional constraints can be similarly classified as formal and 
informal constraints.  In the context of international investment, organisations are subject not only to 
domestic institutional constraints, but additional, and sometimes different institutional constraints that 
are characteristic of the foreign markets in which they invest.  More detailed discussion of 
institutional constraints will be provided in subsection 3.2.2 „The research on internationalisation and 
entry mode selection‟, below.  However, in general, increasing number of researchers have found the 
institutional perspective is very relevant in explaining firms‟ internationalisation and entry mode 
choices, in particular those regarding emerging markets (see, for example, Davis et al., 2000; Lu, Liu 
& Wang, 2010; and Cui & Jiang, 2012, with the latter two concerning Chinese MNEs).  One major 
drawback of this perspective when applied in the international business literature is that it focuses 
exclusively on the effect of the institutions upon MNEs‟ operations, which ignores the effect of 
ownership advantages MNEs possess towards their internationalisation activities.  The perspective 
will receive more discussion in the following subsection 3.2.2 „The research on internationalisation 
and entry mode selection‟. 
 
3.2.1.4 Resource-based Perspective 
In the context of FDI studies, the resource-based perspective suggests that firms need to possess 
significant ownership advantages in order to expand overseas (Child & Rodrigues, 2005: 384).  The 
resource-based perspective has become an influential theoretical perspective in international business 
research recently, as can be seen in the increasing number of studies adopting the perspective (see, for 
example, Berning & Holtbrugge, 2012: 176; Hitt, Bierman, Uhlenbruck and Shimizu, 2006; Westhead, 
Wright & Ucbasaran, 2001; Peng, 2001, Peng et al., 2008; and Yamakawa, Peng & Deeds, 2008).  
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The growing popularity of the perspective in the context of international business can be explained by 
the growing consensus among researchers that firms‟ internationalisation activity is usefully 
conceived of as a process deploying organisational resources in the foreign market.  How to maximise 
firms‟ control and operational efficiency over slack resources, and what impact those resources would 
have upon the firms‟ internationalisation process are the key questions underlying these types of 
studies (see, for example, Lu, et al., 2010).   In addition, the resources refer not only to tangible assets, 
but also intangible assets such as technology, human resources, managerial skills and R&D capability.  
These form the core competency of a firm and are difficult to be traded between countries.  Hence, 
from a resource-based perspective, firms‟ entry mode choices may be influenced by the resources they 
have on hand.  Not surprisingly, there are a growing number of scholars resorting to this perspective 
to explain their findings regarding firms‟ entry mode choices, as will be reviewed later in subsection 
3.2.2 „The research on internationalisation and entry mode selection‟. 
 
3.2.2 The Research on Internationalisation and Entry Mode Selection 
This subsection reviews the findings of the internationalisation and entry mode literature that has 
applied one or more of the four major theoretical approaches discussed above.  It focuses on: one, the 
literature related to developed countries; two, the literature related to emerging or developing 
countries; three, the literature related to Chinese MNEs; four the literature related to Chinese 
investment in Australia.  It concludes by noting that, as demonstrated by the review of the literature, 
that no one of the four theoretical perspectives examined provides a fully satisfactory perspective for 
the examination of the internationalisation and entry mode decisions of Chinese firms. Hence, this 
thesis will adopt a multi-framework perspective. 
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3.2.2.1The developed country literature 
The majority of earlier studies regarding firms‟ internationalisation decisions, in particular those 
related to entry mode decisions, were carried out in the context of developed nations.  It was upon the 
findings of these studies that the bulk of theoretical work was first developed.  This subsection 
reviews the literature regarding entry strategies of MNEs from developed nations. A number of 
limitations of this literature are highlighted, in particular:  one, most earlier studies demonstrate a 
developed country bias, and tended to focus exclusively on transaction costs when analysing firms‟ 
internationalisation decisions; two, the general lack of focus of these studies in regard to the impact of 
the environments in which MNEs operate, environments which can have a significant influence on 
their internationalisation choices. The review also shows that, in the new millennium, studies of 
developed countries‟ market entry strategies started to incorporate institutional factors into their 
theoretical foundations, enabling a more comprehensive understanding of the process.   
Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Gomes-Casseres (1989), Hennart (1988), Agarwal and Ramaswami 
(1992), Meyer (2001), Brouthers (2002), Yiu and Makino (2002), Gaba, Pan and Ungson (2002), and 
Florin and Ogbuehi (2004) provided useful discussion of the theoretical underpinning that has been 
adopted in market entry studies regarding developed nations.  Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Arora 
and Fosfuri (2000), Meyer (2001), Brouthers (2002), and Yiu and Makino (2002) have identified a 
range of factors associated with foreign entry mode choices; and Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) and 
Arora and Fosfuri (2000) provide support for the methodology applied in this thesis (for example, 
why it is necessary to analyse cases from different industries, and how some variables were measured).  
All of the above mentioned studies will be elaborated in the following paragraphs. 
Some early pioneers of FDI studies, including Buckley and Casson (1976), Rugman (1981), and 
Hennart (1982), argued that the international business activities of MNEs could be best explained by 
looking at the transaction costs of firms.  Not surprisingly, most, if not all, of the early applications of 
the transaction costs approach were in the context of developed regions or countries as, in this period, 
there were relatively few MNEs from emerging countries.  For example, Anderson and Gatignon 
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(1986), and Gomes-Casseres (1989) looked at entry mode choices made by the US firms investing 
abroad.  They found their choices were in large part determined by the transaction cost of transferring 
firm-specific capabilities to the new venture.  A key point of these two studies is that both recognised 
the fact that the most appropriate entry mode is a function of the trade-off between control and the 
cost of resource commitment or transaction costs involved.  However, Anderson and Gatignon (1986) 
failed to take into account managerial costs, which are costs associated with corporate management 
both in the parent company and foreign affiliates when valuing transaction cost arguments.   
Another early study applying transaction cost theory to entry mode decisions is Hennart (1988).  
Hennart‟s is a qualitative study, which sketched a transaction cost theory of the choice between 
contract production, full ownership and JVs in American MNEs.  It explained a number of 
characteristics of JVs, including a JV‟s potential ability to transfer both patented knowledge (tangible) 
and tacit knowledge (intangible and difficult to quantify) between the partners in the JV, and its 
popularity as an entry mode over that of licensing in diversifying firms (Hennart, 1988: 370).  One 
drawback of this study is that its discussion focused exclusively on the benefits of JVs with almost no 
coverage of their limitations, such as that of limited control.  In addition, another weakness of the 
study, particularly as regards firms from emerging countries, is that while recognising that factors 
such as country knowledge, technology and culture  would have an influence on the setting up of JVs 
(Hennart, 1988: 365), Hennart ignored the influence of both the host and home governments in the 
process of establishing JVs, which could be considerable, especially when the host and home 
countries vary significantly in culture and extent of industrialisation (see, for example, Osland & 
Cavusgil, 1998; Barkema, Bell & Pennings, 1996; Bruning, Turtle & Buhr, 1997; Tatoglu & Glaister, 
1998; Demirbag, Tatoglu & Glaister, 2008; and Tan & Meyer, 2011; which have all provided 
examples of the influence of governments).  
In the early 2000s, scholars started to consider the limitations of transaction cost theory in the studies 
of entry mode choices.  For example, Meyer (2001) examined the entry mode choices of firms from 
Germany and Britain when investing in the emerging economies of Eastern Europe.  The author used 
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a questionnaire survey distributed to 677 German and British companies.  He constructed a model to 
test the relationship between firms‟ entry mode choices and the institutional environment their 
subsidiaries faced in transitional economies.  It was found that underdeveloped institutions as 
reflected in the high level of corruption and weak protection of intellectual property, tended to drive 
up the transaction costs of establishing wholly-owned ventures; to ensure their business can operate 
smoothly in such unfamiliar environments, entrants preferred to have local guidance, and therefore the 
setting up of JVs in these nations (Meyer, 2001: 364).  Hence, not surprisingly, Meyer acknowledged 
the importance of taking into consideration institutional factors when analysing entry mode choices 
involving transitional economies, factors often neglected in earlier studies that had adopted a 
transaction cost perspective. 
Brouthers (2002) provided further findings regarding market entry strategies among firms from the 
European Union (EU).  Based on Brouthers and Brouthers (2000) and Delios and Beamish (1999), 
Brouthers (2002) argued that there was a need to extend the transaction cost model by 
including cultural context and institutional context variables. Through the use of questionnaire 
surveys, the author found that firms‟ perceived level of transaction costs, the extent of host country 
regulation, and host country market risk appeared to have driven their entry mode selections 
(Brouthers, 2002: 215).    
Similarly to Brouthers (2002), Yiu and Makino (2002) analysed entry mode choices of Japanese firms‟ 
overseas subsidiaries using a number of theoretical frameworks.  Recognising that the studies of 
foreign entry mode choices had been based almost exclusively on transaction cost theory which 
focused on the impacts of firm- and industry-specific factors, the authors focused on the effects of 
country-specific contextual factors within the context of an institutional perspective.  They found that 
both institutional variables (regulative pressure and the entry mode choices of leading competitors‟ in 
a host country) and transaction cost variables (R&D intensity and parent experience in the host 
country) were important determinants for foreign entry mode choices.  Their results once again, 
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suggested that explanations that only considered transaction cost variables were insufficient, and that 
institutional variables had a significant contribution in explaining entry mode choice decisions 
The above mentioned Meyer (2001), Brouthers (2002), and Yiu and Makino (2002) were some of the 
earlier studies that found it necessary to resort to more than one theoretical framework in the 
investigation of developed country market entry strategies.  This multi-framework approach in 
evaluating entry mode decisions has since been more frequently used in recent years, particularly 
regarding emerging countries, as will be discussed in subsection 3.2.2.2. 
A number of other studies concerning developed countries have investigated the relationship between 
MNEs‟ entry mode choices and their firm-level characteristics.  For example, Kogut (1988), Gomes-
Casseres (1990), Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) all found a correlation 
between size and a preference for the WOS full control mode.  In addition, researchers such as Phatak, 
et al. (1996), Chen and Mujtaba (2007), Yiu and Makino (2002), and Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004) 
concluded that firms with abundant international experience were more inclined to set up a WOS, as, 
although a WOS required a greater understanding of international operations, this was experience 
which the firms had gained.  In addition, Kogut and Singh (1988), Caves and Mehra (1986), 
Brouthers and Brouthers (2000), Klein, Frazier and Roth (1990), Sutcliffe and Zaheer (1998), 
Barkema and Vermeulen (1998), and Cheng (2006) examined the influence of cultural distance on the 
entry mode choices of firms from developed Western nations, and all found that a large cultural 
distance tended to encourage investors to select the WOS mode of entry, because it largely avoids 
daily interaction with local partners, which could bring about potential conflicts.  However, none of 
the above mentioned studies included in their scope MNEs from emerging countries, leaving the 
question open as to the extent to which their findings could be generalised to such MNEs from 
emerging and developing countries. 
In particular, Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), drawing on Dunning‟s eclectic paradigm, investigated 
the influences of the OLI factors on the choice of foreign entry mode in the US equipment leasing 
industry.  They found that firms with a larger size, possessing greater multinational experience and a 
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greater capacity for product differentiation were more likely to be associated with the WOS mode.  In 
addition, they found that countries characterised by high market potential and a high investment risk 
tended to induce MNEs to choose the JV entry mode, where entrants can be assured of a relatively 
smooth operation and fast turnaround under the guide of local partners.  Despite being limited to only 
firms from one service industry in a developed country and hence its limited generalisability, this 
study was among the first to capture the effect of OLI advantages and their interactions for entry 
mode decisions using a survey method.  According to the authors, surveys were distributed to 
presidents of 536 American leasing firms, with a response rate of 22.8 per cent.  Another novel 
feature of this study, as described by the authors, was that it used managerial perceptions for 
measuring the explanatory factors, including the difficult-to-comprehend factors of host country 
market risk and host market potential.  Specifically, firms‟ ability to develop differentiated products 
was measured by the perceived ability of the firm to create new leasing transactions; firms‟ 
multinational experience was measured by managers‟ perceived degree of internationalisation and 
perceived readiness to handle international business; host market potential and investment risk were 
measured by managerial perceptions of the host market growth and political, social and economic 
conditions in the host country.  The reliance on personal perceptions is a common practice in 
psychological and behavioural research – see, for example, Pinho (2007) who used interviews to 
triangulate surveys of SMEs‟ entry mode choices. Scott (2009), also, for example, relied on 
salespersons‟ self-perception for exploring issues related to organisational commitments, and Fan et al. 
(2012) relied on interviewees‟ perceptions to investigate Chinese MNEs‟ internationalisation 
processes.  It is an approach that is especially useful when researchers are confronted with hard to 
quantify and “difficult-to-estimate” variables (Buckley, 1988: 188).  It is an approach adopted in this 
study, where factors such as home and host government regulatory environments and levels of firms‟ 
intangible goodwill capital were examined based on managerial perceptions as revealed in detailed 
interviews (see the detailed discussion in Chapter 4, Section 4.3 „Data Collection and Analysis‟). 
Arora and Fosfuri (2000) analysed the determinants of the choice between a WOS and technology 
licensing as strategies for expansion abroad in developed countries‟ chemical industries.  They found 
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that cultural distance, previous experience in foreign countries and the number of technology 
suppliers played a critical role in foreign entry strategies.  They concluded that when there were many 
sources of technological competencies, an entrant might favour the use of licensing as entry mode vis-
à-vis wholly owning a project, which was less demanding in terms of resources and commitments 
(Arora & Fosfuri, 2000: 570).  They also argued that their one-sector-oriented study allowed them to 
control “many sources of heterogeneity in the data”, having found that studies ignoring sectoral 
characteristics may be less “robust… in the test of determinants of the entry mode choices” (Arora & 
Fosfuri, 2000: 556, 569).  They argued that by focusing on one industry, they could better control for 
differences in technology characteristics, “such as codifiability and complexity”, which was much 
more difficult in cross-industry studies (Arora & Fosfuri, 2000: 569).  They pointed out that firms 
from different industries, even in the same country, may display different preferences towards modes 
of foreign entry, because they face, for example, different levels of government scrutiny, domestic or 
overseas market competition, and transaction costs associated with production.  Their findings suggest 
that, for this thesis, there is no reason why one should expect the choice of entry mode by Chinese 
firms in the Australian market to be similar, apart from those characterised by similar technologies, 
which face similar institutional characteristics and operate in a similar manner.   
Gaba, Pan and Ungson (2002) examined US firms‟ market entry issues regarding investments into 
China with a particular focus on timing of entry.  The authors found that those who entered the 
Chinese market in the first few years after the Open Door policy were largely JVs, and they concluded 
that firms adopting JV modes were likely to enter the Chinese market earlier than those choosing 
WOS as their entry modes.  Two reasons explained this situation: first, the Chinese government 
required most, if not all foreign firms to use the JV mode for entry to Chinese markets at the country‟s 
early stage of market liberalisation (Pyo, 2010: 77); second, as recognised in Gaba et al. (2002) and 
Isobe, Makino and Montgomery (2000), joint venturing required a smaller resource commitment as 
compared to the full-control WOS mode, and therefore is faster to plan and implement, which could 
shorten firms‟ time taken to enter new markets. Though the focus of Gaba et al. (2002) was on entry 
time, in the general market entry literature, it was among the first to find a linkage between the 
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resource-based perspective, reflected in firms‟ level of internationalisation, and firms‟ market entry 
decisions.   
Florin and Ogbuehi (2004: 83) adopted a “contingency framework” for their study of entry mode 
decisions, drawing upon the resource-based and institutional perspective, in addition to transaction 
cost theory.  Their central finding was that firms‟ entry mode decisions were not made independently 
or in isolation from other decisions such as entry location, entry time or international operation 
strategy.  Rather, these decisions were made largely simultaneously, based on a range of factors 
including market conditions, institutional factors and firm characteristics.  This is in contrast to Pan 
and Tse (2000: 538), who proposed a hierarchical model of entry mode decisions, and assumed that 
managers tend to decompose complex entry mode decisions into a hierarchical process and adopt a 
small set of critical variables to assess the appropriateness of each node hierarchically.  Florin and 
Ogbuehi (2004) marked one of the earliest studies that have adopted a multi-framework approach to 
investigate market entry choices made by MNEs in developed countries.   
This subsection has reviewed the literature pertinent to the entry mode choices of firms from 
developed nations.  Earlier studies such as Kogut (1988), Anderson and Gatignon (1986), Gomes-
Casseres (1989), and Hennart (1988) to name only a few, all found that transaction cost theory was 
suitable for explaining the market entry decisions of corporations from industrialised nations.  In the 
1990‟s, after Dunning (1980 & 1988) developed the eclectic paradigm to explain MNEs‟ 
internationalisation decisions, more researchers started to resort to this paradigm in relevant studies 
(for example, Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997; and Phatak, et al., 1996).  The 
eclectic paradigm has become the most widely applied traditional FDI theory (Buckley, et al., 2007).  
More recently, scholars have come to realise the limitations of the classical FDI theory, as noted 
above.  In particular, the institutional environment that MNEs operate in was recognised as having a 
considerable influence on their entry mode decisions (for example, see Meyer, 2001; and Brouthers, 
2002).  Also, studies such as Isobe, et al. (2000), Gaba et al. (2002), and Florin and Ogbuehi (2004) 
incorporated the resource-based perspective to the study of entry mode choices of developed nations.  
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How MNEs deploy their resources in their early-stage of FDI activities was the main concern of those 
studies.   
The following subsection reviews the entry mode literature regarding OFDI from emerging countries, 
who are “latecomers” to the global market (Mathews, 2006: 18). 
 
3.2.2.2 The emerging country literature 
Researchers began to focus, for the most part, on the market entry decisions of emerging country 
MNEs in the 1990s.  This subsection reviews the major works in this field to identify their strengths 
and weaknesses.  It is necessary to note that there is a general lack of definition in the literature 
regarding which countries can be classified as emerging countries.  It sometimes refers to  countries as 
low in per capita GDP as India, and, in contrast, as highly developed as Hong Kong, Singapore and 
South Korea.  While the exact meaning of the term varies, in this subsection and thesis as a whole, the 
term refers to countries or markets that are experiencing relatively rapid growth and industrialisation, 
but are not often classified as industrialised.  Major criticisms and highlights of this subsection 
include: one, although studies concerning the internationalisation activities of emerging countries date 
back to the early 90‟s, the examination of entry mode choices of emerging country MNEs commenced 
only in the early 2000s; two, the earlier entry mode studies concerning emerging country MNEs 
tended to rely largely on transaction cost theory, which, as had been the case with earlier studies of 
firms from developed countries, tended to focus exclusively on factors internal to the firm, neglecting 
external factors; three, later studies started to incorporate the institutional and resource-based 
perspectives, helping to remedy the deficiencies of the earlier studies.  
The studies examined in this section were selected for two reasons: one, they are among the most 
frequently cited studies as noted on Google Scholar; and two, they were seen to be of value to this 
thesis either in their theory building concerns or the findings they generate.  The countries and regions 
examined include Taiwan, South Korea, Singapore, Thailand, Hong Kong, Turkey, India, and Central 
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Europe.  Aggarwal and Agmon (1990), Dunning, Hoesel and Narula (1996), Nakos and Brouthers 
(2002), Rhee (2008), Theingi and Tang (2006), Pyo (2010), Singal and Jain (2012), Wang, Hong and 
Kafouros (2012), Cheng (2006), Makino, Lau and Yeh (2002), Luo and Tung (2007), and Ang and 
Michailova (2008) were analysed with reference to their theoretical underpinnings. As will be 
illustrated below, there is clearly a trend to rely on more than one theoretical perspective to explain 
the entry mode choices of firms from emerging countries.  Studies such as those of Rhee (2008), 
Theingi and Tang (2006), Cheng (2006), and Pyo (2010) indicated factors such as previous 
international experience and host market regulatory restrictions were influential in determining 
emerging country MNEs‟ entry mode decision making process; the review of these factors guided  the 
development of this thesis‟ research propositions. 
Aggarwal and Agmon (1990) is among the earlier studies that examined the international experience 
of emerging country firms. They used the concept of comparative advantage to model the 
internationalisation process of firms in manufacturing and service industries. They found that the 
success of firms from the emerging countries of India, Singapore and South Korea could not be fully 
explainable by the traditional theory of comparative advantages. Rather, their comparative advantages 
and success were shaped to a great extent by the roles of government or the institutional environment 
in which they operated (Aggarwal & Agmon, 1990: 175).  Although this emerging-market-focused 
study did not examine entry mode choices of firms in these markets, the study was among the earliest 
to identify the relevance of the institutional perspective in the internationalisation literature.     
Other earlier studies of internationalisation by firms from emerging countries include Dunning et al. 
(1996) and Young, Huang and McDermott (1996).  Dunning et al. (1996) investigated whether 
emerging countries such as Taiwan and South Korea follow the same stages of internationalisation as 
they had proposed was the case with firms from developed countries, based on the eclectic paradigm.  
It was found that the locational and ownership advantages of emerging country firms did not exhibit 
the same characteristics as that of the developed country firms, because the extent and nature of their 
created and natural assets, their strategy of economic development and the role of governments in 
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these areas are all distinctively different to those of developed countries (Dunning et al., 1996: 18).  
However, overall, they felt that the OLI model of the eclectic paradigm could explain their 
internationalisation processes (Dunning et al., 1996: 20).  Similarly, in Young et al. (1996), the 
authors also found some evidence to support the view that internationalisation process models could 
explain both the inward and outward internationalisation activities of Chinese MNEs (Young et al., 
1996: 295).  Again, although these two studies do not specifically analyse the entry mode choices of 
firms from emerging markets, they provide the earliest evidence regarding the applicability of the 
eclectic paradigm in the general internationalisation activities initiated by emerging market MNEs. 
The specific issue of entry mode choices of emerging country MNEs was a relatively new topic 
compared to the broad topic concerning emerging country MNEs‟ general OFDI activities.  Nakos 
and Brouthers (2002) was one of the earliest studies investigating the entry mode choices of firms 
from emerging countries.  Their focus was on small to medium sized enterprises (SME) in Central and 
Eastern Europe.  It found that transaction cost theory could provide a good explanation for SMEs‟ 
entry mode choices (Nakos & Brouthers, 2002: 47).  In contrast, following Nakos and Brouthers‟ 
application of transaction cost theory in emerging economies, Theingi and Tang (2006) also used 
transaction cost theory to investigate the entry mode decisions of Thai MNEs.  While they found that 
greater international experience was associated with a higher probability of the choice of WOS among 
Thai MNEs (Theingi & Tang, 2006: 36), the authors argued that the transaction cost approach alone 
did not provide the richest explanation and prediction for entry mode choices of those companies. 
This required taking into account the influence of the institutional environment in Thailand, which 
was radically different to that of most developed countries (Theingi & Tang, 2006: 46).  One 
limitation of Theingi and Tang (2006) is that their study focused exclusively on Thailand‟s electrical 
and electronics industry, which limits the generalisability of the study since there may be an industry-
specific bias related to the findings (see, for example, Arora & Fosfuri, 2000: 560).  Also, the time 
period selected for the study (1995-1998) overlapped that of the Asian financial crisis, during which 
time the country experienced a significant economic downturn, so it is reasonable to suspect that the 
home country institutional environment (reflected in, for example, government‟s attitude towards 
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OFDI, etc) for outward investing Thai MNEs might be different to when the economic condition was 
stable.  This point might further limit the generalisability of the findings given the special economic 
environment during that period of time. 
Rhee (2008) investigated the entry mode choices of Korean MNEs.  He found that the greater the 
degree to which firms‟ competitive advantages were based on technology and the larger the start-up 
team members‟ social networks, the greater the propensity of MNEs to set up WOSs based on 
transaction cost theory.  This is because the hazards related to technological leakage are most 
prominent when new ventures choose JV modes and their technology-based advantages are exposed 
to the partners (Rhee, 2008: 99).  Also, an extensive social network can provide venturing firms with 
sufficient knowledge about foreign markets for their independent start-up as a WOS (Rhee, 2008: 
102).  While his study relied primarily on transaction cost theory, Rhee also indicated in his 
conclusion, though without any further explanation, that including additional theoretical perspectives 
such as “social network… can significantly help us predict a new venture‟s choice of entry mode” 
because transaction cost theory alone is not sufficient to understand entry strategies of firms from 
emerging countries (Rhee, 2008: 110).  The significance of the “social network perspective” 
recognised here reflects not only the networking resources – and therefore the resource-based 
perspective – a firm possesses, but it also reflects the significance of the institutional environment that 
a firm operates in.   
Pyo (2010) also examined the market entry choices of Korean firms.  The study found that many large 
MNEs continue to export goods produced in Korea to foreign countries where they also operated local 
production facilities.  This is in contrast to the assumption adopted by earlier studies, where 
FDI and export were deemed substitutes and firms chose either the FDI or export modes (Buckley & 
Pearce, 1979, 1981; and Root, Spielmann & Kaden, 1987, for example).  Using the transaction cost 
approach, the paper explained that this situation of one firm adopting two types of entry modes was 
usually associated with large manufacturers such as automobile companies (Pyo, 2010: 68).  Such 
firms, despite having established some production lines in their foreign affiliates through FDI, 
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sometimes found that implementing additional, new production lines would generate too high a 
transaction cost and would not achieve the necessary economies of scale, so exporting for these lines 
was a more cost efficient option.  A significant contribution of this paper is that it acknowledged the 
significant influence of the government in MNEs‟ entry mode decisions for purposes such as to 
protect relevant domestic industry, or protect domestic resources (Pyo, 2010: 90), a factor of likely 
significance for Chinese firms entering the Australian resources sector. 
Entry mode studies that have explicitly adopted an institutional perspective regarding emerging 
economies are now well documented.  For example, Singal and Jain (2012) have analysed OFDI 
trends for Indian automotive, pharmaceuticals and information services industries.  They found that 
existing theories did not fully explain the internationalisation process of emerging MNEs from India, 
because Indian firms in these industries tend to build their strategic capability before going overseas; 
therefore, they prefer to have local connections through the establishment of strategic alliances, JVs, 
and technology acquisitions (Singal & Jain, 2012: 443).  Their preference for JVs may be strongly 
related to the local business or political environment, although this concept is yet to be empirically 
tested (Singal & Jain, 2012: 443).  In addition, Wang et al. (2012) explored the role of government 
involvement in OFDI from emerging economies. They found that firms did not possess an equal 
ability to respond to institutional pressures exerted by government, such as legislation to facilitate or 
restrain OFDI.  Not only did Wang et al. (2012) demonstrate that governments could influence MNEs‟ 
level of overseas investment, its location and its investment aim, the authors also showed that the 
effect of government involvement regarding MNEs‟ international expansion depended on firms' own 
resources and capabilities, suggesting that not all firms possess an equal ability to internalise 
government-related advantages and respond to institutional pressures.  Consequently, Wang et al. 
(2012: 655) concluded that the resource-based and institutional perspectives were highly related to 
each other, particularly in the context of emerging markets.   
Cheng (2006), through his investigation of Taiwanese manufacturing firms investing in China, 
ASEAN, Japan, NAFTA and the EU, found that the higher the level of industrial concentration in the 
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host market, the lower the level of regulatory restrictions, the less firm-specific the assets to be 
transferred to the foreign market, and the smaller the cultural distance involved were all factors more 
likely to persuade investors to enter foreign markets through Brownfield over Greenfield sites.  Cheng 
(2006: 214) also noted that transaction cost theory, the institutional perspective and the resource-
based perspective combined provided useful and complementary explanations for Taiwanese MNEs‟ 
entry mode choice strategy, because “collectively they have greater explanatory power than any single 
theoretical perspective in describing the principal determinants of FDI mode choice in foreign 
markets”.  Other studies concerning internationalisation activities of Taiwanese OFDI, including 
Makino et al. (2002: 403), and Yiu, Lau and Bruton (2007: 519), also highlighted the fact that firms in 
emerging economies were constrained by an institutional environment and the resources they have on 
hand when making their foreign market entry decisions.  Luo and Tung (2007: 490) found that 
emerging economy firms are motivated to internationalise in order to alleviate domestic institutional 
constraints, overcome latecomer disadvantages, and exploit their own competitive advantages in host 
countries.  The explanatory power of the institutional perspective was again confirmed by Ang and 
Michailova (2008: 551), who investigated the adoption of an equity alliance mode (JV) by 628 firms 
from 64 emerging countries, and found that institutional environment, as reflected in host country 
regulatory institutions, cultural distance, and prior practices of other firms in the same industry and 
host country shaped their final choice of entry mode.  Again, as indicated in the above studies, there 
clearly has been a rising trend that recognises the limitations of transaction cost theory in explaining 
entry mode choices of firms from emerging countries and, in contrast, the value of the institutional 
perspective. 
The increasing and wide application of the institutional perspective regarding emerging country 
MNEs springs from the fact that while developed markets usually have relatively sound formal, 
regulatory institutions, emerging markets on the whole have relatively weak formal regulatory 
institutions (Peng, 2002).  This means constraints springing from informal institutions tend to play a 
larger role in regulating business operations in these markets (Peng & Heath, 1996: 504; and Peng, 
2002).  The most important aspect of informal institutions, arguably, is the role interpersonal 
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relationships play.  Interpersonal relationships can be divided into two types: manager-to-manager 
relationships and manager-to-government relationships.  In developed countries formal institutions 
provide, for example, greater information availability and stronger market regulation, so that market 
transparency is relatively high, which, in turn, enables mangers to evaluate and explore business 
opportunities in a more efficient manner.  Managers in many Asian countries, in contrast, have to 
devote greater time and energy to the cultivation of personal relationships, compared to their western 
rivals in order to gain similar information.  As described by Peng (2002), managers in diversified 
conglomerates from emerging countries often share similar family, clan, and educational backgrounds, 
reducing uncertainty in the decision making process.  Not surprisingly, when a problem emerges, such 
managers will rely at least partly and maybe entirely, on their family and interpersonal networks to 
help resolve problems, complementing, and even substituting for the formal channels of information 
exchange and regulation typical of more developed economies (Child, 1994). 
The importance of manager-to-government relationships was highlighted by Peng and Luo (2000) and 
Peng (2002). Only those managers who maintain “disproportionately greater contact” with 
government officials can lead their organisations‟ fight against possible environmental uncertainty 
(Child, 1994: 154).  Such relationships are not only prominent in the case of SOEs, but for most 
public and private enterprises (Peng, Au & Wang, 2001).  If a strong link between the firm and the 
government can be developed and preserved, there is perceived to be an increased possibility that 
firms can get inside information on new developments so as to avoid uncertainty or promote growth, 
at least in the early stage of the firms‟ marketisation and internationalisation process (Peng et al., 
2001: 171).  Country specific empirical evidence supporting this point is well documented.  For 
instance, Peng and Luo (2000: 496) found that ties with government officials seem to be more 
influential upon firm performance than inter-management connections in China.  In Thailand, it is a 
common practice that a substantial number of board directors are “active-duty or retired military 
officers”, valued for their connections to key government agencies and individuals (Peng et al., 2001: 
167).  Ren, Au and Birtch (2009: 219) investigated the board structure and business networks of 
Chinese listed firms and found, unsurprisingly, that government ownership and interlocking 
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directorates were common characteristics.  In short, government officials are the providers of 
important political resources, often vital for the operation of Asian companies (Boddewyn & Brewer, 
1994; and Oliver, 1997).   
Because the institutional perspective indicates the need to take into account the different institutional 
environments of emerging countries, it has become widely applied as an extension to Dunning‟s 
eclectic paradigm.  Indeed, one major criticism of Dunning‟s original approach was its limited 
applicability in the context of emerging economies (Mathews, 2006).  The major explanation for this 
is that most of, if not all, earlier FDI theories were generated based on the studies of relatively 
developed countries which started to engage in FDI long before their emerging country counterparts.  
As Bonaglia and Goldstein (2007: 94) noted, the original eclectic paradigm was formed “squarely 
based on the experiences of large, predominantly Anglo-American, successful international firms” 
who could relatively easily find the resources and capabilities to cultivate the advantages necessary 
for their international expansion.  Mathews (2006: 17, 18) also summarised the eclectic paradigm as a 
“predominantly Anglo-American approach” to theorise internationalisation decisions of MNEs, and 
yet the newcomers to the global market “appear to lack all the trappings traditionally associated with 
the MNE”.  In addition, in western countries, the traditional focus of FDI theories, their usually 
market-based institutions were mature enough to support stable business activities (Kang & Jiang, 
2012).  This is in contrast to the situation faced by emerging countries where the institutional 
environment is not as well developed as that of the developed nations, and they are latecomers to the 
global market, often with relatively limited resources and capabilities.  These limitations of the 
eclectic paradigm, as argued by Amighini, Sanfilippo and Rabellotti (2010: 5), for example, indicate 
that the paradigm was “static”, in that the original framework did not incorporate possible changes in 
market conditions (including the evolving government stance on OFDI regulations from tight control 
to direct funding support, as in the case of Chinese government), and it is therefore of limited value in 
the context of emerging countries. 
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This subsection has reviewed the literature pertinent to entry strategies of corporations from emerging 
countries.  It found that there has been an increasing range of studies examining the market entry 
strategies of corporations from South Korea, Hong Kong, Taiwan, India, Thailand, Turkey, and 
Central Europe.  In particular, it found that the older, more traditional FDI theories (including the 
transaction cost theory and eclectic paradigm) had distinct limitations when applied in the context of 
emerging countries.  For example, the traditional FDI theories ignore the impact institutions could 
exert upon firms‟ entry mode choices, neither do they address the peculiar characteristics of the less-
experienced, often government-backed emerging country MNEs.  Hence, scholars began to either 
extend the traditional frameworks (for example, Dunning, 1995; Rugman and Verbeke, 2004; 
Dunning, 2006; Narula, 2006; and Dunning and Lundan, 2008), or adopt multiple  perspectives such 
as the resource-based perspective and the institutional perspective, notably the latter, in order to better 
explain FDI from emerging countries, particularly regarding  entry mode strategies (see, for example, 
Makino et al., 2002; Cheng, 2006; Amighini, et al., 2010; and Wang et al., 2012).  The following 
subsection provides a literature review pertinent to entry mode strategies of Chinese MNEs. 
 
3.2.2.3 The literature on Chinese MNEs. 
It is only in the past decade that the entry mode decision processes of Chinese MNEs have attracted 
much attention in the international business literature.  Hence, this subsection reviews the major 
works in this field.  It is expected that both theoretical and empirical findings of those studies provide 
the most relevant information for the development of this thesis, which examines the entry mode 
choices of Chinese MNEs when making investments in Australia.   
The studies reviewed were selected for two reasons: one, they have attracted the highest number of 
references among studies concerning Chinese OFDI entry mode choices on Google Scholar and 
Proquest; and two, they provide theoretical and empirical insights regarding firms‟ choices, and are 
particularly valuable for this thesis given the scarce research on Chinese investments in Australia.  
These studies cover Chinese investments into both developed and emerging countries since the 
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beginning of its Go Global era.  The following studies were reviewed with a focus on their empirical 
findings as regards entry mode decisions: Bell (1996), Gao (2009), Cui et al. (2011), Cui and Jiang 
(2009, 2010, 2012), Ning (2009), Kang and Jiang (2012), Fan et al. (2012), Quer et al. (2012), Alon 
(2010), and Buckley et al. (2007).  In addition, the following studies have elaborated on theoretical 
underpinnings: Cui and Jiang (2009, 2010, 2012), Cui et al. (2011), Ning (2009), Quer et al. (2012), 
Alon (2010), and Buckley et al. (2007).  An increasingly common feature of these studies was their 
identification of the limitations of traditional FDI theories in explaining Chinese MNEs‟ entry mode 
strategies, leading to their supplementation with other theoretical perspectives, notably the 
institutional and resource based perspectives.  
Child and Rodrigues (2005) is among the earliest studies to examine the internationalisation process 
of Chinese MNEs.  The authors conducted case studies of prominent market-seeking Chinese firms, 
and their aim was to assess whether there was a need to extend the mainstream FDI theory to fit the 
context of emerging countries such as China.  They found that rather than exploiting their existing 
ownership advantages as the experience of developed country MNEs suggested, Chinese MNEs 
internationalised to react to pressures such as government direction and encouragement, their 
latecomer position, global competition, and domestic institutional constraints (Child & Rodrigues, 
2005: 402).  They also found that emerging market MNEs faced different institutional environments 
that could not be explained by the traditional theoretical models, a finding that was also supported by 
Luo and Tung (2007: 495), Fillis (2001: 780), Johanson and Vahlne (2003: 83), Meyer and Gelbuda 
(2006: 160), Sandberg (2008: 12), and Liu, Wen & Huang (2008: 488).  One drawback regarding 
Child and Rodrigues (2005) and Luo and Tung (2007), however, was that they examined only MNEs 
with a market-seeking or strategic asset-seeking motivation, with no reference to natural resource-
seeking companies, perhaps the most dominant investment motivation among outbound Chinese 
MNEs (Larum, 2011: 7).  Also, the fact that Child and Rodrigues (2005) focused on the four “most 
dynamic” large Chinese firms limits the generalisability of their findings, especially as regards the 
behaviour of increasingly active, Chinese SMEs. 
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Given the rise of studies concerning the internationalisation of Chinese MNEs in general, entry mode 
choice as one aspect of their FDI activities has gradually attracted more attention in the literature.  
Early research in international business suggested that investors (mainly from developed nations) in 
general do not have a clear preference towards their entry mode choices in light of their investment 
motivation (Kogut & Singh, 1988; Hennart, 1991; Kim & Hwang, 1992; Larimo, 1993).  More recent 
studies concerning China, such as Bell (1996), Gao (2009), and Cui et al. (2011) have, on the other 
hand, found that where a Chinese firm aimed to gain market shares and seek assets in a new market, 
they displayed a strong tendency to adopt the full control, WOS mode rather than the shared control 
JV mode, when there was no restriction imposed by the host government regarding entry mode.   
Cui and Jiang (2009: 442) investigated the determinants of FDI entry mode choice as between a WOS 
and a JV by Chinese firms.  They found that four variables were related to such choices: when 
Chinese MNEs adopt a global strategy, face severe competition in host country markets, and aim to 
seek assets through their FDI, they tend to prefer the WOS rather than JV mode of entry, because 
fully controlled business units constitute a more integrated global business network, whereas jointly 
controlled business units involve one or more business partners, either of which may not comply with 
the strategic intent of each other (Cui & Jiang, 2009: 437).  In contrast, a JV mode is preferred when 
the firm is investing in a high growth host market because JVs take less time to start up and the 
cooperation with an incumbent partner may help investors to gain a better competitive position in a 
fast moving market (Cui & Jiang, 2009: 439).  As with other studies involving emerging countries 
such as Yiu and Makino (2002), Luo and Tung (2007), and Rhee (2008), the authors used a variety of 
theoretical perspectives, including transaction cost theory and the strategic behaviour approach to 
underpin their research.  They found that such a combined approach is “of particular relevance to 
firms in an emerging economy”, since firms from these countries go abroad in pursuit of various 
strategic purposes that cannot be adequately explained by transaction cost theory.  One limitation of 
Cui and Jiang (2009) is its relatively small sample size with 138 valid surveys from firms investing in 
various countries in the world for quantitative analysis.  As there have been at least 400 Chinese direct 
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investments in Australia alone (as at July 2011), the reliability of findings from a world-wide survey 
based on 138 responses is likely to be limited.   
In their follow-up studies, Cui and Jiang (2010 & 2012), Cui et al. (2011) also relied on a multi-
framework perspective to investigate Chinese MNEs‟ entry mode choices.  Cui and Jiang (2010) was 
based on ten case studies, and they found that a conceptual framework that integrates the institutional- 
and resource-based views could provide a more comprehensive explanation of Chinese MNEs‟ entry 
mode choices.  Specifically, the authors recognised that while firms may prefer a wholly owned, and 
therefore fully controlled, foreign venture, the realisation of this preference depends on their ability to 
commit resources, which may refer to the size of their FDI projects and their motivation to seek brand 
assets and global strategic assets (Cui & Jiang, 2010: 757).  The authors also found that both home 
and host country institutions can have positive and negative impacts on Chinese firms‟ ability and 
willingness to choose the high resource commitment (WOS) entry mode, reflected in host government 
restrictions, cultural barriers, financial support from home institutions, and approval restrictiveness 
(Cui & Jiang, 2010: 769).  
Cui et al. (2011) investigated Chinese MNEs‟ entry mode decisions on the basis of what they 
described as a strategic behaviour approach, drawing on both the institutional perspective and the 
resource-based perspective.  A strategic behaviour construct posits that a firm‟s FDI entry mode 
serves its foreign market entry motives and strategies (Cui & Jiang, 2010: 755), either to maximise 
profitability (Kogut, 1988), to retain flexibility (Harrigan, 1988), to achieve a superior market position 
(Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997), or to pursue global synergy effects and other global strategic motivations 
(Kim & Hwang, 1992).  They used the same data they collected for Cui and Jiang (2009) – being the 
138 surveys.  They found that a low-cost advantage (such as level of economies of scale realised) and 
learning opportunities in the host industry (such as the opportunity to acquire know-how) may induce 
Chinese MNEs to opt for a WOS rather than the JV entry mode (Cui & Jiang, 2011: 490), though the 
WOS mode was expected to be more costly, at least in the short run, than a JV.  This is because the 
exclusive ownership position granted the firm full control over the acquired foreign assets, which 
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would enable the firm to reconfigure the technological and managerial resources within its global 
business network.  However, they found that the market attractiveness of the host country (reflected in 
host country market potential and market growth rate), perceived host country restrictions toward 
foreign investors, cultural barriers, and cognitive pressure (such as perceived home country 
government influence on business decision making) may induce Chinese MNEs to opt for a JV rather 
than WOS (Cui & Jiang, 2011: 490).  The findings of this study confirmed that firm resource and 
institutional variables collectively influence the entry mode choices of Chinese MNEs. 
As state-owned or controlled firms remain the dominant force in Chinese OFDI, Cui and Jiang (2012) 
investigated the effect of state ownership on Chinese MNEs‟ OFDI ownership decisions.  The authors 
believed MNEs from advanced economies were structurally largely separate from government 
institutions, while SOEs from emerging economies, because of their government influence and 
ownership, were in a sense part of the external institutional environment in which they operated.  In 
this regard, a combined framework of institutional and resource-based perspectives was found useful 
for understanding firm behaviour.  They found that firms under high levels of foreign institutional 
pressures, such as strict regulation and scrutiny, were likely to opt for a joint ownership structure (JV) 
to attain institutional legitimacy, exchanging control for legitimacy in order to gain access to and 
operate in foreign markets.  This view coincides with that of Deng (2009), Voss, Buckley and Cross 
(2010), Lin (2010), and Morck et al., (2008), who found that as the host country regulatory 
institutional barriers were higher for SOEs than for non-SOEs, so that Chinese SOEs tended to opt for 
the shared control JV mode, exchanging ownership for legitimacy and market access. 
Ning (2009) analysed how successful the Go Global strategy has been in promoting the 
internationalisation of the Chinese information and communication technology (ICT) industry.  It 
recognised the significant role government has been playing in stimulating Chinese firms‟ foreign 
market entry decisions, and concluded that because the traditional FDI theories did not consider the 
role of government policy and government ownership, it could not sufficiently explain Chinese OFDI 
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(Ning, 2009: 88).  This finding is consistent with several prior studies such as Yiu and Makino (2002) 
and Cui and Jiang (2012).  
Kang and Jiang (2012) investigated the factors determining locational choices of Chinese MNEs.  As 
with Cui et al. (2011) and Cui and Jiang (2009), they used the institutional perspective to supplement 
traditional FDI theory.  Though they did not directly review Chinese MNEs‟ entry mode decisions, 
their findings further support the view that institutional factors (including economic freedom, political 
influence, FDI restriction and cultural distance) have a high level of significance in determining FDI 
strategic choice in comparison with economic factors (such as GDP per capita, unit labour cost and 
economic openness).  One limitation of their study was that it failed to address the impact of industry-
specific influences on Chinese MNEs‟ market entry decisions.  Corporations in different industries 
develop different competitive strategies that reflect the characteristics of their respective industrial 
environments (Porter, 1980).  For example, Arora and Fosfuri (2000) found that firms in fast-paced 
high-technology industry might favour the use of licensing as an entry mode, which required less 
resource commitment and is more time efficient to set up compared to WOS.  This neglect of 
industrial characteristics when investigating Chinese MNEs‟ market entry choices is a common 
limitation shared by many studies including Cui and Jiang (2012), Kang and Jiang (2012), and Fan et 
al. (2012).  Kang and Jiang (2012: 46) in contrast, aimed to give more “robustness… in seeking to 
understand the FDI behaviour of Chinese MNEs” by incorporating an institution-based view in their 
study. 
Quer et al. (2012), building on transaction cost theory, institutional and resource-based views, 
analysed the determining factors of FDI entry mode decisions by Chinese firms.  The authors picked 
all 35 Chinese firms listed on the Fortune 500 in 2008, and searched news items published on the 
website of China Daily for any discussion relating to their foreign investments from 2002 to 2009.  
Using secondary sources, the authors obtained 139 FDI entry mode decisions relating to the 35 
companies.  Quantitative analysis was performed regarding factors affecting their entry mode choices.  
Their results showed that the host country's political risk and cultural distance did not affect Chinese 
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MNEs‟ entry mode choices, while firm size was negatively related to the choice of WOS.  This is in 
contrast to Fan et al. (2012), Yiu and Makino (2002) and Kang and Jiang (2012), who found that a 
large cultural distance would encourage firms to choose a full control mode of entry because joint 
venturing with companies from those countries would generate more problems during daily 
operations than if a sole ownership subsidiary was selected.  However, the reliability of news items as 
a source of data for analysis of factors such as “cultural distance” and “political risks” is questionable, 
since there was no standard measure and news reports were composed by different journalists. 
Alon (2010) pointed out that depending on whether Chinese firms were state- or private-owned, the 
institutional constraints they face would affect their internationalisation decisions.  Specifically, firms 
in the private sector were particularly drawn to large and open economies, where through fair 
competition they could offset domestic institutional constraints such as a lack of government support 
or the government grants offered only to large SOEs in the same industry (Alon, 2010: 20).  In 
contrast, state-owned firms had more institution-specific advantages (such as economies of scale 
derived from a monopoly position, easy access to state finance and direct relations with government 
officials), and appeared to pursue complex and costly projects.  Alon (2010) also found that an 
institutional-based perspective (complemented by resource-based theories) of FDI is necessary to 
understand China‟s globalisation and that of the emerging world more generally.  Alon‟s findings 
suggest that this thesis may be able to find significant differences between the entry mode decisions of 
state- and privately-owned Chinese firms regarding Australia.   
In terms of the aim of Chinese OFDI activities, Buckley et al. (2007: 509) found that prior to 2001, 
Chinese MNEs entering industrialised countries were largely resource-seeking rather than asset-
seeking.  Since the data for Buckley et al. (2007) covered only the period to 2001, it might not hold 
true for the period since that date, as China‟s Go Global strategy, which encourages the seeking of 
both natural and strategic assets overseas, was gradually introduced after 2000; this is a possibility 
examined in this thesis (see Section 3.3 Proposition Development).  Buckley et al. (2007: 503) also 
found that the government plays a significant role in guiding Chinese MNEs‟ internationalisation 
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strategies, as it “at various levels, seeks to influence the amount, direction and scope of outward 
capital flows”.   
All of the above mentioned studies, including Cui and Jiang (2010 & 2012), Cui et al. (2011), Ning 
(2009), Kang and Jiang (2012), Quer et al. (2012), Alon (2010), and Buckley et al. (2007) argued that 
in order to explain the market entry decisions of Chinese MNEs, it was necessary to incorporate 
institutional and/or resource-based perspectives in addition to the conventional eclectic paradigm.  As 
Deng (2009), Yang (2009), and Alon et al. (2011) noted, a single theoretical perspective was not 
sufficient to account for all the factors that may have influenced Chinese MNEs‟ entry mode choices.   
Even the founder of the eclectic paradigm, John Dunning, later stressed the importance to incorporate 
other factors into his eclectic paradigm.  Specifically, Dunning (2006: 174) recognised that it was 
necessary to incorporate institutional factors in an extension of the original OLI model.  Also, 
Dunning and Lundan (2008: 575) recognised that the resource-based arguments focused on the 
uniqueness of a particular firm‟s capabilities was relevant for understanding its competitive position 
vis-à-vis other firms.  The authors further asserted that institutions affect all three components of the 
OLI paradigm, and for firms from emerging countries who tended to be constrained by institutional 
context more heavily, incorporating an institution-based view into the existing eclectic paradigm was 
even more important (Dunning and Lundan, 2008: 583).  
This subsection has reviewed the literature on entry mode choices of Chinese MNEs.  Researchers 
have identified a range of factors that can be relevant to the choice of entry modes of Chinese MNEs, 
including corporate size, previous internationalisation experience, culture, and institutional 
environments in both the home and host country.  The significance of these factors (and others) will 
be addressed in this study.  Also, as with studies of MNEs from other emerging countries, the studies 
found in explaining the entry mode choices of Chinese MNEs, it was necessary to draw upon a 
number of theoretical frameworks and perspectives in order to provide a comprehensive 
understanding.  In addition to transaction cost theory and the eclectic paradigm, the two theoretical 
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frameworks that have been most frequently referred to in studies examining Chinese MNEs‟ entry 
mode choices are the institutional perspective and the resource-based perspective.   
 
3.2.2.4 The literature on Chinese investment in Australia 
As noted in Chapter 2, Australia has been a major recipient of Chinese offshore investments since the 
beginning of the Open Door era.  However, there have been few empirical or conceptual studies of 
this investment.  This subsection reviews those studies, with an emphasis on entry mode decisions.   
Three reports studying the Australia-China investment relationship, specifically China‟s outbound 
direct investment in Australia, have attracted the researcher‟s attention.  These reports were prepared 
by KPMG, the China Studies Centre of the University of Sydney, the Australia China Business 
Council, and the Lowy Institute for international policy in Australia.  These three reports were largely 
of a statistical nature, aimed at examining the distribution of Chinese investments in Australia, their 
characteristics, the challenges they face, and their implications for both Chinese MNEs and the 
Australian Government.  For example, the report Demystifying Chinese Investment (KPMG, 2012) 
prepared by KPMG and the University of Sydney jointly detailed the nature and geographical 
distribution of China‟s investment flows to Australia, their industrial distribution, the types of 
investors involved and their entry strategies.  Through analysis of recent SOE reforms, this report 
concluded that Chinese SOEs abroad are behaving “more like international corporations” who have 
shown strong commercial motivations for their investments rather than what was commonly 
perceived as “political goals” through international expansion (KPMG, 2012: 13).   
This result is in contrast to others, which found that Chinese SOEs “may not be profit maximisers or 
may be maximising subject to government-guided influences” (Deng, 2012: 416; also see Kim, 2006; 
Lieberthal & Herberg, 2006; Wu, 2005; and Deng, 2009).  The changing perception suggests that at 
their early stage of internationalisation, Chinese MNEs and particularly SOEs were oriented to more 
political objectives, and, as their level of internationalisation deepens, they transformed to become 
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more oriented to commercial objectives.  This point is supported, to a limited degree, by a 
governmental decision released by MOFCOM in 2004.  The “Decision on Reforming the Investment 
System” (MOFCOM, 2004: 6-7) stated that “government investment is only used in fields concerning 
national security items that can be constructed through social investment shall be constructed through 
utilising social capital with total independence when possible”, and that even for decision-making 
mechanism for government investment projects, “scientific decision-making rules and procedures 
shall be… adhered to… so that they are made scientifically and democratically”.  However, the 
meaning of “democratically” was not made clear and suggests that political factors will continue to be 
of at least some importance in regard to MNEs‟ OFDI, especially SOEs. The OECD‟s view is that the 
Chinese government plans to transform its role from one of approving and controlling to one of 
monitoring and facilitating investment projects (OECD, 2008: 85).  In summary, it is likely that 
Chinese MNEs‟ investment strategies developed and modified over time, and that they have adopted 
diversified investment strategies at different stages of development and perhaps regarding different 
countries, both with and without government influence and direction. 
Although the KPMG study arguably provides “the most detailed and up-to-date information on 
Chinese ODI [OFDI] in Australia” (KPMG, 2012: 13), it offered extremely limited discussion in 
terms of entry modes adopted by Chinese SOEs in particular, or MNEs in general.  Only one 
paragraph was provided in that regard (KPMG, 2012: 13), and it concluded that Chinese SOEs have 
utilised a variety of entry strategies including WOS, JV, and forming strategic alliances.  This thesis 
aims to remedy this shortfall and provide a fuller understanding of what factors have influenced 
Chinese MNEs when making their entry mode decisions for their Australian investments. 
The second report, which investigated the Australia-China investment relationship, was conducted by 
Larum and Qian (2012).  Much of the report graphically presents how Chinese OFDI to Australia has 
evolved over time in terms of its investment weight, the sectors, and its relative investment pattern 
compared to those of other developed nations including Japan, US and UK.   The report also examines 
a number of more dramatic cases, notably the Rio and Chinalco cases, as discussed in Section 2.3 
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„The Australian Market‟ in Chapter 2 of this thesis.  The report speculated that due to “Australia‟s 
mistrust and discrimination” (Larum & Qian, 2012: 8), recently fewer mega-deals were initiated by 
Chinese investors, and there were more JVs and more indirect investments compared to 2006-2008.  It 
also noted that Chinese investors had now increased their effort to improve their operations and 
promote better public communication systems (Larum & Qian, 2012: 10).  The KPMG and University 
of Sydney report also found that Chinese SOEs wanted to persuade the Australian public that they 
have shifted their operational focus from reaching political goals to more commercial goals (KPMG, 
2012: 13).   
Two largely qualitative studies were found that had investigated Chinese OFDI activities in Australia.  
First, Zha (2013) focused on Chinese direct investment in the resource sector in Australia.  He 
investigated the Chinese perceptions of Australia as an investment destination through interviews with 
Chinese investors in Australia, Australian managers in companies that have received significant 
Chinese investment, and Australian government officials.  He noted the sensitivities surrounding 
Chinese investments in the resource sector, particularly those made by SOEs.  He also found that 
SOEs, after the failure of Chinalco to acquire Rio, have pursued a less aggressive path where an 
earlier preference for a majority shareholding in Australian projects is declining. There have been 
numerous cases of Chinese investors acquiring non-majority share holdings in Australian companies 
or projects (Zha, 2013: 6).  Zha argued that there was still a considerable need for Chinese investors to 
familiarise themselves with local laws and rules in order to conduct business successfully, and 
correspondingly, a need for Australian authorities to prepare comprehensive examinations and wide 
publicity of the performance record of established Chinese investments so as to lower unnecessary 
public concern regarding incoming Chinese investments (Zha, 2013: 22).  However, Zha (2013) 
focused only on the mining sector, so the results thus generated may have little generalisability 
regarding other Chinese investments in Australia, particularly those by non-SOEs. 
Second, Fan et al. (2012) undertook a qualitative, interview-based study regarding Chinese MNEs‟ 
investment in Australia.  The authors analysed the factors that have influenced Chinese MNEs‟ global 
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integration processes, and how Chinese MNEs have utilised the global integration process as a source 
of competitive advantage to operate in foreign markets (Fan et al., 2012: 2).  Although this study did 
not focus on the entry mode strategies of Chinese MNEs in Australia, it does provide some useful 
information regarding the general internationalisation process of Chinese MNEs in Australia; for 
example, it found that previous experience and manufacturing scales are relevant to Chinese MNEs‟ 
operating strategies, while advertising intensity was not deemed as important for their operation (Fan 
et al., 2012: 15).  As with Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992), Fan et al. (2012) relied on survey-based, 
managerial perceptions as their main source of data.  The results showed that industrial differences 
played a significant role in managers‟ perception on internationalisation (Fan et al., 2012: 16).   
In summary, the limited amount and limited findings of the previous research on Chinese MNEs‟ 
market entry strategies as regards Australia merits more detailed work given the importance of the 
Australian market to China.  This is particularly so with regard to their entry mode choices where 
almost no research findings have been identified.  This thesis aims to fill this research gap in an 
exploratory fashion.   
 
3.2.3 A Multi-Framework Perspective 
In light of the above review of the literature, it was decided that no one theoretical perspective was 
sufficient to provide a comprehensive understanding of issues related to Chinese MNEs‟ 
internationalisation and entry mode choices.  Therefore, a multi-framework perspective was adopted.  
It includes the eclectic paradigm, the institutional perspective, and the resource-based perspective.  
The following section develops propositions based on this multi-framework perspective. 
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3.3 Research Questions and Proposition Development 
Based on the multi-framework perspective indicated above, this section leads to the generation of 
research questions and corresponding propositions.  Two research questions are developed first.  Then 
a number of specific propositions are developed to help answer those research questions.  A total of 
ten propositions are developed covering relevant factors related to Chinese MNEs‟ decisions to invest 
in Australia and their related, entry mode decisions.  Subsection 3.3.1 examines Research Question 
One and puts forward two related propositions; subsection 3.3.2 reviews Research Question Two and 
suggests eight corresponding propositions. 
As discussed earlier, it was only recently that the focus of entry mode research shifted to emerging 
countries because of their rapid economic growth and hence increasing OFDI.  However, although 
now there are a small but growing number of studies looking at the OFDI motivations and entry mode 
choices of Chinese investors, there has been no detailed study of Chinese OFDI and entry mode 
choice in regard to the Australian market.  This is despite the fact that Australia is a major recipient of 
Chinese FDI and has been so for the past thirty years (see detailed discussion in Chapter 2).  Hence, a 
major aim of this study is to help remedy this deficiency and, in addition, to throw further light on the 
determinants of entry mode choice by firms from emerging economies in general. 
In order to investigate Chinese MNEs‟ FDI and entry mode choices in regard to the Australian market, 
it is first necessary to know why they are interested in investing in Australia in order to provide the 
context within which their entry mode decisions were made. In other words, what makes the 
Australian market appealing to the Chinese investors; hence the first research question is: 
1. Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia?   
The second research question addresses the main focus of this study, the entry mode choices of 
Chinese firms entering Australia,  
2. What factors have influenced their choice of entry modes for Australia? 
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The following subsections will elaborate on these two research questions respectively. 
 
3.3.1 Research Question 1 
The aim of this subsection is to identify and assess the existing literature in relation to the selection of 
Australia for investment by Chinese firms and, based on that assessment, develop appropriate, related 
propositions designed to help answer Research Question One.  It first examines the investment 
motives of Chinese MNEs regarding developed and emerging countries, excluding Australia.  This is 
followed by a comparison of the findings from this more general literature with the far more limited 
literature regarding the motives of Chinese MNEs investing in Australia, in order to determine 
whether or not the motivations regarding Australia are different from those regarding other countries.  
In turn, this will suggest appropriate research propositions to be examined in relation to Research 
Question One, particularly where there seem to be significant differences. 
 
The Investment Motivation of Chinese Firms for Countries Other than Australia.  
In the following paragraphs, the author will examine the type of motives of Chinese MNEs engaging 
in FDI respectively, as identified in the literature.  Overall, the range of motives includes market-
seeking, efficiency-seeking, resource-seeking, and strategic asset-seeking (the latter two are 
sometimes referred to as asset-seeking, see for example, Buckley et al., 2007).  A number of push and 
pull factors that have driven Chinese MNEs‟ internationalisation will also be reviewed. 
First of all, Chinese firms may choose to go abroad to seek more market potentials due to the 
saturation of its home market.  Empirical evidence suggests that the most common motivation for 
Chinese MNEs is market-seeking. According to a survey conducted by the China Council for the 
Promotion of International Trade (CCPIT) in 2009, of the 1104 Chinese MNEs who engaged in OFDI 
internationally, market expansion, in other words, market-seeking was the most widely recognised 
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driving force for 39 per cent of the respondents.  The second most common reason for engaging in 
OFDI was to gain advanced know-how and experience, which accounted for 30 per cent of the sample 
population.  This aim, together with 19 per cent of the population who wished to exploit natural 
resources and 19 per cent who wished to acquire reputable brand names, can be construed as asset-
seeking motivation in the broadest sense.  A follow-up survey conducted in 2011 also confirmed that 
seeking overseas markets was the most significant driving force for Chinese MNEs (CCPIT, 2012).   
In addition to the survey conducted by Chinese institutions, Fung, Garcia-Herrero and Siu (2009) 
examined Chinese MNEs from 1991 to 2006 and concluded that market-seeking was a significant 
driving force for Chinese MNEs.  Cheung and Qian (2007) and a more recent qualitative study, Voss 
et al. (2010), have both found that the internationalisation of Chinese MNEs was dominated by 
market-seeking factors.   
Single country studies have tended to support the survey results of the CCPIT (2009, 2010 & 2012).  
Zhang and Van Den Bulcke (1996), for example, conducted a survey of the internationalisation 
motives of Chinese firms in the UK.  They found that market-seeking in regard to the broader, 
European market was the main aim of SOEs, although, interestingly, Zhang and Van Den Bulcke 
suggest that most of them were constrained by a lack of strategic vision (p.142).  Their survey 
instrument was later utilised by Liu and Tian (2008) again in the context of the UK, who confirmed 
this market-seeking focus as one of the main motivating factors for Chinese companies.  Liu and Tian 
(2008) also found that UK-oriented Chinese MNEs considered cultural and language proximity as the 
third most influential factor driving their FDI, due to the relatively high number of Chinese 
expatriates in the UK compared to Europe as a whole.  In addition, Fontagne and Py (2010) in a report 
for the French Research Centre for International Economies (CEPII) once again confirmed that 
Chinese MNEs‟ OFDI in the EU was mostly attracted by its market potential and other market-related 
factors, including “better access to public procurement markets” (Fontagne & Py, 2010: 24).   
Resource-seeking is another common investment motivation among outbound Chinese investors.  
With limited domestic resources and their increasing trading prices, Chinese firms, especially those 
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SOEs and large group companies which have strong financial capital and bargaining power, are 
turning to countries with good natural resource endowments, including oil, gas, and timber.  Also 
noted in the survey by CCPIT, while market-seeking construed the most significant driving force for 
Chinese MNEs, resource acquisition was the second most important reason for Chinese OFDI (CCPIT, 
2012: 13).  However, overall, the relative significance of the resource-seeking motivation seemed to 
have increased in more recent years.  Fung et al. (2009: 96) examined Chinese MNEs from 1991 to 
2006 and found that the regression result for three variables used to proximate the resource-seeking 
motivation – being fuel, food, and metal exports in total exports from the host economy was not 
significant.  Buckley et al. (2007: 509 & 511), on the other hand, while it did not find a significant 
relationship between Chinese OFDI and host country natural resource endowment in general, noticed 
that over time, natural resource endowment became a more significant determinant.  This change may 
be explained by the change in the foreign investment behaviour of Chinese enterprises over time, and 
that this is at least partly due to changes in government policy.  As recognised by Buckley et al. 
(2007), Chinese firms have moved away from undertaking mainly market-seeking strategies towards 
the securing of raw materials to support the country‟s ongoing domestic growth.  Other scholars who 
support this view include Buckley et al. (2008), Haglund (2008), and Zha (2013).   
Another motivation identified in the FDI literature is strategic asset-seeking (sometimes regarded as a 
subset of asset-seeking or resource-seeking motivation, see Buckley et al., 2007: 501).  In recent years, 
an expressed goal of state-directed Chinese OFDI has been to access advanced proprietary technology, 
intangible strategic assets (e.g., brands, local distribution networks) and other capabilities abroad 
(Taylor, 2002; Deng, 2003; and Zhang, 2003).  However, overall, a strategic asset-seeking motivation 
does not seem to be one of the dominant driving forces for Chinese MNEs engaging in OFDI 
activities (Buckley et al., 2007: 510). 
From the above discussion of the existing literature, it can be concluded that Chinese firms invest in 
developed firms mainly for gaining access to a larger market and to some, but growing extent, seek 
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natural resources; and, neither the strategic asset-seeking nor the efficiency-seeking motivations was 
dominant. 
While the above mentioned studies all focused on Chinese investments in industrialised countries 
(except for the two studies of CCPIT which did not distinguish between countries), there has been a 
very limited number of studies examining Chinese MNEs‟ motivations for investing in emerging 
countries.  Ren (2006), for example, investigated the motivation for Chinese investments in Vietnam.  
It concluded that Chinese MNEs invest in Vietnam to: one, explore its emerging large domestic 
market; two, to reduce transaction costs such as high tariffs set for imported goods and transportation 
costs by the Vietnamese Government; three, to seek greater efficiency based on the lower building 
and labour costs in Vietnam compared to China.  Moreover, Africa and Latin America are also 
becoming increasingly popular destinations for Chinese FDI.  In 2011, about 5 per cent of Chinese 
FDI flowed into Africa and 16 per cent into Latin America, compared to 3 per cent into Oceania 
(mainly Australia) (MOFCOM, 2012: 23).  Haglund (2008: 547) conducted a study regarding Chinese 
MNEs‟ investments in “weak African states” such as Zambia, Angola, Sudan, and Nigeria.  He found 
that the first and possibly most immediate objective for their investments in African countries was to 
maintain resource security, which was essential for continued domestic economic growth (Haglund, 
2008: 551).  To conclude, Chinese firms invest in other emerging markets for mainly the following 
reasons: to seek natural resources from countries with abundant endowment; to seek new markets; and 
to seek greater efficiency especially for large labour-intensive manufacturing firms. 
The survey conducted by CCPIT in 2009 revealed a range of push and pull factors that have, 
combined, influenced Chinese investors‟ internationalisation activities.  According to the survey 
results, significant push factors for Chinese MNEs to invest in the developed markets included: the 
Chinese government‟s Go Global strategy and related incentives, a stagnant domestic market in some 
sectors, and the availability of investment capital from domestic sources. The Government‟s Go 
Global strategy and related incentives appeared to be decisive for most surveyed companies (CCPIT, 
2010: 14).  Clearly, the stagnation of the domestic market is related to the market-seeking motivation 
86 
 
 
as discussed above.  However, the push factors in China which influence investments in developing 
countries are quite different.  While government‟s incentives are still important, Chinese companies‟ 
investment in developing countries is also influenced by rising labour costs in the domestic market 
(CCPIT, 2010: 16), which is clearly a concern causing efficiency-seeking investments. 
The pull factors from the host countries also vary according to destination regions.  Regarding 
investments in the developed markets, market potential, access to natural resources, access to skilled 
labour resources and to advanced technology, and acquisition of established brands appear to be 
decisive or very important factors for most MNEs surveyed; access to low cost labour or avoid 
transportation costs did not seem relevant (CCPIT, 2010: 16).  Regarding investments in developing 
countries, the picture is once again, quite different.  Access to natural resources and to low costs 
labour appeared quite important (CCPIT, 2010: 17).  The intention to gain access to natural resources 
can be construed as a resource-seeking motivation, and the interest in low cost labour can be 
construed as an efficiency-seeking motivation.  Following these two factors, market potential is also a 
very important factor suggesting that it is also quite common for Chinese firms to engage in OFDI in 
developing markets to acquire market shares.  However, the survey results showed that factors such as 
access to skilled labour resources, access to advanced technology or acquisition of established brands 
were not relevant in developing markets as compared to developed markets. 
 
The Investment Motivation of Chinese Firms Regarding Australia.  
The following paragraphs review the investment motivation of Chinese MNEs investing in Australia 
as evidenced in the literature to date.  With reference to the limited number of studies available, it 
seems that Chinese MNEs‟ engage in Australian direct investments predominantly for the country‟s 
natural resource endowment.   
As reviewed earlier, studies concerning Chinese MNEs in developed countries in general tend to find 
that Chinese MNEs internationalise for primarily market-seeking purposes.  Though also being a 
87 
 
 
developed country, Australia is distinguished from many other developed countries in terms of its rich 
natural resource endowment. Its significant resource endowment has enticed many Chinese 
enterprises to invest in the country, and not surprisingly the limited number of studies concerning 
Chinese investments in Australia focused almost exclusively on the country‟s resource sector.  The 
following mentioned studies are examples.  As Larum‟s report (2011: 9) for the Australia China 
Business Council pointed out, after analysing statistics from FIRB, Global Investment Tracker, and 
the Heritage Foundation database, for Chinese OFDI, “Australia‟s major attraction is resources”.  In 
his later, 2012 study, Larum confirmed that as reflected both in the number of investments and the 
monetary value involved, Australia‟s resources sector has been the primary target for Chinese 
investments (Larum, 2012: 13).   A 2012 KPMG report also emphasised the importance of Australia‟s 
resource-seeking sectors to Chinese investors (KPMG, 2012).  Zha (2013) also found, more generally, 
that the aim of a secure and stable supply of resources was of the greatest concern for Chinese 
investors, followed by making profits given the volatile resource prices worldwide.  In other words 
the available scholarly research evidence suggests that Chinese MNEs do not invest in Australia for 
primarily market-seeking or efficiency-seeking reasons, but are largely resource oriented (see also, for 
example, Ren, 2006; and Haglund, 2008).  There has been very little description or discussion of 
whether or not market-seeking or strategic asset-seeking motives play a role in stimulating Chinese 
MNE investment in Australia, but based on the prior discussion concerning Chinese FDI motivations 
in other developed regions, it is proposed that these two motives also have an influence on Chinese 
MNEs‟ Australian FDI, an influence not so far detected in the limited literature available.   
Hence, given the limited nature of the available findings regarding other than the resource-seeking 
motivations for Chinese firms investing in Australia,  Proposition 1 is aimed at determining whether 
or not market-seeking and asset-seeking motivations are of importance, 
Proposition 1: Chinese firms invest in Australia for primarily market-seeking and asset-
seeking motivations; 
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In addition, given what the literature suggests is the largely market-seeking motivation of Chinese 
investment in other developed countries, a second, related proposition is proposed,  
Proposition 2: The motives driving Chinese firms to invest in Australia are different from 
those which drive Chinese investment in other countries. 
 
3.3.2 Research Question 2 
The aim of this section is to identify and assess the existing literature in relation to the entry mode 
choice of Chinese firms in regard to Australia and, based on that assessment, develop appropriate, 
related propositions designed to help answer Research Question Two.  The literature suggests that a 
range of factors help determine entry mode choice, notably the type of investment motivation, firm 
size, previous international experience, goodwill capital, government policy and regulations, 
including both the source country (China) and the host country (Australia) and cultural factors.  Hence, 
the section is divided into a number of subsections, each examining the relevant literature in relation 
to a specific factor. 
 
Eclectic Paradigm and Entry Mode Choice 
Recent work shows that investment motivations have an influence on MNEs‟ entry mode choices (for 
example, Bell, 1996, and Cui et al., 2011).  Specifically, it is proposed that market-seeking and asset-
seeking (both natural and intangible) motives influence Chinese MNEs‟ entry mode choices, as 
discussed below.  Though gaining access to cheaper resources and advanced technologies may help 
reduce the production costs of the investing firms and hence, help increase its production efficiency, 
this study adopts the view point of Buckley et al. (2007: 501) that efficiency-seeking FDI occurs in 
the search for lower cost labour in particular.  Given China‟s comparatively low labour cost levels this 
motivation is unlikely, and is not explicitly considered here.  This assumption corresponds with the 
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findings in the literature that efficiency-seeking motivation is not commonly seen in Chinese OFDI 
into developed countries, as discussed earlier in 3.3.1 Research Question One. 
 
Market-seeking motivation.  Research evidence on other countries suggests that a market-seeking 
motivation is often associated with the establishment of a JV.  For example, Bell (1996) used market 
growth rate to proximate market potential and found that firms aiming to attain market shares 
preferred a joint ownership mode.  This is because, the study suggested, a JV enabled the foreign firm 
to utilise the advantages of its local partners to compensate for its own liabilities of foreignness.  
Similarly, Zhang, Zhang and Liu (2007: 769) also found that the JV mode can “neutralising 
environmental deterrence” and is preferred for MNEs with market-seeking objectives, particularly 
when investing in emerging markets.  Therefore, a JV is more desirable in a competitive industrial 
environment where incumbent firms are likely to strategically retaliate against new entrants.   
However, in contrast to the above finding, the JV is normally not the first choice of Chinese MNEs 
because in general, the investment strategies adopted by Chinese MNEs and that of the developed 
country local firms are different (Cui & Jiang, 2009; Cui, et al., 2011).  “Chinese MNEs generally 
adopt cost leadership and niche-market focused competitive strategies, whilst developed country local 
firms usually focus on the development of value-adding technology and product differentiation” (Cui 
et al., 2011: 5).  The study was based on survey results for 138 Chinese MNEs, which is to date one of 
the few studies that have systematically investigated possible factors that may have influenced 
Chinese MNEs entry mode choices.  The difference in strategic foci and operational strategies of 
Chinese MNEs and MNEs from developed countries in general makes it hard for Chinese MNEs to 
operate flawlessly with a local partner through joint venturing, suggesting a preference for the WOS 
mode.  
A number of other studies also support the proposition that the JV is often not the best mode of entry 
for Chinese MNEs when engaging in market-seeking OFDI.  For example, Nicolas (2010), in a case 
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study of Chinese TV producer TCL‟s JV with the French Thomson TV, found that the JV had been a 
failure, with TCL exiting the French market.  There were several reasons for the failure, but cultural 
barriers and conflicts in managerial styles between TCL and Thomson were particularly important 
(Nicolas 2010: 39). Similarly, a 2012 CCPIT study found that overseas JVs are more frequently 
confronted with such challenges than WOSs, largely due to their differing business structures, 
particularly when Chinese MNEs are faced with severe local competition or seeking local market 
shares, with WOS being more successful (CCPIT, 2010: 24; and 2012: 36).  Thus, it is reasonable to 
suspect that the potential operational problems may deter Chinese MNEs from choosing a JV mode of 
entry.  
Hence, regarding Chinese investments in Australia, the following proposition is offered: 
Proposition 3: Chinese firms with a market-seeking motivation tend to choose the WOS mode 
of entry for the Australian market. 
 
Asset-seeking motivation.  It is proposed that an asset-seeking motivation is also influential upon 
Chinese MNEs‟ entry mode choices when investing in Australia.  The term asset-seeking has two 
aspects: one, tangible physical assets such as natural resources, fresh produce, equipment and 
materials; two, strategic assets that are generally intangible but may bring firm-specific advantages 
such as know-how, business networks, and advanced technology.  While there are studies confirming 
that asset-seeking is an important motive for emerging economies to engage in FDI (for example, see 
Campos & Kinoshita, 2003), few have looked at the relationship between this investment motivation 
and the possible entry mode choices of emerging economies‟ MNEs.    
In Cui et al. (2011: 492), it was found that Chinese MNEs preferred full control when asset-seeking 
motivation was of a high strategic priority in their FDI process, because it gives investing firms access 
to the raw materials or intangible resources they are interested in without the possible complications 
of dealing with  local partners.  A WOS allows investing firms to rely on their current strategies and 
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business practices, if they prefer, and to modify them as they see fit.  Often, this full control is 
achieved through Brownfield acquisition (Cui & Jiang, 2009), where an exclusive ownership position 
can be achieved through the full control over acquired foreign assets. It provides managers with not 
only the technological patents, licenses and the production lines, but also, where they exist, the entire 
R&D team, management personnel, and professional employees. 
Hence the author proposes the following proposition: 
Proposition 4a: Chinese firms with an asset-seeking motivation tend to choose the WOS mode 
of entry for the Australian market. 
 
Resource-based Perspective and Entry Mode Choice 
In addition to the above factors, from a resource-based perspective, it has been argued that FDI entry 
mode choice is constrained by the configuration of firm assets or the competitive advantages/ 
disadvantages of a firm.  In other words, it is believed that both the tangible and intangible resources 
firms possess affect their decisions to internationalise, including choices of entry mode (see, Matthew, 
2006; Alon, 2010; Cui & Jiang, 2010; and Lu et al., 2010).  For example, Cui and Jiang (2010: 763) 
argued that Chinese MNEs‟ ability to set up WOSs “may be constrained by their tangible asset 
endowment, most notably their capital asset size”, which simply means firms with more money are 
more likely to set up WOSs.  The tangible resource constraint that might influence Chinese MNEs‟ 
Australian entry mode choices includes corporate size (different measurements may be used including 
number of employees, annual sales, and return on assets, etc.), and the intangible resource constraints 
include the level of previous international experience and goodwill capital a firm possesses.  The 
following paragraphs elaborate on these factors respectively and hence generate four propositions. 
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Firm size.  As will be shown, there have been several studies investigating the possible relationship 
between ownership type and firm size.  In general, the majority of scholars in this field found that 
firm size is positively related to the likelihood for MNEs to establish WOS in a foreign market.  
However, some studies have only found limited or no evidence supporting this view.  It is suggested 
that these contradictory findings maybe attributable to the relative sizes of the firms studied. In order 
to test the argument two propositions are warranted.  The first is that Chinese MNEs with larger sizes 
(see classification of size in Chapter 4 Research Methodology) tend to select the WOS mode for entry 
to the Australian market.  This is because larger firms usually have greater financial resources and a 
more clearly-defined firm-specific culture and managerial style that they would like to retain in their 
overseas subsidiaries, which could be most effectively achieved through the establishment of full-
control WOSs, indicating a preference for the WOS mode (Tsai & Cheng, 2004). In contrast, the 
second, related proposition is that smaller firms with fewer resources are more likely to work 
collectively with others or rely upon network assets, regardless of any preference they may have for 
the WOS mode (Yiu et al., 2007; Zhou, Wu & Luo, 2007; and Lau, Ngo & Yiu, 2010).   
Empirical evidence suggests that the majority of scholars in international business acknowledge the 
significance of firm size for entry mode choice.  For example, Zacharakis (1997), Kuo and Li (2003), 
Yiu et al. (2007), Zhou et al. (2007), Agyenim, Wang, and Yang (2008), Lau et al. (2010), Gao, 
Murray, Kotabe, and Lu (2009) found that firms of larger sizes were more likely to engage in 
international activities to enhance their value and competitiveness through WOS.  In addition, a 
number of researchers have provided evidence supporting the view that firms larger in size tend to 
prefer a full control mode of entry, especially in manufacturing industries (Kogut & Singh, 1988; 
Gomes-Casseres, 1990; Agarwal & Ramaswami, 1992; Aulakh & Kotabe, 1997; and Tsai & Cheng, 
2004).   
However, other researchers have found little or no evidence on the relationship between firm size and 
entry mode choices.  For example, Lau (1992), Erramilli and Rao (1993), Bell (1995), and Berra, 
Piatti and Vitali (1995) found that the effect of firm size was not significant for the choice of entry 
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mode for smaller firms.  It is necessary to note that firms referred to in these studies are “small-to-
medium-sized” companies (Berra, et al., 1995: 67) mostly in service industries (Erramilli & Rao, 
1993: 19).  The difference in findings compared to the majority of the studies is very likely because 
smaller firms have limited resources that they can commit in their foreign investments, so instead of 
devoting their resources to set up a subsidiary with a pre-defined ownership mode, they would in 
reality choose any ownership type that emerges and seems suitable and appropriate in their particular 
case, given their capability.  It is reasonable to suspect that those Chinese MNEs with smaller sizes 
would also demonstrate different preference towards entry mode choices compared to those with 
larger sizes.  In order to test the validity of both of these arguments in relation to the Australian 
market the following two propositions are proposed:  
Proposition 5a: Chinese firms with larger sizes tend to choose the WOS mode of entry for the 
Australian market.  
Proposition 5b: Chinese firms with smaller sizes tend to be indifferent as to their entry mode 
choice for the Australian market.  
 
International experience.  The literature has found abundant evidence supporting the view that 
greater levels of international experience increase the likelihood of an MNE choosing a high control, 
WOS entry mode.  This is because experienced MNEs will be more confident of their capacity to 
manage the challenges of establishing a new international operation, without having to rely upon a 
foreign partner. The learning involved in earlier OFDI activities, it is argued, develops the firm‟s 
capability to detect opportunities, cope with foreign market risks, and reduce the level of uncertainty 
in later OFDI ventures.  This was found to be the case, for example, in Chen and Mujtaba (2007: 330) 
examining MNEs in general and in Kessapidou and Varsakelis (2002: 273) concerning Greek 
companies.  In order to test whether this common finding holds true for the Australian market, 
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Proposition 6, below, indicates that Chinese MNEs with more international experience will be more 
inclined to set up full control, WOS subsidiaries than those with limited or no experience.    
Empirical evidence from Phatak, Muralidharan, and Chandran (1996: 39), Brouthers and Brouthers 
(2000: 90 & 93), Ekeledo and Sivakumar (2004: 76), as well as Hu and Fan (2011: 560) also suggests 
that firms with no or limited international experience tend to choose a low-control entry mode such as 
a JV to “limit their risk exposure” (Chen & Mujtaba, 2007: 330).  In the case of Chinese FDI, a case 
study of Galanz, a successful Chinese manufacturer of white goods, also confirmed that the 
accumulation of international experience stimulated the company to select the full-control, WOS for 
cross-border investments (Ge & Ding, 2008). 
It should be noted that there are, however, a limited number of earlier studies that provide different 
findings regarding the influence of international experience.  Kogut and Singh (1988: 426), who 
studied foreign entries into the US and Erramilli (1991: 487) are two studies that did not find a 
significant relationship between previous international experience and the selection of the WOS mode.  
However, as Kogut and Singh‟s work focused only on the US as the destination country, and their 
study was based on data from nearly thirty years ago, its relevance to the Chinese context is perhaps 
limited.  Even Kogut and Singh (1988: 426) noted that it was still “premature… to speculate on the 
causes” of their finding that there was an insignificant relationship between experience and the 
selection of the full-control entry mode.  Erramilli‟s study, focused only on service firms so that, as 
with Kogut and Singh‟s earlier study, its continuing validity and generalisability is questionable.  
Hence, the following proposition is raised: 
Proposition 6: Chinese firms with previous international experience tend to select the WOS 
mode of entry for the Australian market. 
 
Goodwill capital.  Goodwill capital refers to the asset value of a company name or a brand name 
(Mueller & Supina, 2002: 233).  It is residual, in that it is the market value of a company, minus the 
95 
 
 
value of its tangible assets, its R&D capital, and its advertising capital (Mueller & Supina, 2002:235).  
It cannot be bought or sold separately because of its residual and intangible character.  Goodwill 
capital, as the study of Mueller and Supina (2002: 243) suggests, can be as high as 80 per cent of a 
corporation‟s market value, and fluctuates considerably.  Hence, it comes as no surprise that MNEs, 
especially those successful ones with significant goodwill capital, are very cautious when choosing 
their entry mode for a new market, though the research findings are mixed, as noted below.   The 
majority of the studies in the literature have found that the higher the level of goodwill capital of a 
firm, the greater the likelihood of it selecting the WOS over the JV mode.  However, Cui et al. (2011) 
and Shieh and Wu (2012), both focused exclusively on developing country initiated OFDI, and found 
no significant evidence supporting that view.  Based on these latter findings, it is proposed that the 
level of goodwill capital an MNE possesses affect its entry mode choice in such a way that a shared 
control mode is preferred by companies with higher level of goodwill capital.   
Stopford and Wells (1972), Gatignon and Anderson (1986), and Arregle, Hebert and Beamish (2006), 
for example, all found a positive relationship between the investing firm's advertising intensity, which 
could be construed as positively related to the level of goodwill capital the firm possesses, and the 
propensity to establish WOSs.  This is because MNEs that produce intensive advertising find WOSs 
offer them the most effective protection for their brand value (Arregle et al. 2006; and Shieh & Wu, 
2012).  Similarly, by using the marketing intensity of the subsidiary as a measure for the firm's 
reputation and hence its goodwill capital, Gomes-Casseres (1989) also found that it tended to induce 
MNEs to choose a full control mode for their foreign affiliate, because again, a full control mode 
offers better protection for their brand images.  Caves (1982) also highlighted the danger of 
local partners, who had less to lose from degrading a brand than did the foreign entrants.  Therefore, 
high-control entry modes such as WOSs were considered to be the most suitable governance 
structures where the potential for free-riding was high (Caves, 1982).  Research regarding other firms 
in other developing countries provides similar findings, for example, Phatak, Muralidharan and 
Chandran (1996: 45) found that firm specific assets and tacit know-how was positively associated 
with the degree of control sought in the entry mode. 
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In the Chinese context, Deng (2003), in examining the choices of entry modes of foreign firms 
investing in China, also found that there was a positive relationship between the goodwill capital a 
firm held and its subsequent full or high control mode of entry.  However,  Cui et al. (2011: 7),  found 
that as late participants in global markets, most Chinese MNEs were still in the process of building 
their global brands: “Their current business reputation is regional and not globally distinct, which 
does not generate extra value for their products and services, and therefore does not necessarily cause 
free-riding risk”.  Cui et al. (2011) also argued that Chinese firms with relatively higher goodwill 
capital may be perceived by their foreign counterparts as more trustworthy potential partners.  
Moreover, once such a JV partnership is successfully established, with the help from local partners, it 
might guide these Chinese firms through uncertainties and risks in the new market and thereby 
preserve their goodwill capital.  Similarly, Shieh and Wu (2012), who investigated Chinese MNEs‟ 
entry mode choices into Vietnam, also purported a significant relationship between goodwill capital 
and firms‟ full control WOS mode.  The above discussion leads to the development of Proposition 7, 
that: 
Proposition 7: Chinese firms who value their goodwill capital at a higher level tend to select 
the JV mode of entry for the Australian market.  
 
Institutional Perspective and Entry Mode Choice 
As noted in the previous section, given the extent of state control of the Chinese economy, 
institutional constraints, reflected in both formal rules and informal norms, are likely to have had far-
reaching effects on the internationalisation activities of Chinese MNEs, and in this context, their 
foreign entry mode choices.  It is suggested that the institutional factors relevant to such choices are 
derived from three sources; the domestic, „home‟ country; the foreign, „host‟ country; and the cultural 
distance between the two countries concerned.  It is suggested that the less stringent is government 
regulation and control of market entry by foreign firms, in either the home or host country, the more 
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likely a  full control WOS will be selected.  Also, given the high cultural distance between China and 
Australia, Chinese MNEs investing in Australia are prone to use a high control mode to allow them 
more flexibility in their daily operations.  
 
Chinese government policy and regulations.  There have been relatively few scholarly studies 
investigating the influence of Chinese government policy on Chinese MNEs‟ entry mode choices.  
The available historical data indicates that there has been a shift in entry mode preference across time, 
accompanying the change in government OFDI regulations, as noted below.  
The Chinese government has influenced the entry mode choices of Chinese firms, although the mode 
preferred has varied over time.  In the 1990s, for example, Chinese firms investing abroad were 
encouraged to apply to establish foreign affiliates, provided they had sufficient capital, technical and 
operational know-how “and a suitable joint venture partner” (Buckley et al., 2007: 504).  The 
preference for JVs was aimed at encouraging the Chinese partner to transfer technology and 
managerial knowledge back to China and also to attenuate the business risk involved in overseas 
operations (Voss et al., 2007: 7).  As China‟s OFDI increased, government policy became more 
liberal resulting in a rapid increase in the selection of the WOS mode by Chinese firms.  Sixty-one per 
cent, for example, of overseas affiliates in approved projects took the WOS mode in 2001 compared 
to 30 per cent in 1991 (MOFCOM, 2002).   In 2004, the Government,  in its  “Decision on reforming 
the investment system” (hereafter “Decision”), officially encouraged domestic enterprises to engage 
in FDI with “various ownership types” given that investors think that “conditions are mature” 
(MOFCOM, 2004: 10).  The change in policy reflected: one, a growing confidence among the 
regulating authorities that managers of Chinese MNEs had become sufficiently experienced and 
skilled to take effective control of the activities of geographically-dispersed affiliates; two, on a 
somewhat speculative basis, the greater use of WOS may reflect the increased availability of 
investment funds for international activities, particularly after the government liberalised the capital 
raising requirements imposed upon Chinese MNEs in 2003 (SAFE, 2003).   
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The government‟s effort to streamline and encourage FDI activities of Chinese MNEs was welcomed 
by most Chinese investors.  Based on a series of interviews, Buckley et al. (2010: 33) showed that a 
range of incentives were designed to make investing in foreign countries attractive, including 
preferential long-term loans for large Chinese OFDI projects, and on a more modest scale, seminars 
organised to inform investors about potential foreign business opportunities, market conditions, and 
foreign legal environments.  One of the interviewees in Buckley et al. (2010: 38) indicated that the 
whole OFDI application process was simplified by the government to such an extent that it became 
merely a registration process aimed at gathering information about “where and how many Chinese 
firms invest abroad”.  At present, only investments in some critical industries such as the resources 
sector, or those exceeding USD30 million need the approval of the central government, with the rest 
being approved at the regional level (MOFCOM, 2008).    
A survey by CCPIT in 2011 showed that nearly 70 per cent of newly established overseas subsidiaries 
of Chinese MNEs took the form of WOS, in contrast to 30 per cent who chose to set up JVs (CCPIT, 
2012: 19).  Specifically, 73 per cent of surveyed firms thought the support provided by the Chinese 
government, including frequently updated reports regarding foreign investment conditions, a 
simplified administration process related to the investments, and gradually improving overseas legal 
protection for Chinese firms had all contributed to their decisions to establish WOSs by Chinese 
MNEs (CCPIT, 2012: 26).  Proposition 8, below, is developed to investigate whether Chinese firms 
investing in Australia feel that Chinese government support lead to the selection of the WOS mode:  
Proposition 8: Chinese firms who perceive the Chinese governmental support as being helpful 
tend to select the WOS mode of entry for the Australian market.  
 
Host government policy and regulations.  The  literature regarding Chinese OFDI  tends to suggest 
that sometimes investing firms may have to sacrifice full ownership in order to operate legitimately in 
a market with restrictive regulations towards incoming investments (for example, Cui et al. 2011; 
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Voss et al. 2010; Deng, 2011; and Li, 2013).  With reference to regulatory practices in the US, Brazil 
and Australia, for example, it can also be seen that in some cases, investors have to face the 
uncertainty and higher possibility of rejected applications if a full control entry mode was proposed.  
Hence, as indicated below, it is proposed that a restrictive or seemingly restrictive host government 
regulatory environment will make Chinese MNEs prone to adopt a JV mode of entry to minimise 
public controversy and possible governmental scrutiny.  
In a host country with a high level of regulatory restrictiveness, foreign investing firms are subject to 
discriminatory host government policies on foreign ownership in local business, access to local 
resources, mandates for exporting, and many other constraining policies.   In such circumstances, as 
found by Cui et al. (2011), a JV mode of entry is often preferred, since in these markets the WOS 
entry mode generally requires more stringent government scrutiny and often involves more 
restrictions.  A similar conclusion was reached by Voss et al. (2010) and Deng (2011), who found that 
in most cases where the host country institutional barriers are higher for SOEs than for non-SOEs, 
SOEs tend to opt for the JV entry mode “to exchange ownership for legitimacy” (Deng, 2011: 7).  The 
findings of Yiu and Makino also support this view, that is, the more restrictive the regulatory domain 
of the host country, the more likely the multinational enterprise would choose a JV mode of entry 
(2002).   
A number of countries provide examples of increased regulatory constraints as regards foreign 
investment. For example, the US Congress promulgated the Exon–Florio Amendment based on its 
Defense Production Act (1950) in 1988, aimed at scrutinising then increasing incoming foreign 
investment, particularly those acquisitions initiated by Japanese firms. The amendment noted that all 
foreign investments that might affect national security may be reviewed and if deemed to pose a threat 
to security, the President may block the investment when “there is credible evidence that leads the 
President to believe that the foreign interest exercising control might take action that threatens to 
impair the national security” (US Statutes at Large, 1988: 1107).  In addition, the Foreign Investment 
and National Security Act (2007) includes energy supplies among critical US assets that require 
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special consideration when faced with potential foreign investment, and it further imposes restrictions 
on the right of foreign SOEs to conduct mergers and acquisitions.  According to Li (2013: 9), federal 
intervention at least indirectly led to the failed investment attempts of Huawei regarding 3Corn, and 
the acquisition of Bear Sterns by CITIC securities.  Similarly, Brazil has imposed restrictions upon 
FDI in its resources section, including the requirements that foreign natural persons or individual 
companies can only explore and exploit its resources if the company is incorporated in Brazil,  has at 
least 51 per cent Brazilian capital, two thirds Brazilian employees and a Brazilian majority in 
management (Manucci Advogados, 2013). 
In the case of Australia, FIRB oversees proposed direct international investment with a value greater 
than AUD$248 million as at 1 January, 2013.  FIRB takes a “case-by-case approach” to proposed 
investments (Australian Treasury, 2013: 1), with the aim of maximising investment flows but also 
protecting the national interest. FIRB prescribes a list of sensitive sectors which may receive more 
detailed assessment before the application is approved or rejected.  However, according to FIRB, 
there are no hard or fast rules as to what clearly classifies as a sensitive investment (Australian 
Treasury, 2013: 1).   Australia‟s Foreign Investment Policy notes that for an investment proposal to be 
classified as non-threatening to Australia‟s national interest, particularly if it involves foreign 
government investors, it would be better if it can assure “the existence of external partners or 
shareholders in the investment; the level of non-associated ownership interests; the governance 
arrangements for the investment; ongoing arrangements to protect Australian interests from non-
commercial dealings…” (Australian Treasury, 2013: 8).  Clearly, proposed investments that fall into 
this category will be more favourably assessed if they are JVs involving suitable “external partners or 
shareholders”.  Li (2013: 15) argued that FIRB has a “de facto requirement for minority shareholding” 
for Chinese companies who pursue an M&A project in the mining sector.  It is not a formal 
requirement, but rather a norm that has been “intermittently enforced” by FIRB at the federal level (Li, 
2013: 8).  At the state level, there also seems to be a preference for large resource companies to accept 
Chinese investors as a source of capital and stable demand, as opposed to a majority shareholder (Li, 
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2013: 9). Given these findings, Proposition 9 is included to test the impact of Australian government 
regulation on entry mode choice, as follows: 
Proposition 9: The greater the perception by Chinese managers that Australian regulations 
constrain investment in Australia by Chinese firms, the more likely it is that they will select 
the JV entry mode. 
 
Cultural factors.  A number of scholars have found evidence supporting the view that firms are more 
likely to set up full control WOS in countries with a bigger cultural distance from the state of origin  
(for example, Hennart & Larimo, 1998; Makino & Neupert, 2000; Mayrhofer, 2004; and Chen & 
Mujtaba, 2007). Others, however, have found that emerging market MNEs faced with a significant 
cultural distance instead tended to establish JVs (Ang & Michailova, 2008).  The available evidence is 
thus decidedly mixed.  As China is an emerging economy and Chinese culture is very different from 
that of Australia, it is proposed that Chinese MNEs will tend to choose a shared control JV mode for 
Australia as it will assist them mitigate the unfamiliarity associated with the different business 
environment.   
The notion of cultural distance was first developed by Hofstede in a series of studies (1991, 1994).  
Hofstede‟s model identifies four primary dimensions in differentiating cultures: Power Distance (PDI), 
Individualism (IDV), Masculinity (MAS), and Uncertainty Avoidance (UAI).   In his follow up study 
with Chinese employees and managers, he added a fifth Dimension–that of Long Term Orientation 
(LTO) focused on the degree to which the society embraces, or does not embrace, long-term devotion 
to traditional, forward thinking values (Hofstede, 2007).   
As Mayrhofer indicated in regard to Hofstede‟s work (2004), all six studies measuring the influence 
of power distance on the choice of market entry mode indicate that power distance has a positive and 
significant influence on the likelihood of choosing a full control mode.  This is because MNEs 
perceive that venturing with companies from a country with a high power distance would pose more 
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problems when it comes to decisions regarding daily operations than it would if a sole ownership 
subsidiary was set up instead.  Hennart and Larimo (1998), Makino and Neupert (2000), and Chen 
and Mujtaba (2007) also support this finding.   
However, differing opinions do exist.  For instance, Ang and Michailova (2008: 557) proposed that 
when cultural distance increases, firms from emerging economics were more likely to set up JVs so 
that they can “rely on their host partners to gain and sustain legitimacy”.  Based on Hofstede‟s scores 
of cultural dimensions, China exhibits a markedly different pattern as compared with that of 
Australia‟s (Hofstede, 1993), indicating the large cultural difference between the two countries: PDI – 
China 80, Australia 36; IDV – China 20, Australia 90; MAS – China 51, Australia 58; UAI – China 
60, Australia 48; and LTO – China 118, Australia 28.  Hence, Proposition 10 is developed in order to 
test the impact of cultural distance on entry mode choice for Chinese firms in Australia:  
Proposition 10: The significant cultural distance between China and Australia results in a 
tendency for Chinese firms to select the JV mode of entry for the Australian market. 
 
3.4 Conclusion 
This chapter defined the basic concepts used in the study, provided an overview of the dominant 
theoretical perspectives related to internationalisation and entry mode choice, critically reviewed the 
literature drawing on these perspectives and, based on the findings of that review, developed two 
research questions and ten related research propositions.  
It argued that, given the limitations of the major theoretical perspectives or frameworks, the thesis 
should adopt a multi-framework approach that combines, in particular, the eclectic paradigm, the 
resource-based perspective and the institutional perspective, as has been increasingly the case in the 
more recent literature.  It will draw upon each of them, as appropriate, to generate insights into the 
internationalisation of Chinese firms and their entry mode choices regarding Australia.  
103 
 
 
Chapter 4: Research Methodology 
This study utilises primarily a case study based research methodology supplemented by secondary 
information from government, web resources, the specific companies being studied and the existing 
academic literature.  The purpose of this chapter is to describe and justify the research methodology 
adopted in this thesis.  It contains information regarding why such a method was chosen, what the 
strengths and weaknesses are regarding the application of this method, how the population was 
identified, how participants were selected and recruited, and how the data obtained is documented and 
compiled for detailed analysis in the next chapter.   
The chapter is structured as follows: Section 4.1 introduces the case study research method and argues 
why it is appropriate for this thesis.  Section 4.2 describes how the population of Chinese MNEs 
operating in Australia was defined and what procedures were undertaken to finalise the selection of 
the eight cases.  Section 4.3 provides a description of the details of the on-site and telephone 
interviews with participants.  By referring to previous literature, this section also discusses how the 
data collected from the field was analysed, linking to the next chapter, Chapter 5: Analysis and 
Findings.   Section 4.4 provides a conclusion. 
 
4.1 The Case Study Approach 
As described by Yin (2003: 13), a case study is “an empirical enquiry that investigates a 
contemporary phenomenon within its real-life context”.  It is the preferred strategy when “how” or 
“why” questions are being posed, when the investigator has little control over events, and when the 
focus is on a contemporary phenomenon within some real-life context (Yin, 2003:1).  Therefore, it is 
very useful for exploring new processes and behaviours, for example when there is a lack of previous 
understanding or knowledge regarding a certain issue, as the detail or the extent of the problems 
concerned is largely unknown to the researcher (Yin, 2003).  Ghauri (2004: 109) also confirms this 
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viewpoint.  He values the case study method when the area of research is “relatively less known, and 
the researcher is engaged in theory-building types of research”.  Hence, given the very limited 
existing research regarding the reasons for Chinese investment in Australia, particularly the lack of 
studies of their entry mode choice, a case study approach was regarded as appropriate.  In essence, the 
study is of an exploratory nature, a type well suited to the use of the case study method as argued by 
Yin (2003) and Ghauri (2004).   
In addition, given the detailed focus of a case study, they have the potential for discovering and 
illustrating casual paths and mechanisms through the shear richness of detail. Further, as Yin notes, 
they also have the potential for helping identify casual influences and interaction effects which may 
not be treated as operationalised variables in a statistical study (Yin, 2003).  In particular, he notes 
that the case study‟s “unique strength” is its ability to incorporate a full variety of differing types of 
evidence, including documents, artefacts, interviews and observations (Yin 2003: 8).  
This thesis is not the first study to investigate the internationalisation process and particularly entry 
mode selection of Chinese MNEs by using the case study method.  However, as summarised by Deng 
(2011), the previous case studies tended to focus on a small number of prominent, large Chinese firms.  
For example, Nicolas (2010) looked at TCL‟s internationalisation strategies in France; Ge and Ding 
(2008) examined a successful Chinese white goods manufacturer Galanz; and Niosi and Tschang 
(2009) analysed the leaders of the Chinese software industry including Huawei and Lenovo.  These 
prominent companies are largely highly profitable SOEs, often with an officially sanctioned 
monopoly. Thus, their limited focus provides only a limited understanding of the internationalisation 
and entry mode choices of the full range of Chinese firms, let along those choices regarding Australia.  
This study, with its focus on a range of both small and large Chinese firms, aims to generate a more 
extensive understanding by examining a series of cases which differ in size, ownership type, industry, 
and firm duration.  It will also generate findings which will be used to test the validity of aspects of 
existing FDI theories.  
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The case study approach adopted is qualitative in nature.  As indicated by Easterby-Smith, Thorpe and 
Lowe (1991) and Gummesson (1991), there are several advantages to the qualitative case study 
method.  With reference to this thesis, these advantages include:  
 One, it enables the researcher to comprehend and clarify in detail the experiences of 
individual companies – in the case of this thesis, it enabled the author to examine in greater 
detail the decision making of Chinese firms‟ internationalisation processes, including their 
entry mode choices, in the Australian context;  
 Two, it focuses on firm representatives‟ understanding and interpretations rather than seeking 
general laws for behaviour across the whole population, thus providing a more precise 
understanding of specific situations – the majority of data collected through this thesis was 
gathered directly from top level managers, the group of people that have the richest and most 
extensive knowledge of their firms‟ internationalisation decisions;  
 Three, it allows the researcher to undergo the research process together with the interview 
participants and interpret research issues from their perspective – in this thesis, the bulk of the 
issues identified were drawn from those interviewed, although also compared with those in 
the existing literature, so that the analysis reflects the actual investment situation of Chinese 
firms in Australia;  
 Four, it provides details on managerial and corporate governance issues that may be of 
interest to managers of potential outward investing Chinese MNEs;  
 Five, it provides information collected from a variety of different interviewees, assisting in 
the application of a triangulation approach to help achieve greater validity; 
 Six, it assists in the assessment of existing theory and empirical findings by comparing them 
with the findings from a detailed examination of relevant cases.   
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4.1.1 The Limitations of the Case Study Approach 
While, as noted above, the case study approach provides a number of valuable benefits, it also has a 
number of established limitations.  One limitation is the case study‟s dependency on a relatively few 
resources to generate conclusions, sometimes resulting in the relatively weak internal validity of its 
findings.  This is particularly the case when conducting interviews, such as were undertaken for this 
study.  As indicated by Neuman (2000), if one researcher conducts interviews of people‟s behaviour 
or choice, a single object (interviewee) means “the limitations of the one observer become the 
limitations of the study” (p.125), and therefore, adding multiple interviewees can add alternative 
perspectives, backgrounds, and social characteristics to minimise the influence of such limitations.  
This remedial process is called triangulation, in which data is collected from different times, space or 
persons (Denzin, 2006).  The triangulation process can help to enhance the credibility of the data 
(Lincoln & Guba, 1985).  As described by Herr and Anderson (2005: 56), “The notion of triangulation, 
or the inclusion of multiple perspectives, guards against viewing events in a simplistic or self-serving 
way.”  Therefore, when applying the case study method, it is necessary to “triangulate” data sources 
wherever possible, as has been the case in this study.  
Another common limitation regarding the case study approach is that it provides relatively little basis 
for scientific generalisation (Yin, 1994).  In case study research, only one or a few cases are examined, 
so it cannot, without further study, produce findings which are universally representative (Veal, 2005).  
Instead of developing rigorous hypotheses ready for scientific testing, propositions are developed to 
see to what extent they were confirmed in the case study context of this thesis.  The findings related to 
the proposition can be used to inform and guide future qualitative and quantitative research to achieve 
a greater degree of generalisability.  
As Yin (1994) notes, construct validity can be problematic in case study research and it has been a 
source of criticism because of potential investigator subjectivity.  Hence, Yin (1994) proposes up to 
three remedies to counteract this issue.  One, using multiple sources of evidence, as was the case in 
this study; two, establishing a chain of evidence; and three, having a draft case study report reviewed 
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by key informants.  This study has attempted to ensure construct validity by using data triangulation, 
as noted, where the researcher took the transcribed data from a number of interviewees in each firm 
and compared it to the recorded interviews and notes across all interviewees.  Also, the researcher was 
able to establish a reliable chain of evidence by connecting themes identified in the different 
interviews and, where available, comparing that evidence with that available in published sources.  In 
addition, each transcript was emailed to each interviewee for their consideration upon request.  
 
4.2 Case Selection 
This section elaborates on how cases for this thesis were selected.  It starts off by outlining the criteria 
used for sampling and screening different Chinese MNEs, and is then followed by a step by step 
description of the actual selection process.  A list of the cases finally selected is attached at the end of 
this section which indicates the industries each company is in, how long they have operated in 
Australia, and how many interviewees were engaged. 
The selection of cases is crucial for reliable and informative research.  In this thesis, to enable 
discussion regarding propositions developed in Chapter 3 Section 3.3 „Proposition Development‟, a 
list of criteria was defined to guide the researcher through the sample selection process, as outlined 
below: 
 One, the list of cases should comprise companies in a variety of industries to avoid final 
results bearing an industry-specific bias; 
 Two, the cases to be examined should cover companies of a range of  different sizes (large 
and small in terms of number of employees); 
 Three, the cases to be examined should include all major types of ownership, including 
government-owned (SOEs), public and private enterprises; and 
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 Four, the cases to be examined should comprise MNEs with differing extents of overseas 
investment and differing levels of experience, particularly regarding their investments in 
Australia. 
China‟s MOFCOM administers the applications of Chinese MNEs for OFDI.  The website of 
MOFCOM contains a database which provides general information regarding most, if not all Chinese 
firms who have gained approval to undertake overseas direct investments since 1980 (MOFCOM, 
2013a).  A list comprising of 445 enterprises was retrieved as at 31
st
 July 2011 from the database 
containing information about all companies that have made direct investments in Australia since 1980.  
It should be noted that some private or small-scale enterprises may not have been included in the 
database, as noted by Davies (2013: 43) and that failed companies have not been excluded from the 
list.  However, despite these limitations, there is no other source that provides fuller or more accurate 
information of which the author is aware.  
The distribution of the 445 enterprises by industry is provided in Table 2-9 in Chapter 2 Section 2.3 
„The Australian Market‟.  The author then searched online for the official websites of the 445 
enterprises (where available) and recorded their contact details including email addresses and 
telephone numbers.  The contact details of the staff responsible for overseas investments of the 
companies were also identified and recorded where available.  For those companies without websites 
(roughly 10 per cent of the population), their contact details were gathered from a variety of other 
sources such as job-seeking websites.  In China, most small companies recruit through those 
professional platforms (such as 51job.com, yingjiesheng.com), and those companies often leave 
contact numbers or email addresses of recruitment staff for individual job-seekers to contact them 
directly.  This gave the researcher contact details for small companies.  The researcher then grouped 
companies by industry, and started contacting firms in different industries in order to gain a 
reasonably diversified industrial distribution. As only senior managers were likely to have had 
experience with internationalisation and entry mode decisions, they were the main target for 
interviews.   
109 
 
 
In order to triangulate, it is understandable that perhaps “the more the better” regarding the number of 
interviewees.  However, the actual number of interviewees is an unavoidable limitation for this study.  
This is because only senior managers or above may be familiar with their company‟s 
internationalisation processes, and the number of those available as potential interviewees was very 
limited in each company, let along the difficulties in getting their consent to participate in this study.  
Hence, each case conducted involved only two to three interviewees.  To at least partially remedy this 
limitation, the interview data was supplemented by a range of web-based and textual material, 
including corporate reports, information in the media and a limited number of interviews with 
government officials from China and Australia.  These sources of information helped the researcher to 
get a better understanding regarding the enterprises‟ financial situation and operational strategy before 
and during their Australia operations. 
Potential participants were contacted by telephone or email.  In almost all cases the phone numbers of 
managers in responsible departments were not publicly available.  Some companies, however, chose 
to release the email addresses of those departmental managers.  Therefore, when neither the phone 
numbers nor the email addresses of relevant managers were available, phone calls were made to the 
receptionist or overseas investment department to gain contact information of relevant personnel.  In 
the phone call, the author introduced the project briefly, and asked if the company would participate 
in the study.  After the phone call a formal invitation letter was sent by email to those agreeing to 
participate, containing more detailed information about the study and formally requested the 
participation of senior managers.  After two weeks, if no feedback was received, a follow up call was 
made to encourage their participation.   After several rounds of communication it was decided that 
eight companies would be used as distinctive cases in this research.   
As expected, it proved difficult and time-consuming to contact potential interviewees.  Of the eight 
cases, only one was contacted through emailing, the others were all connected directly through three 
to five rounds of telephone communication.  This number is small, and is one of the limitations of this 
thesis.  Nevertheless, from the point of view of the researcher, eight cases are sufficient for the 
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following reasons.  First, as argued by Yin (1994), there is no ideal formula for selecting the number 
of cases to utilise – it is mainly up to the judgment of the researcher.  Second, the eight enterprises 
covered several industries and were of different sizes, ownership types, and duration of Australian 
operation, in line with the pre-defined selection criteria.  As a result, although the total number of 
companies that agreed to participate in this research was limited, the author believes that it provides 
valuable insights regarding Chinese firms in Australia.    
The following table, Table 4-11, provides a summary of the cases that this thesis has examined.   
Table 4-11: Cases and codes of interviewees 
Case No. Industry Size Ownership Type FDI in Australia since Interviewee Codes 
CS1 Biochemistry Large SOE 2008 T1 
    
T2 
T3 
CS2 Mining Large SOE 2009 V1 
     
V2 
CS3 Mining Large Public 2009 C1 
     
C2 
     
C3 
CS4 Manufacturing Large Public 2006 H1 
     
H2 
     
H3 
CS5 Livestock Small Private 2008 S1 
     
S2 
     
S3 
CS6 Pharmaceutical Small Private 2006 Z1 
     
Z2 
CS7 Fur & Leather Small Private 2006 X1 
     
X2 
CS8 Dairy Large Public 2010 B1 
          B2 
      Australia Government Official 
  
G1 
Chinese Government Official 
  
G2 
 
4.3 Data Collection and Analysis 
This section first discusses the procedures involved in the data collection stage, where and how 
interviews were conducted and what questions were asked.  Second, it introduces the methods applied 
to analyse the data so as to address the research questions.   
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As described earlier, the interview was the major method for data collection used in this thesis.  Table 
4-11 indicates that 22 interviews were conducted in total, one of which was with a government 
official from China, one with a current government official from Australia.  Five of the twenty two 
interviews were conducted by telephone, the remainder on a face to face basis. In all cases the 
structure of the interviews was the same, as follows.  
1. I introduced myself, as the interviewer, to the interviewee and thanked them for their 
participation.  
2. I briefly reminded them of the objectives of the PhD and the objectives of the interview 
(these had already been provided in written or electronically to the interviewees). 
3. The interviewee was reminded that the interview was voluntary and that they could 
withdraw at any time.  
4. At this stage, with the agreement of the interviewee, digital-recording commenced. 
5. The questions then commenced, based on a standard list (see below)  
6. Upon completion of the list of questions I indicated that the interview was now at an end 
and again thanked the interviewee for their participation.  
7. I reminded the interviewee that interview transcripts would be made available upon request. 
All interviewees were asked a set list of standard questions as below.  The interviews with all 
corporate managers were conducted in Chinese, with requests for clarification of questions being dealt 
with by the researcher.  Then, in each case, a range of follow-up questions were raised depending on 
the answers the researcher got from the standard questions being asked: 
Q1. Why did your company invest in Australia? 
Q2. What entry mode did your company chose? 
Q3. Who was involved in the choice of entry mode and when was the final decision made? 
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Q4. What factors determined the choice of entry mode? 
The collection and analysis of the interview data followed that recommended by Huberman and Miles 
(1994).  In summary, they suggest that qualitative data analysis should embrace three linked sub-
processes: data reduction, data display, and conclusion verification.  The data reduction stage involves 
filtering various information gathered during data collection, such as diary, interview notes, interview 
transcripts, and contextual and background information.  This aim of this process is to reduce the 
amount of information available for further investigation and save time and effort in the next display 
stage by identifying key themes and patterns in the material collected.  The next stage, data display, 
involves visually displaying the reduced data, primarily through the formulation of detailed matrices 
encompassing the key themes and patterns identified.  The final stage is that of conclusion verification, 
involving the interpretation of the reduced data emanating from the data reduction and display stages.   
Based on the above, first, every interview was digitally recorded and subsequently transcribed and 
translated by the bilingual researcher.  This produced 227 pages of transcribed material.  Transcribing 
the interviews enabled the researcher to more easily identify key issues and patterns and get a better 
„feel‟ for the data.   
Key words and phrases were identified, highlighted and recorded both on the relevant sections of each 
printed transcript and in a separate log book.  The author also identified key ideas expressed or 
implied in the transcripts, and recorded them as sets of „self-developed‟ labels.  For example, words 
such as “experience definitely mattered” and “prefer full control mode” were extracted and recorded 
directly from the transcripts; while “to secure iron ore supply” can be construed as “natural resource-
seeking” and was therefore recorded in the relevant section as well.  These formed the codes of the 
data pool.  As the coding developed, the log book also enabled the researcher to record reflections and 
observations on the data.  The reflections and observations included understandings of the codes – 
how they interrelated and how they explained the research questions; as well as any contradictions 
and anomalies identified in each case.  This strategy helped the researcher to recognise any trend or 
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pattern out of the data pool.  The process of reading and coding was repeated several times to make 
sure that all relevant information was filtered.  
Following the first stage of data reduction, the codes were grouped according to the research 
questions they concerned.  Specifically, codes relevant to answer Research Question One, “Why have 
Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia through OFDI?” and Research Question Two, “What 
factors have influenced their choices of entry modes for Australia?” were grouped separately.  
Through analysis of the interview data, it was apparent that eight factors emerged regarding the 
discussion around Research Question Two, including: market-seeking motivation, asset-seeking 
motivation, size, experience, goodwill, Chinese governmental support, Australian governmental 
scrutiny, and cultural distance.  Therefore, relevant codes were further grouped according to the 
specific factor they related to.  During the grouping stage, it was noted that several codes were related 
to more than one factor.  For example, “prefer WOS in ideal situation” was a common response of 
many managers when asked about their entry mode decision process, and it was mentioned constantly 
in discussions regarding many factors, including size, prior international experience, and institutional 
environment.  Therefore, a repetition and cross-referencing in grouping was necessary regarding some 
codes.   
Then in the next stage, data display, the grouped codes were presented on a „mind map‟ showing all 
the connections.  This process visualised all codes relevant to answering each question, and showed 
intuitively how they were related to each other, which facilitated further analysis by the researcher.  A 
simple example of what and how codes were linked to a research question is illustrated in Figure 4-7.  
It is an excerpt from the larger mind map and shows codes relevant to the discussion of factor “size”, 
one of the factors identified regarding Research Question Two “What factors have influenced their 
choices of entry modes for Australia?” 
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Figure 4-7: Data display – excerpt of mind map 
 
In the third stage of conclusion verification, two types of interpretation regarding the sorted data sets 
were involved.  Firstly, a long, primarily descriptive representation of each case was prepared.  This 
comprised what normally appears in the case study literature as background knowledge or 
demographic information.  The second type of interpretation was the analysis directly addressing the 
research questions proposed in this thesis, following the descriptive stories for each case.  These 
analyses were stimulated by and built primarily upon the mind maps set out in the data display stage 
as illustrated above.  Based on the case-by-case analysis, an overall discussion regarding all eight 
cases was then prepared to compare and contrast the findings. 
 
4.4 Conclusion 
This chapter presented the methodology adopted in this study.  The first section articulates what a 
case study is, the strengths and weaknesses associated with it, and briefly justifies why such an 
approach is the most suitable method for this study.  The second section details how the population of 
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Chinese MNEs in Australia was identified.  It first sets out a list of selection criteria which guided the 
participant recruitment process for this thesis.  Then it goes on to discuss how participants were 
contacted.  At the end of this section, a list comprising general information of the eight cases selected 
is also attached.  The third section discusses how interviews were conducted.  In addition, how data 
collected was organised, analysed, and presented were outlined and reported. 
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Chapter 5: Analysis and Findings 
This chapter provides a detailed discussion of the cases studied in this thesis.  The chapter is divided 
into ten major sections, with the first eight each focusing on a separate case.  Each of the individual 
case section is comprised of five parts that follow the same basic pattern, with the first introducing the 
industry in question, the second outlining the development of the MNE, the third providing a largely 
chronological discussion of the MNE‟s internationalisation activities, if any, before its Australian 
investment and the fourth examines the major features of the Australian investment, and the fifth part 
relates the interview data to the review of research questions.  In the ninth section the findings 
regarding the eight cases are reviewed and compared drawing on references to the existing literature.   
The tenth and final section concludes this chapter. 
 
5.1 Case One (CS1) 
5.1.1 Background: the Chinese Pesticide Industry 
In the last thirty years the Chinese pesticide industry has expanded rapidly (Bai & Run, 2011).  This 
includes all of the five main types of products: herbicides, fungicides, insecticides, rodenticides and 
plant growth regulating agents (Meng, 2011).  In 2005, for example, the aggregate domestic 
production of these five categories of pesticides exceeded one million tons, making China the largest 
pesticide producer in the world for the first time.  The figure rose rapidly, and by 2012, China‟s 
annual pesticide production reached 2 million tons (Nuomei Consulting, 2013).  Table 5-12 details the 
yearly total production of the Chinese pesticide industry on a five-year interval from 1990; it also 
shows the corresponding value of output in that particular year. 
 
  
117 
 
 
Table 5-12: Yearly production and value of output of Chinese pesticide industry 
Year 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Total Production (thousand tons) 227 349 636 1039 2687 
% increase N/A 53.7 82.2 63.4 158.6 
Revenue (billion Yuan) 15.7 19.4 26.0 64.2 138.6 
% increase N/A 23.6 34.0 146.9 115.9 
(Source: NBSC, 1990, 1995, 2000, 2005 & 2010) 
Along with the increase in production volume has been a rapid increase in revenue.  By 2012, the total 
revenue of the whole industry amounted to RMB236 billion, a 71 per cent increase from the 2010 
figure of RMB138 billion as shown in Table 5-12 (Nuomei Consulting, 2013). This has been 
sufficient to meet rapidly rising domestic demand and, in addition, to sustain a rapid increase in 
exports, making China the second largest exporter of pesticides after the US.  By the end of 2012, for 
example, a wide range of products were exported to over 100 countries, resulting in export revenue of 
RMB29 billion, approximately 12 per cent of total domestic production (Nuomei Consulting, 2013).  
The importance of foreign markets to domestic pesticide producers is likely to increase over the years 
to come as production capacity exceeds that needed to satisfy domestic demand (Nuomei Consulting, 
2013; NDRC, 2012; and China Industry Information, 2013). 
It should be noted that, as indicated by an NDRC report the average export prices of Chinese 
pesticides are significantly lower than that of imported pesticide products (NDRC, 2012: 4). In 2012, 
for example, the average export price of Chinese pesticides was approximately USD3,188 per ton, 
only a third of the average import price (NCRC, 2012: 4).  In other words the majority of Chinese 
exported pesticides are low-end products with little value added, in contrast to imported pesticides.   
This suggests that there may be considerable potential for Chinese pesticide producers to develop 
more advanced products for both the domestic and export markets, particularly if they can gain access 
to the necessary technology.  
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5.1.2 The Company (CS1) 
CS1 is a group corporation that operates in the pesticide and fine chemicals industry.  The group also 
manufactures building materials and textiles, specialises in biochemical water treatment and provides 
on-site vocational education.  It is an unlisted SOE in an industry that consists of many small, 
“workshop” sized enterprises, but is dominated by relatively few much larger producers (CS1, 2013). 
CS1 has 11 production lines and an estimated annual production capacity of 100,000 tons by 2012 
(CS1, 2013).  Other than glyphosate, acetochlor, butachlor, pretilachlor, trifluralin, and thifensulfuron, 
which are deemed to be basic products, the company also produces what they perceive as high-end 
products, including phenthoate, dimethoate, and imidacloprid (T3).  The high-end products, as well as 
a patented new bactericide, KEJUN, are recommended by China‟s Ministry of Agricultural as good 
replacements for traditionally used, highly toxic pesticides.  These, especially KEJUN, are regarded as 
“market winners”.  CS1 also exports agricultural additives to 27 countries and regions around the 
world (T3), ranging from 96 to 98 per cent dimethoate raw powder, 95 per cent phenthoate raw oil, 95 
per cent acetochlor raw oil, butachlor raw oil, pretilachlor raw oil, and 95 per cent thifensulfuron-
methyl raw oil (CS1, 2013). 
CS1 has gained an AAA credit rating from Chinese government financing agencies for ten 
consecutive years (CS1, 2013).  It has also gained a series of provincial and national awards (CS1, 
2013).  In 2006, CS1 ranked 59 out of 100, by level of net profit, in the national list of pesticide 
manufacturers (Chinese Chemical Industry Association, 2006).  Its ranking was 60
th
 in 2010 (Chinese 
Chemical Industry Association, 2010).  Regionally, CS1 is the second largest pesticide producers in 
Jiangsu Province, one of the most affluent coastal provinces in China (CS1, 2013).   
CS1 internal corporate reports detail its financial performance and strategic milestones (CS1, 2008). 
The income the enterprise has accumulated through the introduction of phenthoate and other high-end 
pesticides as described above provided a significant portion of the capital needed to establish the 
following Australian investment, with the remaining financed through Chinese banks.  In 2004, for 
example, CS1 realised annual pesticide sales of RMB681 million, which increased to RMB800 
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million in 2007 and RMB950 million in 2008 before the setup of their Australian subsidiary in the 
same year.  The steady increase in sales provided strong financial support for CS1 to go abroad. 
 
5.1.3 CS1’s Pre-Australian International Activities  
The company had no overseas investment before establishing its Australian subsidiary in 2008.   
However, it had gained experience of working with an international partner from 2004, in the form of 
a JV with a Singaporean company, United Envirotech, based at their Chinese production site in 
Jiangsu Province.  The JV focused on water and wastewater treatment using an advanced membrane 
bioreactor and continuous membrane filtration process in microfiltration, ultrafiltration and reverse 
osmosis (T1).  With this advanced film treating technology, the bio-chemical water treatment project 
increased the company‟s daily wastewater treatment capacity from 50,000 tons in 2004 when it was 
first established to 200,000 tons in 2010.  The income of the JV from waste water treatment increased 
from SGD1.33 million in 2005 to SGD3.94 million in 2011 (United Envirotech, 2005; 2011).  The 
successful project helped CS1 to accumulate experience in dealing with foreign stakeholders, and 
most importantly, experience in gaining access to the financial capital needed for their subsequent 
overseas expansion (T2).  In the meantime, the advanced technology and experience gained from this 
JV provided valuable knowledge necessary for their future operation in Australia, where the 
environmental protection requirements in their particular industry are much more stringent than that 
of China (T2, T3).   
 
5.1.4 CS1’s Australian Direct Investment  
CS1 commenced its preliminary market research in Australia in 2000.  It established a representative 
office in Sydney to help collect market information, conduct market demand research, and provide 
customer services for the products sold through export trading.  This preliminary stage was in large 
part a response to the Chinese government‟s “Go Global” strategy in late 1999, so it had “the 
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advantage of experiencing good policy-level support from every dimension of government” (T1, 
further discussion of this point follows in subsection 5.1.5).  The preliminary investigation was made 
to evaluate the potential for possible direct investment opportunities in Australia.  The final decision 
to invest in Australia was made after nearly six years of market information collection and analysis. 
As indicated  by interviewees T1, T2, and T3, the decision to carry out direct investment in Australia 
and its relevant entry mode choice were the result of many group meetings involving top managers 
and the board over a two-year period.  Three years after the representative office started to operate in 
Australia, much knowledge was accumulated about almost every aspect of the local market.  With the 
help of the Australian office, the marketing and sales department prepared a formal report detailing 
the market prospects of Australia.  The report was then reviewed and discussed by top level managers 
and the board.  After several rounds of discussion, the finance department was delegated to come up 
with an indicative budget of how much the company should, and could invest in this project.  This 
indicative report was then further reviewed and discussed in the top level meetings.  When the 
majority of senior managers and the board were convinced that the benefit for the company to carry 
out this investment in Australia exceeded the costs associated with the investment, a strategic decision 
to proceed with the project was made.  A group of staff was then selected from a variety of 
departments, including manufacturing, sales, finance, and research, to prepare a detailed feasibility 
report.  This report contained information about the intended full control entry mode, and it was, not 
surprisingly, subjected to close examination and analysis before finalisation.  Once every department 
was prepared to make their contribution for this movement forward, and every resource was in place 
(including a plan to recruit additional staff and deploy monetary capital), applications to operate in 
Australia were handed in to both the Chinese and Australian governments for approvals. 
Finally in 2008, the company established its own WOS in Australia, with 33 employees, rising to 52 
in 2011.  The company aimed to produce some pesticides and herbicides offshore and directly 
penetrate the Australian market with such products.  Ingredients to make pesticides were sourced from 
both China and Australia domestically.  The production generally involves blending and mixing up 
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pesticide preparations rather than making them “from scratch”, onsite.  The Australian subsidiary also 
facilitated the import of products that were not directly produced in this subsidiary.  As indicated by 
their international operations manager, the company has valued this Australian investment highly and 
plans to invest more resources to further develop the subsidiary (T1).   
An indication of the value CS1 placed in the Australian investment was the fact that it did so at a time 
when its revenue was adversely impacted by a number of factors.  It was expected in late 2007 that 
CS1 would be able to achieve sales of approximately RMB1.2 billion in 2008, and yet the actual 
figure was RMB950 million (CS1 Internal Report, 2007: 35; 2008: 1).  Although it still represented an 
18 per cent increase from 2007, the increase was smaller than expected, for three main reasons, as 
indicated in company reports and the T1 interview.  First, a major earthquake in Sichuan Province on 
May 12, 2008 severely damaged crop growing areas, accompanied by a huge loss in lives, especially 
in the rural regions where agriculture forms the basis of local economy. The result was that many 
fields were left unattended and output was low, in turn directly resulting in a sharp drop in demand for 
pesticides and herbicides.  Second, Yunnan Province, an important agricultural area growing wheat, 
rice, tea, herbs and tobacco, faced a serious drought that lasted into 2012, again adversely impacting 
demand for CS1 products. Third, the global financial crisis resulted in a sharp drop in demand for 
pesticides.  In addition, CS1‟s cash flow was further strained by the fact that the company started a 
major relocation to a local economic zone at the end of 2007, which required major capital injections 
for plant construction and new technologies (T3).   
As a result CS1‟s sales of pesticides fell to RMB600 million in 2009 and RMB570 million in 2010, 
respectively (CS1 Internal Report, 2008: 1).  At the time of the interview in 2012, interviewee T1 
indicated that revenue had increased in the first half of year 2011 compared to 2010. It turned out to 
have reached RMB850 million in 2011, confirmed T1‟s evaluation.  
The group‟s overseas trading activities did not experience as drastic a decrease in revenue or net profit 
as their overall business did.  In 2008, for example, after the establishment of their Australian 
subsidiary, CS1  achieved an aggregate net profit for overseas sales of RMB10.36 million, more than 
122 
 
 
30 per cent (RMB3.21 million) being  attributable to their Australian investment (CS1 Internal Report, 
2008: 30).  This was a considerable achievement as the company had only been in production for 10 
months (T3).  However, as the effect of the global economic downturn deepened in 2009, overall net 
profit from overseas direct investments almost halved, to RMB5.85 million RMB (CS1 Internal 
Report, 2009: 1).  Despite that, the Australian affiliate still realised more than 50 per cent of this net 
profit amount (RMB3.22 million), suggesting that the performance of the subsidiary was at least not 
deteriorating.  In 2010, net profit for overseas trading bounced back significantly to RMB22.42 
million.  Not surprisingly, the Australian company was the largest contributor to the increase, with 
RMB15.18 million worth of net profit (CS1 Internal Report, 2010: 1).  This progress in performance 
was accompanied by the increase in the number of employees in their Australian affiliate from 33 to 
52.  The rapid recovery in CS1‟s international trading – especially regarding its Australian investment 
– further convinced the top level managers that they had made the right decision to invest in Australia, 
and they intended to expand their investments in the years to come (T3). 
 
5.1.5 CS1 and Research Questions 
5.1.5.1 Research Question 1: Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia through 
OFDI? 
The three CS1 interviewees indicated that the decision to invest in Australia was driven by two key 
factors: first, the potential for growth in the Australian market; and second, the fact that Australia 
would provide a valuable learning experience in a demanding and highly developed market.   
Regarding the first driving factor, as T1 noted, while Australia‟s population was relatively small, it 
had a large and advanced agriculture industry.  The company wanted to explore the market.  In 
addition to that, T1, T2 and T3 all equally stressed the importance of the second driving factor, the 
accumulation of international experience.  According to T2, the experience gained in the Australian 
investment would assist it in further developing the quality of its products and, as a result, would help 
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it to enter other, larger, but more remote developed markets.  In particular, interviewees felt that 
valuable experience had been gained in at least two ways: one, in managing in a multi-cultural 
environment with a different language; and two, in providing easier access to new technologies 
related to pesticides.    
To sum up, CS1‟s motivation was twofold: to explore market opportunities in Australia, to 
accumulate experience for future internationalisation purposes. 
 
5.1.5.2 Research Question 2: What factors have influenced Chinese MNE’s choice of entry mode 
for Australia? 
CS1 set up a WOS in Australia in 2008.  In summary, the following factors influenced its entry mode 
decision: the motivation to seek an overseas market and assets, the size of their parent company, their 
previous joint venture investment experience, and supportive home government policies. In contrast, 
they felt that their goodwill capital would have negative effects on the setting up of a WOS. 
As regards investment motivation, T1 noted that setting up a WOS was more useful as it was felt that 
“… the cycle involved in setting up a WOS would be shorter than that of JVs,” which would be more 
advantageous for them since “we want to attract more market shares in a given period of time”; so the 
shorter the time cycle for establishing a foreign affiliate, the quicker they would be able to plunge into 
production and expand the domestic production and distribution net.  T2 also stated that a WOS was 
chosen as CS1 did not need to share their core expertise and technologies with any potential partner or 
competitor. While this would restrict access to the expertise and technologies of potential JV partners, 
it was felt that an affiliate directly operating in a foreign market would still find it relatively easy to 
get access to advanced marketing strategies and managerial skills as applied in Australia.   
In summary, those interviewed saw the advantages of a WOS over a JV as threefold.  The first was 
that it enabled more effective control.  In a WOS, with CS1 as the sole owner, it could ensure its 
dominant power in overseeing day-to-day operations and in making strategic decisions.  There would 
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be no need for excessive documentation or prolonged discussions with people other than those from 
the same company, which saves time and effort.  The second was that they felt a WOS could 
commence operations and therefore generate income sooner as there would be no need for 
coordinating matters with other partners.  The third was that they felt that the core expertise and 
related technologies of the company would not have to be shared with a partner.   
The literature suggests that the larger the size, the higher the probability that a WOS mode will be 
chosen rather than a JV.  As noted above, CS1 is a relatively large company compared to both 
Chinese and international norms for the industry.  In 2005, for example, it had imported a new raw 
chemical production line, which significantly increased its already large production capacity.  Hence, 
as T1 said, “… we are a large group company with over 10000 employees, so we have the capability 
to transform and utilise the knowledge accumulated elsewhere… so we prefer a WOS rather than 
interest sharing JVs”, which allowed them to “start operations immediately” with “almost no third 
party except the Australian government and local distributors involved”.   
However, it was noted that entering via a WOS could be difficult.  T1, for example, indicated that if  a 
JV mode had been selected, “the Australian reviewing process might have been shortened” because 
one, it would have reduced the size of the CS1 investment and two, the Australian government might 
have been more comfortable in letting an experienced local company guide the new enterprise (T1).  
As it happened, CS1 was large enough, with sufficient capacity to “be able to bear and digest those 
possible uncertainties” (T1).   
As described earlier, CS1 had no prior experience in foreign direct investment.  However, the JV with 
their Singaporean partner provided CS1 with valuable knowledge regarding how to communicate and 
operate with foreign partners.  Interviewees from CS1 also indicated that the JV wastewater project 
had influenced their final entry mode choice of WOS.  “We have… definitely drawn on the 
investment experience in the Singaporean project before deciding to establish our own Australian 
branch without the help of local partners” (T1).  The JV plant, for example, provided valuable 
experience for their Australian investment regarding, but not limited to: environment protection, 
125 
 
 
dealing with foreign partners, managing overseas supplier/ distributer/ trade relationships, and 
operating under an unfamiliar institutional environment.   
The goodwill capital of a company can include the company‟s reputation, its human resources and its 
brand image.  Both T1 and T2 recognised that goodwill was important for a company and also saw 
greater risks to goodwill in a joint venture, assuming that it experienced difficulties.  “We think 
considering our business scale and reputation, it must be more effective and efficient to establish a 
WOS… because that‟s [goodwill capital] what we want to preserve, and that could only be best kept 
if no external influence was to exerted upon our daily operation, and that‟s what is unavoidable in a 
JV… therefore by setting up a WOS we can avoid possible alterations to our brand value in a foreign 
market” (T1); “It was because we have a strong and sound goodwill capital, and that we had the  
necessary resources on hand to ensure the practicability of a full control mode, that we managed to get 
into the Australian market on our own” (T2).   
The Australian government was viewed as having a rather supportive and positive attitude towards 
CS1‟s investment proposal, but it did not express a preference as to entry mode, or try to influence 
CS1 in any particular direction.  T1 indicated that if the Australian Government had preferred that 
foreign firms such as CS1 set up a JV with an Australian firm, or if taxes were higher on foreign-
owned WOS, then CS1 might have made a different entry mode decision.  In other words the choice 
depended, in part, upon the particular circumstances, rather than solely upon a preference for using a 
WOS. 
Both T1 and T3 indicated that the Chinese government‟s policy of encouraging local companies to go 
abroad had a degree of influence over the company‟s decision to invest abroad.  T2 was uncertain as 
regards this factor, although he did state that as CS1 had not encountered any significant difficulty 
when dealing with the government in the approvals process, it must have been supportive of CS1‟s 
internationalisation efforts.  In terms of the selection of entry mode, T1 indicated that the Chinese 
government had no explicit rules limiting the type of entry mode specific companies should choose. 
As long as the application for an overseas investment was supported with appropriate materials and 
126 
 
 
reports, companies could get approvals in a relatively short period of time, at least as compared to the 
Australian approvals process, regardless of the choice of entry mode.  T2 acknowledged that they 
easily got the funding from local banks to develop this Australian affiliate as they were a large SOE in 
one of the most advanced Chinese provinces, a fact which also made the selection of the WOS mode 
more feasible. 
Interviewees from CS1 were aware of the effect of culture regarding their entry mode choices: 
“Australian employees tend not to have cognition about class differences, so they wouldn‟t feel 
uncomfortable by joking with the boss, or speaking out their different opinions, which are rare in our 
country, especially in larger SOEs…” (T1).  They indicated that setting up a WOS could “minimise” 
those cultural problems by minimising the opportunity for any confrontation, so that no extra effort 
would be needed to “accommodate your partner” within a JV (T1).  However, the interviewees also 
stated that cultural distance was not a key or determining factor in their overseas investment decision.  
“Since you have already made this investment decision, you must have prepared for any uncertainties 
including cultural shock…” (T1).   
 
5.2 Case Two (CS2) 
5.2.1 Background: the Chinese Iron and Steel Industry 
The development of the Chinese iron and steel industry since 1949 falls into three broad stages: the 
highly centralised planned economy period (1949 to 1978); the market transition period from a 
planned economy to a market economy after market liberalisation (1978 to 2000); and the rapid 
growth stage where the reform has been deepened and local manufacturers were encouraged to 
compete in the global market (from 2000 onwards; CASS, 2009). This section provides a brief 
description of the second and third stages in the development of the industry.  
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Table 5-13 indicates the output of crude steel since market opening in 1978, at five-year intervals until 
2010. 
Table 5-13 Chinese output of crude steel from 1978 to 2010 
Year 1978 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 2005 2010 
Crude Steel Production (million tons) 31.8 35.6 46.2 65.4 95.4 128.5 355.8 626.7 
% increase N/A 11.9 29.8 41.6 45.8 34.7 176.9 76.1 
(Source: NBSC, various years; China Steel Industry Association, 2012). 
In the second development stage (1978 to 2000) the annual production of crude steel saw a fast, but 
relatively steady increase in output, averaging an annual increase of approximately 5.5 per cent from 
1980 to 1990, then 7 per cent from 1990 to 2000.  The output was sufficient to meet 73 per cent of 
domestic demand in 1978, rising to 94 per cent by the end of 2000 (NBSC, 2000a).  The second stage 
saw many small-scaled manufacturers with limited productivity and product differentiation eliminated 
or nationalised through mergers and acquisitions (China Steel Industry Association, 2012).  
Production also became more efficient, with the per ton energy consumption of steel production 
dropping  from 2.54 tons of standard coal in 1978 to 1.18 tons in 2000, closer to international norms, a 
target for the industry (China Steel Industry Association, 2012).   
In the third, post 2000 stage of development, the industry has experienced even faster growth and 
more changeable domestic and international markets.  From 2000 till 2010, the annualised percentage 
increase in crude steel production went up to 17.2 per cent.  In 2003, the yearly production of crude 
steel was over 200 million tons for the first time; in 2005, it exceeded 300 million tons; only a year 
later, the figure was over 400 million tons; in 2008, 500 million tons; and in 2010, the country‟s crude 
steel output exceeded 600 million tons (NBSC, 2000, 2003, 2005, 2008 & 2010a; and CASS, 2009).  
By the end of 2010, more than 44 per cent of crude steel produced in the world was made in China 
(MOFCOM, 2012; and World Steel Association, 2012). Also in 2010, the per ton energy consumption 
of steel production further dropped to 0.62 tons of standard coal, which made the production process  
more environmentally sustainable (China Steel Industry Association , 2012). 
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The rapid increase in domestic steel production led to China‟s demand for iron ore outstripping 
domestic supply and an increasing reliance on imported iron ore.  In 2010, more than 62 per cent of 
the iron ore used for steel production was imported (China Steel Industry Association, 2012).  Until 
its recent fall, there was a sharp rise in international iron ore prices, squeezing the profits of Chinese 
steel manufacturers (China Steel Industry Association, 2012).  In 2003, for example, the average price 
of imported iron ore was less than USD30 per ton; it increased more than five times to USD164 per 
ton in 2011 (International Monetary Fund, 2013). In large part the price rises led to Chinese steel 
producers‟ profit margins dropping to 3.08 per cent compare to a 6 per cent margin of the 
manufacturing industry overall (China Steel Industry Association, 2012), and this figure further 
dropped to a low 0.13 per cent in the third quarter in 2013 (China Steel Industry Association, 2012).   
Largely as a result of the increasing demand for imported iron ore and its rapidly rising price, an 
increasing number of larger Chinese steel companies chose to invest overseas in order to secure 
supplies at the best prices available.  
 
5.2.2 The Company (CS2) 
CS2 is a conglomerate formed jointly by three steel companies in 1997.  The establishment of this 
group was part of a state-initiated integration to reform the whole steel industry.  The group is 
overseen by the State-owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC), and is a 
wholly state-owned conglomerate enterprise.  
The group employs 45,000 workers, and was listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange in 1999.  By the 
end of 2011, the group‟s steel production capacity had reached 22 million tons, with total assets of 
RMB113.9 billion.  However, in 2010, the group suffered an extraordinary loss of RMB2.6 billion, 
which made it the least profitable listed company in China in that year (CS2, 2010).  The reason for 
the loss was threefold.  According to the local Securities Regulatory Commission (SRC), the first was 
losses incurred through a failed major project undertaken with Mittal (Xie, 2011).  CS2‟s board 
129 
 
 
secretary also revealed in a domestic interview that the sourcing of iron ore was an increasing 
problem as the company was one of the few Chinese steel manufacturers which did not have domestic 
supplies at all and had to rely wholly on imports (CS2, 2009a: 3).  At the core of the problem was the 
fact that the group had made a poor strategic decision to stockpile imported iron ore at their highest 
historical price in the second season in 2010.  In part, the decision reflected inadequate 
communication and cooperation among the group affiliates.  This made the integrated sourcing of iron 
ore hard to achieve, with each affiliate undertaking their own sourcing of iron ore, despite their 
limited bargaining power and limited experience in the global market (Xie, 2011).  What made it even 
more complicated was that some procurement staff had a vested interest in the materials they sourced 
for the production of their companies, the problem of corruption (Wan, 2011). Also, the three 
affiliates had duplicated production lines which hindered the output efficiency of the group as a whole 
(Xie, 2011).   
In 2011, the group achieved a net profit of RMB70.1 million.  This rise was a combined effect of the 
increase in profit margins of steel domestically, the selling of non-core assets, and receiving 
government subsidies totalling RMB1.2 billion (CS2, 2011).  However, by the end of 2012, with no 
further financial support from the government, the group again suffered a very large net loss of 
RMB3.3 billion (CS2, 2012).   
 
5.2.3 CS2’s Pre-Australian International Activities 
The group‟s international investment activities up to the FMG case examined below, have been 
relatively limited and mixed, focused on a JV partnership with an Indian steel giant, Mittal, with 
discussions commencing in 2005 and operations commencing in 2011.  This investment decision was 
made by CS2 with an aim to integrate into Mittal‟s global procurement program and import 
technology regarding the production of automobile steel.  The CS2 group held 37.67 per cent of the 
share capital of the new company and continued to be the largest shareholder, while the Indian group 
held 36.67 per cent and became the second largest shareholder.   
130 
 
 
However, the partnership was largely unsuccessful, resulting in major losses for CS2, with 
accusations that the Indian partner did not honour the technology transfer commitments it made to 
CS2 and that CS2 was not successfully admitted to its partner‟s global procurement plan for iron ore, 
which increased the sourcing cost for iron ore by RMB7.8 billion in 2010 (Xie, 2011).  In addition, 
cooperation was severely hindered by the lack of coordination of CS2 affiliates in sourcing (Wan, 
2011).  As a result, in a new agreement with CS2, the foreign investor sold two-thirds of its shares 
back to CS2 in four instalments, though cooperation between the two groups in the production of 
automotive steel was to continue (CS2, 2012). 
CS2‟s second international experience, also its first attempt at outbound direct investment was in 2008 
in Australia.  CS2 purchased 11.39 per cent of the shares of one Australian resource company, Golden 
West Resource (GWR).  It was agreed that GWR would supply 4.5 million tons of iron ore every year 
for the following 15 years, a significant proportion of the company‟s 20 million tons of average yearly 
demand (CS2, 2008: 20).  This investment cost the company AUD26 million, which was relatively 
small compared to their later AUD1.27 billion investment in Australia with FMG.  The issuance price 
of the Australian company upon CS2‟s purchase was AUD1.85 per share, and by the end of April 
2013, the price had dropped to AUD0.17 per share.  As noted by China‟s Foreign Economic 
Cooperation Office, CS2‟s investment in the Australian company was more like a trial before their 
major investment with FMG, so the group was not greatly worried about the loss it had made to date 
on its first Australian investment (Department of Commerce of Hunan Province, 2011).  Arguably, the 
nonchalant attitude of management level towards their FDI with GWR may be the one of the reasons 
for CS2‟s overall poor performance. 
On the whole, the group‟s international investment activities before its investment in FMG have been 
far from successful and, at best, a painful learning experience.  
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5.2.4 CS2’s Australian Direct Investment 
In 24
th
 February 2009, CS2 signed a cooperative agreement with another Australian company, FMG.  
FMG is Australia‟s third largest mining company and the world‟s fourth largest iron ore producer, 
which has an iron ore reserve of approximately 4.5 billion tons, and a production capacity of 55 
million tons per year (Fortescue Metals Group, 2009).  According to the agreement, CS2 group 
subscribed to FMG‟s new issue of 225 million shares at AUD2.48 for a total price of AUD558 million.  
Upon completion of the transactions, CS2 held 16.48 per cent of FMG‟s diluted shares, and became 
FMG‟s second largest shareholder (CS2, 2009a).  After approvals obtained from both the Australian 
and Chinese governments, the whole purchase process was completed at the end of April 2009. 
In addition, the two parties reached further agreement regarding the long run supply of iron ore with 
CS2 to receive 10 million tons of iron ore from FMG every year from 2009.  It was hoped that the 
problem of high and fluctuating iron ore trading prices that had so adversely impacted on CS2 for 
years would be alleviated to a large extent through this agreement (CS2, 2009b). 
However, the proposed annual supply of 10 million tons of iron ore has not been achieved as 
originally planned.  In 2010, only 4 million tons were supplied by FMG (Xia & Peng, 2011).  This 
fact, together with the issues discussed above, contributed to the huge losses of the group.  It has been 
estimated that the shortfall in supply accounted for approximately 20 per cent of the total 2010 loss 
(Wan, 2011).  In contrast, from a shareholding point of view, CS2‟s investment in FMG has been 
more satisfactory, as FMG‟s share price rose from AUD2.48 per share in 2009 to AUD3.3 per share 
as at June 2013, a more than 30 per cent capital increase. 
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5.2.5 CS2 and Research Questions 
5.2.5.1 Research Question 1: Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia through 
OFDI? 
Both the interview results and company annual reports showed that CS2 chose to invest in Australia 
primarily because it wanted to have more control regarding the import price of iron ore.  In addition, 
the global financial crisis provided the group with an opportunity for rapid overseas expansion at 
much reduced prices, notably the investment with FMG.  
Interviewee V1 indicated that “our group has this need for expansion”.  V2 indicated that “…our 
company decided to go to Australia because we were attracted by their (natural) deposits”, a not 
surprising motive, given CS2‟s total dependence on imported iron ore and the steep rises in prices.    
In order to secure a constant supply of iron ore at an acceptable price, the group needed to seek long-
term contracts with foreign suppliers.  “If we do not have the resources, then that will certainly hinder 
our business development.  So we need FMG as it gives our business a platform for integrated and 
more efficient production.  This is how we can excel in the market” (V1).  What is more, FMG‟s 
target market was mainly Chinese steel producers since its establishment in 2003, “they have the 
material, they have relatively sound finance, they were experienced in mining, and were experienced 
in working with Chinese partners – they were just running low on cash during the economic turmoil, 
it‟s a god-sent opportunity, so we cannot just let it slip away” (V1). 
Also, despite its current difficulties, the group has ambitious long term goals, aiming to “integrate into 
the global steel industry and be one of the leading and largest steel manufacturers in the world” (V1).  
Cooperation with FMG provides them with a platform to take the initiative and integrate into the 
global steel manufacturing chain.  Regardless as to whether this hope was realistic or not, at least 
when CS2 was approaching FMG, the group had a clear objective to build their global network and 
engage in international business through various international investments – their cooperation with 
Mittal was the first step forward to realise that goal, though it turned out to be unsuccessful. 
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In summary, CS2 chose to invest in Australia for two reasons: one, primarily to secure their supply of 
iron ore at an acceptable price in the long run – seeking natural resources; and, two, in addition to the 
resource-seeking motivation, they wished to develop the network and connections necessary to 
integrate themselves into the global steel production system in the far future – seeking strategic assets.  
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5.2.5.2 Research Question 2: Research Question 2: What factors have influenced Chinese MNE’s 
choice of entry mode for Australia? 
CS2 formed an equity JV with FMG in 2009.  It should be noted that the Australian government is 
extremely cautious about agreeing to the selling of control in major, domestic mining companies to 
foreign investors, especially when that investor is an SOE.  These mining companies hold critical 
resources the nation needs and is of national interest, hence a number of major investment attempts 
such as Minmetal‟s acquisition of Rio Tinto at AUD1.95 billion never made it through FIRB‟s 
examination process.  FMG is the third largest mining firm in Australia, so it is therefore reasonable 
to assume the Australian government had considerable concerns regarding CS2‟s proposed investment.  
As the Chinese Consulate in Melbourne noted, “After all, Australia is a democratic society… even if 
the government would like to sell the mining right to a foreign company, the concerns that this 
activity could violate the nation‟s national interest would very likely result in an anti-government 
attitude of the local citizens, which could lose the government‟s next election, and which is the last 
thing the government wants to see” (G1, 2012). 
Hence, CS2, in order to avoid excessive scrutiny and a prolonged review process (as discussed earlier 
in Chapter 2 regarding Rio‟s case), felt that sharing control with an Australian company was the most, 
if not the only appropriate entry mode for them to adopt.  However, the interviews did suggest that, 
the following factors also directly influenced their entry mode decision: the motivation to acquire 
abundant resources in Australia in the form of iron ore; the attitudes of the Australian government; 
and Chinese government policies. 
CS2 did not invest in Australia to gain a share in the Australian steel market. As interviewee V1 
indicated, “How large is the Australian market for steel?  It is already a developed country with 
relatively advanced infrastructure construction, how large can its demand for steel be?  Not much 
really” (V1).   The factor that attracted CS2 to invest in FMG was simply its iron ore resources.  “This 
resource in Australia is what we value the most in this investment.  If considering no other facts, we 
would definitely prefer to be the largest shareholder and make it our own WOS, but we are certainly 
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constrained by many factors.  It would be more practicable and realistic if we choose to cooperate 
with local companies who have the right to mine, relevant mining experience, and some influence in 
the pricing of the metal on the global market… these could all be our valuable assets once the 
investment was established” (V1). 
In short, CS2 invested in Australia because they were interested in the resources (iron ore) the country 
could provide; and, while it would have preferred the WOS option, it felt that this would be difficult 
to achieve given the level of scrutiny exercised by FIRB regarding such investment proposals in the 
resource industry by SOEs (V1, G1).  
As the group consists of three large-scale companies, V1 indicated that “if we were able to possess the 
mining right of some iron ore deposits and transportation channels, then setting up a WOS is 
definitely a best choice, since we could carry out our daily business more efficiently and effectively 
without accommodating any needs of a local partner”.  Also, as a big group, it has, according to V1, 
its own “well-defined and distinct culture”, which “influences all those activities that could possibly 
have effect on the daily production of the enterprise”.  This is summarised by G1 to be “the Chinese 
ways of doing business”.  It is not necessarily the most efficient business practice, but employees and 
managers from those environments may find it difficult if they were to be exposed to a western 
business environment and work with people from different cultural backgrounds on a daily basis – 
this confrontation is particularly common with large SOEs which are often associated with 
bureaucratic and low efficiency (G1).  To protect the company and the employees from an excessive 
level of cultural shocks, “for sure we would like to establish a WOS, since that was the only possible 
way to totally transform our current practice to a new environment, of course given the conditions of 
the environment” (V1), though of course, from the previous discussion, their current practice may be 
subject to total reform to ensure its efficiency and effectiveness.   
Hence, size was not the determining factor for CS2‟s entry mode decision, though interviewees noted 
that the WOS mode would have been preferred.  As V2 commented, “I think only if an enterprise is 
large enough could it have the right to really choose to establish a WOS in Australia or other countries, 
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but… this also depends on different situations.  For a steel company like us, the Australian 
government will never let you withhold the whole ownership of their local mining firm and let a 
foreign company take control of their resources of national interest, so it‟s a waste of time and effort 
thinking about establishing a WOS in Australia, let along the money required to do so in this industry.  
There is no need for our company to put in that amount of effort”. 
Both interviewees indicated that their relative lack of experience in international investment at least 
partly stimulated their JV choice of entry mode.  Apart from their „trial‟ equity investment in a small 
Australian mining company, CS2 had no further experience in operating in a different country.  As V2 
noted, although CS2 is a large SOE, “it is very easy to understand that we have been quite 
conservative before making the attempt… We wanted to find a way, which could minimise the 
uncertainties and still realise our operation goals” (V2).  In this situation, the group thought that an 
equity JV was more appropriate, despite the unpleasant experience with Mittal.  V1 further 
commented that “we think we pretty well lack the real experience in doing business on the global 
level, and our group also thinks that cooperating with FMG would be more beneficial for us, since 
they have the resources, the networks, good potential, and everything it needs to continue high-speed 
development in Australia except maybe a strong enough cash flow; and cash was not a problem for us 
during that time of crisis, the cooperation is thus a win-win strategy for both parties.”  While this was 
a surprising comment in the light of CS2‟s very large losses in 2010 and 2012, interviewee V1 was 
aware that the Australian government was unlikely to allow a foreign, state owned enterprise to select 
an entry mode freely without extra scrutiny or requirement (V1). 
None of the interviewees thought goodwill capital was a significant factor in determining the choice 
of entry mode.   As V1 summarised: „three points, 1. Whether Australia offers the resources useful for 
our future development; 2. the regulatory requirements of the Australian government; and 3. The level 
of sophistication of our group in exploring overseas markets; these three points combined have 
already determined that JV is the most practicable entry mode.”   
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Other than the understanding that the Australian government would not allow foreign, state-owned 
enterprises to fully control major, domestic mining companies (V2), CS2‟s investment proposal was 
processed rather smoothly and swiftly compared to the investment attempt made by Minmetal in 
acquiring the shares of Rio Tinto.  The contract of cooperation between CS2 and FMG was signed on 
24
th
 February 2009, and the investment application successfully passed the scrutiny of the FIRB on 
31
st
 March 2009, which was only roughly a month.  “We  proposed a transaction worth less than 
AUD1 billion, which was only a fraction of Minmetal‟s Rio investment of AUD19.5 billion, so our 
investment was much less controversial and perhaps it was because of that reason it got processed 
really quickly” (V1).   
The Chinese government was quite supportive in terms of CS2‟s FMG investment: only 20 days after 
CS2 gained the approval from the Australian government (CS2 corporate document, 2009), the 
Chinese government also approved the investment.  “We are a very large SOE, and the country was 
very keen to support our internationalisation process as reflected in perhaps easy access to finance and 
positive media coverage; but there was no specific limitation in terms of the entry mode choice to be 
made” (V1).  V2 also agreed to that point, “they [Chinese government] wouldn‟t limit the size or 
entry mode to be adopted by any outgoing firms, which is good”.  In addition, as an SOE, CS2 got 
finance from the government very easily for their investment proposal as well (V2).   
None of the interviewees saw cultural distance as an important factor influencing their entry mode 
choice in FMG.   
 
5.3 Case Three (CS3) 
5.3.1 Background:  Chinese Lithium Ore Production 
Lithium can be used to produce high-efficiency lithium batteries, and it can also be applied in 
controlled thermonuclear reactions, which makes it an important material with a range of civilian and 
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military uses.  China has experienced rising domestic demand for lithium and significantly expanded 
its production capacity in the past decade.   
By the end of 2002, the world had an identified lithium reserve of 4.1 million tons, of which Chile 
accounts for the largest reserves at 3 million tons, China  second with 0.54 million tons and Australia 
third with 0.16 million tons (China Mining, 2012; Geoscience Australia, 2012).  Australia ranked 
second in world lithium production from 2009 to 2011, producing 30 per cent of the total (Geoscience 
Australia, 2012; US Geological Survey, 2013).   
In contrast, despite its greater reserves, China‟s lithium production was only 40 per cent of Australia‟s 
(US Geological Survey, 2013).  This is because most of the lithium deposits in China exist as 
compounds in salt lakes (Zhang, 2011; China Securities Network, 2011). The extraction of lithium ore 
from lithium mines is relatively easy, whereas the extraction from salt lakes involves more 
complicated purification processes and therefore is more expensive (China Mining, 2012).   Also, the 
fact that most of the country‟s salt lakes that have lithium deposits are located in high altitude areas 
with very limited infrastructure makes extraction in these areas even less practicable.  For this reason, 
although China‟s yearly demand for lithium carbonate has reached 20,000 tons, only 3,000 to 4,000 
tons of lithium carbonate was produced domestically; the majority of Chinese enterprises rely on 
imported lithium ore for related production (Zhang, 2011).   
 
5.3.2 The Company (CS3) 
Founded in 1992, CS3 has become firmly established as one of China‟s earliest and most highly-
regarded, private equity investment groups (CS3, 2013).  Over two decades, the group has developed 
a comprehensive investment portfolio across a range of sectors including manufacturing, agriculture, 
financial services, mineral resources, real estate, and healthcare and pharmaceuticals. 
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CS3‟s record of consistent growth has seen total assets increased from RMB50,000 at inception to 
approximately RMB6 billion by the end of 2009, with a respectable internal rate of return (IRR) 
which is comparable to many good investment firms in the marketplace (CS3, 2013). 
CS3 has developed significant investments in several publicly listed companies in a range of sectors: 
Pinggao Electronics, listed on the  Shanghai Stock Exchange, is China‟s largest manufacturer of high-
voltage switchgear; Andre Juice, listed on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange, is one of the world‟s 
biggest producers of concentrated apple juice exporting more than 90 per cent of its products to 
Europe and America; Shanghai Laishi, listed on the Shenzhen Stock Exchange, is Asia‟s leading 
supplier of blood products; and the group has also acquired an Australia-based company which is 
listed on London Stock Exchange, with major operations in lead zinc ore extraction. 
Since 2005, CS3 has been investigating market demand for a variety of minerals in China, 
South Asia, East Africa and Oceania, as well as associated distribution networks (CS3, 2013; 
C1).  Based on its research the group has commenced investments in the mining sector. In 
China the group has commenced investments in the extraction of lead zinc ore, tungsten 
molybdenum ore, and gold ore.  CS3‟s international investments in the mining sector 
concentrate on lead zinc ore and triphane (lithium ore), both in Australia.  
 
5.3.3 CS3’s Pre-Australian International Activities 
Except for some small equity investments CS3 had one significant international investment activity 
prior to their investment in Galaxy Resources Australia (hereinafter abbreviated as Galaxy), the 
subject of this case study.  This investment happened in 2007, and involved CS3 acquiring more than 
70 per cent of a London Stock Exchange listed company, Zeehan Zinc, also an Australian company  
(CS3, 2013). 
Since the onset of the global economic downturn, the trading prices of most metals have decreased 
significantly, consequently putting some mineral extractors and manufacturers into financial 
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difficulties, leading to a range of investment opportunities at reduced prices.  In this context, CS3 paid 
RMB30 million to acquire 70 per cent of Zeehan Zinc‟s shares, and became Zeehan‟s largest 
shareholder.  CS3 has since then led the further development of Zeehan, making it the integration 
platform for its overseas mining production.  In recognition of its changed status in 2009, Zeehan Zinc 
was renamed as Creat Resources Holdings (Creat Resources, 2010). 
In terms of its operations, although the annual report of Creat Resources claims the company is now 
“extremely well placed financially and strategically to capitalise on the current global financial 
climate” (Creat Resources, 2012), its financial position is not impressive.  It has failed to generate a 
net cash inflow since 2007, with losses of AUD8 million (2007), AUD22 million (2008), AUD8 
million (2009), AUD4 million (2010), AUD20 million (2011), and AUD13 million (2012) (Creat 
Resources, 2010; 2011; 2012).  However, its senior management has indicated that it was not overly 
concerned with its suboptimal financial performance as Creat Resources‟ major role is to provide an 
overseas platform for further “mineral exploration” and “operation of mineral properties” in both 
Australia and overseas (Creat Resources, 2011: 3; C1).  An example of this role and Creat‟s most 
significant strategic development to date was its acquisition of the shares of Galaxy, the case study for 
this section.  It is expected that Creat Resources will experience better shareholder returns once the 
production of Galaxy commences (Creat Resources, 2012: 3).  In this sense, the group‟s investment in 
Creat Resources Holding is a strategic and fundamental step in the group‟s internationalisation 
process. 
 
5.3.4 CS3’s Australian Direct Investments 
Galaxy is an Australia-based company with its main business in integrated lithium mining.  It is listed 
on the Australian Securities Exchange, and is an S&P/ASX 300 Index Company.   
On 3 September 2009, Creat Resources Holdings Ltd spent AUD26 million to acquire 19.9 per cent of 
Galaxy‟s ordinary shares, which made the group Galaxy‟s largest shareholder.  As at 28 May 2012, 
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following a further share issue, Creat Resources Holdings became the third largest shareholder in 
Galaxy.   
In addition to the share purchase, Galaxy and Creat have agreed to set up a JV lithium carbonate plant 
in Zhangjiagang, China, to process the lithium ore imported from the Mt Cattlin mining sites wholly-
owned by Galaxy, located in South Australia.  As proposed by the company, the plant will allow 
Galaxy to maintain complete control over the production and quality of the company‟s products so as 
to secure lower production costs (Galaxy Resources, 2013a).  Also, Galaxy has secured off-take 
agreements for 100 per cent of its capacity with cathode makers in China and Japan (Galaxy 
Resources, 2013a).  With low production costs, its own supplies of the raw mineral, relatively cheap 
labour in China, and growing demands for battery-grade lithium in China, the plant has the potential 
to general significant profits, not only for its direct shareholders, but for its indirect shareholders such 
as CS3 as well.  The plant commenced operation in late 2012.  By the end of June 2013, its monthly 
production was at around 600 tons per month or 7200 tons per year, and sales are growing steadily 
(Galaxy Resources, 2013b).  It is expected that at full capacity, the Zhangjiagang plant will be able to 
produce 17,000 tons of battery grade lithium carbonate per annum, making it the largest producer in 
the Asia-Pacific region and the fourth largest in the world (Galaxy Resources, 2013a).   
 
5.3.5 CS3 and Research Issues 
5.3.5.1 Research Question1: Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia through OFDI? 
The answer to this question from interviewee CS3 was directly to the point “our group has an interest 
in mining, hence we are interested in the mines in Australia and the resources in Australia”.   He 
indicated that China‟s very rapid industrialisation and urbanisation processes have required increasing 
supplies of raw materials and metals, several of which are in short supply in China.   Consequently, 
sourcing good quality raw materials from overseas suppliers which can provide a consistent supply is 
essential.  As C1 stated: “our business was established with an aim to become China‟s own great 
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group company… As China‟s current development requires more resources than the country could 
generate domestically, we feel obliged to seek ways to facilitate the further development of the 
country‟s future industrialisation processes.”  Australia “happens to have the resource [lithium mine] 
the country has been longing for, and we had the chance to purchase it with an under-the-average 
price during the global financial crisis, we wouldn‟t let go the opportunity”. 
Interviewee C3 also noted that the company had seen an opportunity to step into the Australian 
mining industry when the shortage of natural resources for construction in China occurred 
domestically several years ago.  Therefore when the opportunity for them to purchase the shares of 
Zeehan Zinc developed during 2007, they did not hesitate to take it over at what was felt to be a 
bargain price.   
The acquisition of Zeehan Zinc also provided an experienced base from which to help coordinate and 
advise the parent group‟s market research activities.  This was especially the case for the investment 
in Galaxy.  As interviewee C3 said, “Fully controlling Galaxy was not our target, our target was 
making a reasonable investment in exchange for power and influence on the bargaining table, and to 
establish our production chain.”   
 
5.3.5.2 Research Question 2: What factors have influenced Chinese MNE’s choice of entry mode 
for Australia? 
In short, CS3‟s aim of seeking natural resources in Australia, their large corporate size and their 
previous international operation experiences have to various extents, influenced their entry mode 
choices for  Australia. 
As discussed above, CS3 invested in Australia largely because the country had the resource that the 
group needed: “our company needs it, Australia holds it, demand and supply, very naturally it led us 
to this deal… JV was the most cost efficient method, and it can largely get us what we want except for 
perhaps full control” (C1).  According to C1, the group‟s asset-seeking motivation has driven CS3 to 
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take partial, rather than full control of Galaxy.  The ownership question is complicated by the fact that 
the investment vehicle for Galaxy was Creat Resources Holdings, which is an Australian company 
fully owned and controlled by CS3 through share purchases in 2007.  Therefore, there are two 
sequential investments involved here, with CS3 acquired full control of Creat Resources Holdings in 
2007 and, in turn, Creat Resources Holdings taking over partial control of Galaxy in 2009.  The series 
of investments were felt to have made an appropriate balance between cost and control, and most 
importantly, granted them the resources they are interested in.  As C1 noted “market conquering was 
never our priority… at that stage, we were only interested in securing the domestic [China] supply [of 
lithium ore]”.   
C1 suggested that “surely there is some influence of size on entry mode choices”.  More specifically, 
the larger the size, the more corporations would be inclined to establish WOSs.  It was CS3‟s 
relatively large size and record of successful growth that provided it with access to the capital and 
management skills necessary for the purchase of Zeehan Zinc as a WOS.   Nevertheless, as C3 noted, 
although large size may encourage firms such as CS3 to contemplate establishing a WOS, the actual 
entry mode choice is a rather complicated one, requiring a thorough evaluation of financial cost and 
benefit, the results of which might indicate that a JV is preferable in a particular case, as proved to be 
the situation with the investment in Galaxy.   
CS3 had accumulated much experience in various businesses including food processing, 
manufacturing, finance, and the medical industry before their investment in Australia (CS3, 2012).  
After what they felt was a reasonable period of learning from those experiences, the investors were 
more confident in their ability to carry out direct investments in some new areas, through the setting 
up of JVs and WOSs overseas.  Interviewees explicitly recognised the importance of experience on  
the entry mode choice of their Australian investment: “When you are unfamiliar with the foreign legal 
environment, social environment, consumer preferences and institutions, the day your own WOS 
company is established  would be the day it collapses – not to mention if it could ever be  established 
without that knowledge… it is only because we have accumulated significant international business 
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experience that we were able to make an informed and sound entry mode decision that is the most 
suitable for us” (C1).  The interviewees admitted that if previous international experience was the 
only consideration, they would be inclined to set up a WOS.  However, as with the influence of size, 
as noted above, interviewees felt that every investment opportunity was different and needed to be 
separately evaluated; resulting in the decision to purchase a WOS, Zeehan Zinc, but, in the different 
case of Galaxy, simply to take up only a proportion of the shares. 
None of the interviewees thought that the level of goodwill capital of the group had an influence on 
their entry mode choice.  What C1 did stress was that a corporation‟s goodwill capital or all those 
intangible advantages “forms an important factor for entry mode choosing… but perhaps not to a 
determining extent” (C1).  “In terms of the influence of goodwill capital on the  entry mode decision, 
as far as I can see, if you‟d prefer to set up a JV, corporations with sound goodwill capital will just 
have an advantage to have their investment proposal considered and adopted by the investee, no more 
influence than that” (C2). 
The interviewees indicated that Australian governments had no influence on their entry mode decision. 
Overall, the Australian government was felt to be “quite supportive” towards CS3‟s investment in 
both Zeehan Zinc and Galaxy (C1).  Although CS3 has a relatively large size, one of the main reasons 
for its straight forward investment application process, as summarised by interviewee C1, could be 
that CS3 was a wholly privately owned group company with no government ownership that “many 
foreign partners might be fearful of” (C1).  “The local government was not as sensitive towards their 
investment proposal as they were with some investments made by Chinese SOEs” (C3). 
Similarly, interviewees believed that the attitude of the Chinese government regarding their OFDI had 
no influence on their final choice of entry mode, even though the investment in Galaxy was made by 
Creat‟s subsidiary CRH in Australia (C3).  They also indicated that their FDI applications were 
processed smoothly by the Australian government. 
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The interviewees indicated that cultural distance was not a major factor in their entry mode decision 
regarding their Australian investment.  They felt that cultural issues were something that could be 
overcome by means such as keeping the original managerial staff and not interfering with its daily 
production operations unless they absolutely had to (C3).   
 
5.4 Case Four (CS4) 
5.4.1 Background: the Chinese Consumer Electronics Industry 
Before the opening of the domestic market in 1978, perhaps the most common consumer electronics 
product in China was radio, and even that was owned by very few people.  Televisions and 
refrigerators were not even manufactured commercially until the 1980‟s.  However, after 1978, the 
Chinese consumer electronics industry began to develop more rapidly, in common with the general 
increase in the rate of economic development. The industry‟s development boomed after the new 
millennium. 
In 2002, the total output of the industry was RMB269 billion; by the end of 2011, it reached RMB1.14 
trillion.  Similarly, in 2002, the industry‟s total exports amounted to RMB70 billion, dramatically 
expanding to RMB310 billion in 2011 (China Household Electrical Appliance Association, 2012).  At 
present, more than 40 per cent of refrigerators and washing machines, and more than 70 per cent of 
air-conditioners and microwave ovens produced globally every year are made in China, making it the 
world‟s largest manufacturer of consumer electronic products (Liu, 2008).   
China‟s first colour TV set was produced in 1970 and from a modest start its TV production has 
expanded dramatically, so that, for example, China has been the biggest producer of CRT TV in the 
world since a decade ago (NBSC, 2010a; 2010b).  As the domestic market matured and new 
technologies developed, several of the major companies started to expand internationally. While 
Samsung, LG, Sony, Panasonic and Sharp have formed a Japanese-Korean manufacturing group 
146 
 
 
which has dominated global TV sales with nearly 60 per cent of the global market the Chinese TV 
group comprising CS4, TCL and Skyworth achieved a market share of 21.4 per cent by  2010 (Lu, 
2010).  Sales of CS4‟s TV sets accounted for more than 5 per cent of global sales in 2010, making it 
one of the five largest manufacturers (American Consumer Electronics Show, 2010). 
The Chinese consumer electronics industry is still growing steadily. According to a recent report 
released by MarketLine Industry Profile, in 2011, the Chinese consumer electronics market generated 
total revenue of AUD31.5 billion, and a compound annual growth rate of 6.4 per cent between 2007 
and 2011.  While much smaller, the Australian market demonstrated a grow rate of 4.2 per cent in the 
same period, with total revenues of AUD4.5 billion (MarketLine Industry Profile, 2012).  As, for 
example, the recent sales of large screen TVs indicates, there is still quite some market potential in 
markets for TV manufacturers to explore. 
 
5.4.2 The Company (CS4) 
CS4 was established in 1969, formerly known as Qingdao No.2 Radio Factory (CS4, 2013a).  At the 
start, it employed 10 staff and engaged in the production of semiconductor radios.  Its first television 
was designed and manufactured in the following year, 1970; in 1979, its name was changed to 
Qingdao TV General Factory and it was allocated the role of a TV manufacturer by the government in 
the period of the planned economy (CS4, 2013a).  It adopted its present name in 1994 (CS4, 2013a).  
The group consists of two publicly listed companies, with its main products being TVs, refrigerators, 
air-conditioners, and a range of telecommunication products.   
After several years of successful domestic growth and the receipt of several major awards, in 1996 the 
group indicated it would develop a strategy aimed at making it a major international brand (CS4, 
2013a).  The group has also demonstrated a consistently sound financial performance.  In its 2012 
annual report, for example, it was noted that the gross profit margin for the main business had 
increased by 3.85 per cent despite the economic slowdown, and it achieved an operating revenue of 
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RMB25.2 billion, representing a 7.35 per cent increase from the previous year.  The report also noted 
that its international business growth had outperformed the domestic, achieving a 25.7 per cent 
increase in annual revenues (RMB5.3 billion), compared to only 2.1 per cent for the domestic market 
(RMB 17.9 billion).  It expects that the global market will play an increasingly important role in 
CS4‟s revenue structure (CS4, 2012: 12). 
 
5.4.3 CS4’s Pre-Australian International Activities 
CS4 had an established profile in international activities before entering the Australian market.  The 
company‟s first FDI was in the US, establishing a WOS in 2001.  The aim was to gradually introduce 
the full range of CS4 products into the North American market, from televisions to mobile phones 
(CS4, 2013a).  A particular focus was on the development of distribution channels with major retailers, 
including Best Buy, Wal-Mart and Canadian Tire (CS4, 2013a). 
CS4 entered the EU market in 2002 to establish a sales network and a number of WOS have been set 
up, for example, in Hungary in 2004 and Italy in 2006. Also, as part of its aim to establish globalised 
production channels, an Australian firm, CS4-subsidiary, was set up in 2006.  CS4 now has WOSs 
and overseas R&D centres in over 10 countries, including Africa, Europe, Asia, North America, and 
Oceania.  In the last ten years the company‟s overseas sales have increased by 23 times (China 
Industry Online, 2012).  As CS4‟s 2010 corporate annual report notes, the company managed to 
achieve USD1.5 billion in overseas sales, which marked a 40 per cent increase from the previous year, 
and, just as interviewee H2 predicted, the rate of increase was 25 per cent in 2011 (H2; CS4, 2011). 
 
5.4.4 CS4’s Australian Direct Investments 
CS4 Australia was established in March 2006 in Melbourne.  It is wholly owned by CS4 China.  The 
company was established with an aim to penetrate the Australian market with their consumer 
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electronics and home appliance products, including TVs, air-conditioners and refrigerators as part of 
their globalisation plan (CS4, 2013b). 
CS4 positioned their brand at the „B Brand‟ level, which according to them, offers consumers the best 
value for money and un-matched customer service providing consumers with the best overall product 
experience.  Its aggressive long-term goal is to further establish the CS4 brand into consumers‟ 
purchasing decisions as a technologically advanced brand with high quality products, excellent 
customer service and “best value for money” products (CS4, 2013b). 
CS4 has thus put a major effort into strengthening its brand image in Australia.  For example, it has 
gained the major naming rights for one of the most famous sports arenas in Melbourne replacing 
Vodafone, with six-year naming rights to one of the main stadiums used for the annual Australian 
Tennis Open.  This was the first time that a Chinese brand was able to gain such rights for an iconic 
building in a major city in a developed country (H1, G1).  In 2010 CS4 Australia announced another 
major sponsorship with the Cronulla Sharks National Rugby League team. Again in 2010, CS4 
Australia was awarded the Canstar Blue Award for “Most Satisfied LCD TV Customer Award”, a 
consumer 5 Star Award Rating, establishing the CS4 brand in Australia as a real alternative for 
consumers.  The achievement, in large part, was a result of CS4 Australia‟s high level of localisation; 
in fact, as depicted by one of the interviewees, CS4 Australia has the highest level of localisation in 
terms of their selling channels and customer service styles among all foreign TV brands in Australia 
(H2, 2012). 
 
5.4.5 CS4 VS Research Issues 
5.4.5.1 Research Question1: Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia through OFDI? 
Interviewee H1 concluded that the reason for their Australian investment was very simple, namely, 
they were interested in the potential of the Australian market.  This not only referred to the 
development potential of the consumer electronics industry within Australia, but also the potential for 
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the company to gain valuable experience in operating in similar industrialised countries.  “Australia 
provides us with a very good platform to test our products – it has a moderate-size market… we are 
also able to check if our service can survive fierce competition in the context of a developed market 
before we go into Europe, a much larger market, to confront with all those global brands” (H1).  Also, 
the interviewee mentioned that Australia has almost no domestic white or black goods brand, so its 
market “was made to be shared by foreign brands with a good balance of quality and service” (H1).  
H3 also noted the importance of market-seeking as a motive for the firm‟s investment in Australia, 
despite the limited size of the Australian market: “we need a headquarters to coordinate the R&D as 
well as manufacturing issues in the whole Oceania as part of our globalisation plan, Australia is a 
strategic location in that area, so for us to achieve our global strategy, penetrating this market is 
necessary” (H3). 
H3 indicated that the decision to invest in Australia involved some ten years of market research, with 
its international marketing department developing a range of continuing connections with Australian 
local distributors, manufacturers, retailers, and even existing foreign investors to gain firsthand 
information so as to help them analyse likely development trends as regards future products. This 
resulted in a feasibility report to the head office regarding the establishment of the Australian 
company. Further assessments were then organised at head office level, including finance, 
manufacturing capacity, sales and retailing, followed by a series of departmental meetings to discuss 
their findings and possible entry modes, often drawing on their previous overseas investments.  The 
likely impact of Chinese and Australian policies and regulations were also covered during the 
discussions. 
It took the company only a month before getting approval from the Chinese government.  In terms of 
the final entry mode decision, H1 indicated that their previous, largely successful use of WOS in other 
countries led to the general perception that it would also be the most suitable entry mode for Australia. 
Despite such preconceptions, H1 explained that every potential investment needed to be investigated 
on its own merits “there is no formula for entry mode choice to apply to every environment”.  
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Nevertheless, he noted that attention had been focused on operational issues rather than entry mode 
choice.  
 
5.4.5.2 Research Question 2: What factors have influenced Chinese MNE’s choice of entry mode 
for Australia? 
H1 noted that as Australia had no significant, large scale local manufacturer of consumer electronics 
the use of the JV entry mode was impracticable. Hence, combined with its previous experience of 
WOS, the selection of a WOS in Australia was almost an inevitable choice.  
H1 also indicated that “larger corporations from China would be inclined to set up WOSs”, and that 
“if a company has a very large scale, the corporate culture that guides its operations tends to be rooted 
deeply and difficult to alter; in a case where a JV was to be set up it would be harder for them to adapt 
to the new corporate culture, and the process taken from the start till everything works out smoothly 
would not be short”.  H2 shared the same feeling: “A larger corporation is like a container truck, it is 
not as flexible as smaller cars”, and a JV needs “more time to coordinate, and the process would be 
prolonged if two large corporations each had their own culture, beliefs and rules…”  H3 also noted 
the tendency for larger firms to choose to establish WOS did not only exist in television 
manufacturing businesses like theirs, it was quite common in both manufacturing industry and mining 
industry; after all, it symbolises exclusive controlling power.  Also, with shared authority, there is 
always a problem of shared profit distribution, which “sometimes does not necessarily do much good 
to the company” (H3). 
All of CS4 interviewees acknowledged that the company‟s former experience in other countries had 
strongly influenced their choice of the WOS mode of entry. They felt that their WOS experience in 
the US, Italy and Hungary was of considerable importance in leading to use of the WOS mode in 
setting up their regional R&D centre in Australia: “our investments in those areas has given us the 
courage and ability to land in Australia and compete with big global brands; we have certainly learned 
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from our experiences to decide to set up WOS in Australia” (H1).  “Experiences have significantly 
enhanced our ability to foresee possible risks involved in foreign investments, and that has led us to 
the decision of establishing a WOS”, which has a higher requirement for efficient risk management 
and resource deployment (H3). 
There was no consensus among the interviewees regarding the influence of goodwill capital on CS4‟s 
entry mode choice.  H1 felt that “when operating in a completely strange environment, we would 
prefer to find a local partner, who has a good brand image and reasonable familiarity towards the 
institutional relationships in this environment… But… there is no matched partner in Australia, so we 
just have to rely on our previous overseas FDI experience to set up a WOS” (H1).  H2 and H3, on the 
other hand, felt that goodwill capital had no influence on the entry mode decision.  
According to all three interviewees, the Australian government did not explicitly or implicitly 
influence the company‟s choice of entry mode.  In general, the government “showed strong support” 
for their investment by means of its free consultation service with local business specialists and a fast 
approval process (G1, G2, H1).  Similarly, H2 and H3 felt that the Chinese government had exercised 
no influence on entry mode choice and it experienced good support at the government level. 
According to the interviewees, cultural distance was not one of the factors that influenced the 
company‟s choice of entry mode when they considered entering into the Australian market, as the 
company had had considerable experience in its overseas operations.   
 
5.5 Case Five (CS5) 
5.5.1 Background: the Chinese Livestock Farming (Pork) Industry 
China has long been the world‟s largest consumer of pork, and the yearly consumption has stabilised 
at an annual increase of 1.95 per cent from 2000 to 2011 (China Industry Research, 2011; Chinese 
Business Intelligence Network, 2012).  It is also the largest producer of pork products, accounting for 
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around 50 per cent of aggregate global pork production since 2009 (United States Department of 
Agriculture, 2013).  In contrast, Australia is the world‟s 25th largest pork producer (Spicer, 2012).  
According to the Australian Bureau of Agricultural and Resource Economics (ABARE), just less than 
85 per cent of Australia‟s pork production is consumed domestically.  While pork ranks behind the 
other animal livestock industries in Australia, its value to the economy is steadily growing with 
consumption at just over 18 kg per person per annum (Spicer, 2012).  One advantage of the Australian 
pork industry is that the country is free from the major viral diseases that plague the industry overseas 
(Spicer, 2012).  Hogs raised in other countries may require greater use of antibiotics to control 
infection, therefore causing the presence of antibiotic residues in the products sold to consumers.  
Pork, and other livestock produced in Australia are famous for their “clean green image” and are 
becoming very popular in niche markets such as Japan and Singapore (Spicer, 2012).  This makes 
Australia an ideal environment to raise livestock, and it is attractive to foreign agricultural firms. 
 
5.5.2 The Company (CS5) 
CS5 was established in December 1992.  It is a medium-scale private enterprise working on pig 
breeding, pig feed processing, pig slaughtering and relevant products and by-products sales.  To 
facilitate the sales of the products, the company has established a WOS, which has nearly 100 outlets 
in Shanghai and the surrounding areas selling the company-branded pork products exclusively.  
Currently the company employs 230 staff, and it has an annual production of 100,000 hogs (CS5, 
2012). 
 
5.5.3 CS5’s Pre-Australian International Activities 
CS5 had no previous direct investment experience before they came to Australia.  However, they did 
have some experience of cooperation with firms in other countries over the past 10 years.  For 
example, according to the interviewee, some of their production lines were imported from Germany 
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and the US; CS5 also had some agencies in Hong Kong, Taiwan, and Japan selling a number of their 
pork products, but not on a large scale, “just as early stage trial selling only” (S1). Hence, the 
company‟s investment in Australia was the first FDI the company engaged in. 
 
5.5.4 CS5’s Australian Direct Investments 
CS5 established a JV in Australia with a local pig farm in 2008.  The new company has engaged in 
production and sales of pork products and feed.  It is a small-scaled corporation with less than 50 
employees in total.  According to the interviewees, the annual production and revenue is growing 
steadily. 
 
5.5.5 CS5 and Research Questions 
5.5.5.1 Research Question1: Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia through OFDI? 
According to the interviewees, what they found attractive about Australia was that “it is a country 
with a strong agricultural background, and it has a very developed stockbreeding industry.  The whole 
system… is very professional and systemic, only a few people were needed to run a large farm; these 
are all worth learning from for us” (S1); “Few people are involved in this meat production line so it is 
more automatic and involves more technology [compared to that of China]” (S3). Therefore, 
accumulating advanced operating experiences from the Australian market was a major incentive for 
the company to invest in the country. 
A second motive was to explore the potential of the Australian pork market, both for local production 
and for import, as noted by S2.  “For Australia, although the Australians eat lots of beef and lamb, 
pork is still a quite important component of their dietary pattern”; besides, pork raised and slaughtered 
locally “tastes differently to that of the Chinese breed”, the latter of which is preferred by “an 
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increased number of Chinese in Australia”, so the potential to “bring better tasting pork to Australia” 
was another reason for their investment (S2). 
Another unusual, but probably decisive motive, based on the views of those interviewed, was that 
Australia gives overseas investors who have met the necessary criteria the possibility of permanent 
residency (PR) which allows them to stay in the country indefinitely.  The owner admitted in the 
interview that the prospect of Australian PR had been very tempting, as the company had the 
necessary finance and he just wanted a better place for living.  “Australia has cleaner air and water, 
and we rarely hear any food safety issue as we do in China… I am in the food industry as well, so I 
know how serious this problem is and how much damage it will cast upon national health…  I feel 
this sense of safety is even more important than how much money you make, so the Australian 
investment or eventually Australian PR, guarantees that I don‟t put all my eggs in one basket” (S1).  
Also, “Australia offers good quality higher education, which could benefit my child and I found really 
added value to the PR status” (S1).  The owner of the company has sent his child to Australia to study 
with the hope that upon graduation he would be of help to the owner‟s Australian company.  In this 
regard, this PR-oriented investment motivation is “perhaps the key factor” that has determined CS5‟s 
Australian investment (S3).  
S2 indicated that the company started off as a small-scale family-based pig farm in 1992.  Over the 
years, it gradually grew into a company with an integrated production and marketing chain that raises 
and sells pigs and pork products.  Its growing production capacity and sales revenue helped them 
accumulate the financial capital they needed to not only expand their domestic production, but to set 
foot in overseas markets. 
In addition to assisting with its expansion in the local Chinese market, S3 noted that the local Chinese 
Agricultural Commission had provided great support.  It had helped coordinate a number of 
agriculture and commerce expos for the company to attend and source information, and a number of 
conferences regarding how to stimulate foreign investments among local corporations.  What made 
foreign investment for CS5 even more practicable was the fact that the owner‟s child was studying in 
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Australia for tertiary courses in marketing and management; which had given them a great deal of the 
inspiration to introduce their products to an overseas market and to learn from the sometimes more 
advanced technologies those developed countries offered.  So “while the investment was put forward 
by our owner essentially, the local government has helped us to build the trading relationship and 
information platform for us to make this possible…”  Therefore when it comes to the exact entry 
mode, “more instructions were given by our local government who advised that probably a JV would 
be a more favourable choice after weighing different factors…  Of source, the final decision power 
was on our side, and as we do have our own perceptions towards which mode of entry would be better, 
the final decision is a result of thorough contemplation and factor weighing” (S3). 
 
5.5.5.2 Research Question 2: What factors have influenced Chinese MNE’s choice of entry mode 
for Australia? 
Both S1 and S2 indicated that because they wanted to learn from the advanced pig raising technology 
of local Australian companies, and since they had no previous experience in making business overseas, 
they would prefer to, and did actually set up a JV with a local farm which could guide them through 
the process. 
Cs5‟s company size had no influence on their choice of entry mode.  However, S1 and S2 also noted 
that if the company had been large enough in size, they would have preferred to set up a WOS: “we 
had thought of establishing a WOS because it allows more convenience to introduce what we can 
produce to the Australia market.  But as a local private enterprise with our current size… we didn‟t 
really have the initial investment needed to bring such a choice into reality… in a case where money 
is not a concern, and if our company was large enough in size and we had experience in overseas 
investment before, we would definitely incline towards setting up a WOS” (S2).  S3 was neutral about 
the effect of size upon their company‟s entry mode preference. 
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S1, S2 and S3 admitted that their lack of experience in foreign markets was a major reason why they 
chose to set up a JV rather than a WOS.  “We didn‟t have the experience and technology needed to 
operate a business in Australia” (S3); “as a private company, we must be very cautious about every 
decision we make, we are not like SOEs, we can‟t afford losing money for a strategically wrong 
decision” (S2); also, learning from the experiences of local Australian companies “is another reason 
why we have chosen to set up a JV” (S1).  To sum up, had they had relevant FDI experiences, setting 
up a WOS would have been preferred, but the lack of experience and capital led to the selection of the 
JV mode.   
The interviewees did not think their level of goodwill capital influenced their entry mode choice “we 
don‟t put that much concentration in maintaining a brand image – largely because we are still at a 
relatively early stage of brand development, particularly when it comes to overseas investment, we are 
virtually newborn” (S1).   
S2 was rather hostile towards the Australian government for two reasons: one, the new operational 
manager‟s visa application to inspect the Australian operations had recently been rejected; and two, he 
thought the government had special restrictions placed on foreign investment in agriculture.  “The 
application process has always been very slow, and we have supplied so much additional documents 
as they required to justify the monetary source, project feasibility, and even more confidential and 
sensitive information regarding future development plans… We were so frustrated after two months 
of hard work and the final result was like that… we [Chinese government] are two to three times 
faster and more efficient than them here, it‟s true” (s2).  S3 also found it a bit hard to comprehend 
why the new operational manager‟s visa application was rejected after the company has been through 
all the tough scrutiny processes involved in both the investment itself and livestock or meat 
production for import /export.  They did not realise that these issues are handled by different 
departments of the government (G1), and which, unlike China, they do not see it necessary to provide 
cross-disciplinary support in cases like these.  With the current level of „restrictions‟ they face, the 
interviewees felt it would be almost impossible to really set up a WOS in this industry in Australia, 
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which apparently would require higher level of resource commitment and interaction with local 
government: “no matter how badly we would like to set up a WOS, I think the Australia government 
will be the major stumbling stone to this mode of entry” (S2).  However, the interviewees did not 
indicate that Australian government policy or regulation actually shaped their current entry mode 
decision. 
S1 and S2 indicated that the Chinese government did not require the company to choose a particular 
type of entry mode, and S3 noted that while they were offered some advice regarding what an 
appropriate mode might be (as discussed in 5.5.5.1), the final decision was completely up to the 
company and its owners.  “The country gave us no hard rules towards entry modes… I think the 
government also knows the most suitable mode for a corporation is different depending on the 
corporations, and the corporation itself knows it best” (S1). 
The interviewees did not regard culture as a relevant factor in their Australian entry mode choice. 
 
5.6 Case Six (CS6) 
5.6.1 Background: the Chinese Pharmaceutical Industry 
According to a report prepared by KPMG, by the end of 2008, China‟s pharmaceutical industry 
ranked fifth in the world in terms of annual sales, behind the US, Japan, France and Germany (KPMG, 
2011).  It is also expected that by 2015, the country would overtake Japan and become the world‟s 
second largest market (KPMG, 2011).  However, as the report points out, China‟s status as one of the 
world‟s largest markets “rests mainly on the size of its population”, and the overall level of industrial 
development is still very much limited (KPMG, 2011:3).  For example, in monetary terms, Chinese 
annual per capita spending on medicine was among the lowest in the world, at USD35.1 in 2010 
(KPMG, 2011:3).  Also, more than 98 per cent of Chinese pharmaceutical companies do not have 
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patents over any drug they produce, they survive by producing generics; this suggests that the 
majority of those companies are in the lower end of the market (KPMG, 2011:7). 
Although China has enjoyed the benefits of an expanding market for pharmaceutical production, the 
industry suffers from minimal innovation and investment in new drug research.  In contrast, the US‟s 
Food and Drug Administration (FDA) approves roughly 20 new drugs to go on to the market every 
year (Shen, 2011), which are the results of long-term research and huge capital investment.  Chinese 
drug regulators, on the other hand, approve more than 10,000 „new drugs‟ every year, all being 
copycats of foreign patented drugs (Wei, 2008).  A health reform plan issued in 2009 aimed to correct 
this, or at least, alleviate this problem with the government encouraging foreign companies to bring in 
capital, state of the art research and training of personnel.  In the country‟s 12th Five-Year Plan, 
biotechnology has been singled out as one of the seven „strategic emerging industries‟ (KPMG, 
2011:2).  It is hoped that the Plan will support the development of innovative biotech products, high-
end medical devices and patented medicines.   
 
5.6.2 The Company (CS6) 
CS6 is a biopharmaceutical company focused on the development of what the company describes as 
„innovative first in class‟ bio-therapeutic products for medical needs (Z1; CS6, 2012).  It was 
established in 2000 in Shanghai by a Chinese scientist (Z1), who came back to the country following 
his job as a researcher in a prestigious Australian laboratory working to find treatments for heart 
diseases.  CS6‟s major task since its establishment has been to develop a drug valuable in the 
treatment of heart failure, on the basis of theoretical work undertaken by Z1.  CS6 is still in the pre-
production stage, requiring significant capital investment to support the ongoing experiments and 
clinical trials.  During the domestic clinical trial for the new drug in 2007, a multinational 
pharmaceutical company approached CS6 and offered to pay US37 million for the relevant 
technology and agreed to give CS6 9 per cent of its global sales when the drug was marketed (Z1, Z2).  
It seems the drug has considerable potential. 
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5.6.3 CS6’s Pre-Australian International Activities 
In 2006, CS6 set up a WOS in San Diego, the US, to manage FDA filing, clinical trials and the 
commercialisation process of NeucardinTM, the above mentioned novel treatment for heart failure.  
In 2009, CS6 (the US) was approved by the US FDA to conduct two phases of US-based trials of 
NeucardinTM to treat Class II and III Chronic Heart Failure.  The most recent company update 
suggests that the Phase 2 blind clinical data shows an excellent consistency with the Chinese Phase II 
clinical results.  It means the successful Chinese clinical results have been confirmed by US clinical 
trials, and it is a solid step forward in CS6‟s aim of bringing this innovative drug on to the global 
pharmaceutical market (CS6, 2012). 
As the KPMG industry report points out, the US has dominated research into new drugs “for the past 
40 years” (KPMG, 2011:45), where the process normally involves major research costs and a 
prolonged research period.  As a result, the US has been the birth place (registration place) for the 
majority of blockbuster drugs released in the past few decades, while China remained insignificant in 
this area (KPMG, 2011: 40).  For this reason, for an innovative drug to be successful, the US is a 
market that every drug manufacturer has to conquer before they go global.   
 
5.6.4 CS6’s Australian Direct Investments 
CS6 (Australia) was a JV with a local laboratory established in mid 2006. As with their US company, 
it was also established to complete overseas clinical trials needed before a new medicine could be 
marketed.  The corporation was on a small scale, focused on research rather than production.  No 
financial data was available from their company and, as with the Chinese and American subsidiaries, 
it is in the early stages of pre-production research and development, operating on the basis of its 
investment capital.  
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5.6.5 CS6 and Research Questions 
5.6.5.1 Research Question1: Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia through OFDI? 
According to the interviewee Z2, CS6‟s Australian investment was set up with a main aim of 
conducting laboratory experiments and clinical trials for NeucardinTM, based on the relationships the 
owner had established in Australia during his work with prestigious medical and pharmaceutical 
professors.  In addition, like the US, Australia is a developed country with an advanced scientific 
research environment, hardware and software, all of which are beneficial for CS6‟s work in 
developing and promoting the new drug on a global scale.  As Z1 said, “if we want to promote such a 
new product overseas, for sure we need to have some overseas related clinical trial experiences to 
convince local drug administrators, the US is one side, and Australia is another”; “the founder of our 
company, Mr. Zhou, worked as the chief researcher in the cell signal transduction lab in that Cardiac 
Research Institute in Australia from 1996 to 2000… Since he came back from Australia in 2000, he 
has been maintaining good relationships with the Australian side… Whenever we have needs for 
technological support, such as access to leading journals and conducting clinical trials, they [the 
Australian side] are always among the top choices” (Z2).   
 
5.6.5.2 Research Question 2: What factors have influenced Chinese MNE’s choice of entry mode 
for Australia? 
The factors that have influenced CS6‟s entry mode decision for Australia include: the size of the 
parent company, their multinational experience, and home government support. 
Both Z1 and Z2 explained that their motive for investment in Australia was to gain assistance in 
conducting the clinical trials with the help of their connections with Australian professionals.  They 
need the technology and professional personnel that Australia has to offer, which are assets of 
strategic value to the company.  Given the company‟s relative lack of experience such cooperation 
was essential and a JV was seen as the most suitable entry mode for this purpose, in contrast to the 
WOS choice for their US company.  In the US case the company did not have that professional and, to 
161 
 
 
an extent, personal linkages with local experts that they had in Australia.  Also, given the highly 
competitive nature of the US‟s position as the centre of global pharmaceutical industry, the company 
was reluctant to share its knowledge with a US partner.  
Interviewees from CS6 revealed that they did not have that many options when it comes to entry 
mode choice given the current size of their company, “although we have the potential to generate 
millions and millions of dollars, at the current stage, we are just a small company… when it comes to 
entry mode choices, everything happened naturally and smoothly, we didn‟t take too much effort 
before came up with this choice” (Z1).  However, the interviewees did mention that if the company 
had a stronger capital structure, they would have preferred to establish a WOS which, provided that 
the managerial team were all familiar with the western practices, would help them avoid all sorts of 
inconveniences that a Chinese WOS set up in a Western institutional environment would usually 
encounter. 
CS6 had set up a WOS in the US before they officially started their joint cooperation with the 
Australian partner, but the two investment activities took place almost at the same time, both in 2006.  
Therefore, while the management team chose to set up a WOS in the US, for the Australian 
investment project, there was still little or no overseas operating experience to guide them through the 
process of setting up a new company in Australia. This, combined with the need for access to 
experienced staff and expertise led to the selection of the JV mode.  
CS6‟s interviewee indicated that the company‟s goodwill capital was of no influence in the entry 
mode decision, given its short history, its focus on research and clinical trials, and the lack of 
marketed products.  
CS6‟s interviewees felt that neither the Australian nor Chinese government policy had any influence 
on their entry mode decision (Z1).  They indicated that the Chinese government was very supportive 
to CS6, especially when they were facing initial financial difficulties, a continuing issue given its 
stage of development.  The Shanghai municipality and the Chinese industrial zone CS6 is located in, 
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as well as other local SOEs have injected capital into the company at almost every critical point in the 
research of NeucardinTM. “They [the government] see us as potentially the first Chinese 
pharmaceutical company that may have a world-wide-patented, cutting-edge drug” (Z1).  The 
supportive attitude of the government towards CS6 was a big reason why the company could conduct 
FDI and start their overseas clinical trials.   
As noted by the interviewees, CS6‟s management all had overseas working experience in Australia, 
so they felt the cultural distance between Australia and China did not pose any great problem for their 
operations and it did not influence their entry mode decision.   
 
5.7 Case Seven (CS7) 
5.7.1 Background: the Chinese Leather and Fur Products Industry 
Since the reforms of 1978, China‟s leather and fur products industry has grown rapidly.  As the 2012-
2016 Investment Analysis and Forecast Report of the Chinese Leather and Fur Industry shows, in 
1978, the country had a total leather and fur output of only 26 million sheets, increasing tenfold to 260 
million sheets in 2010 (Chao, 2011).  In 2011, the country‟s leather and fur industry has realised a 
total industrial output value of more than RMB770 million (China Leather Online, 2012). 
Accompanying the development of the industry in China has been the growing significance of 
Australia in terms of the supply of wool and sheepskins for the Chinese market.  Australia is the 
world‟s largest producer and exporter of wool.  According to Wooltrade Australia, an independent 
organisation in the trade of Australian wool, three fourths of the processed wool that Australia 
exported in recent years was sent to China, and more than 90 per cent of sheepskin produced in 
Australia was consumed by Chinese customers (Feng & Xiao, 2011).  With Australia as the largest 
supplier of wool and China the largest supplier of wearing apparel in the world market, bilateral trade 
in wool forms an important aspect of the China-Australia trade relationship.  There have been several 
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reasons for the high degree of dependence of Chinese leather and fur producers on Australian 
products.  Australian sheepskin products are of high quality, although they might not be the cheapest 
when taking account of international freight costs (Feng & Xiao, 2011).  In contrast, the quality of 
domestically produced Chinese wool and sheepskin is poorer, and the amount of impurities (such as 
wool grease, vegetable matter, sand, urine stains, faeces, etc) in “even the best merino-style wool is 
much greater than would be the norm in Australia” (Longworth, Brown and Waldron, 2005:18).  With 
the demand for leather and wool products in China gradually increasing, and the recent output of 
Australian fur materials decreasing as a lingering effect of the global financial downturn in 2009, not 
surprisingly Chinese producers are competing to source those materials from Australia.   
 
5.7.2 The Company (CS7) 
CS7 was originally established in 1989 as a small tannery.  The privately-owned company is a 
manufacturer for sheared sheep skin and related products.  It used to rely solely on domestically 
produced wool and sheepskin products.  As the company grew its need for high quality raw materials 
also increased.  In 1999, the company established cooperative relationships with Australian suppliers, 
helping secure its sources of raw materials for production.  Also in that year, the owner successfully 
upgraded CS7‟s tannery techniques to make the company more efficient in the face of more intense 
domestic competition.  As a result the company outperformed many regional tanneries and increased 
its reserves of capital.  A private company, CS7 had a yearly turnover of more than RMB20 million in 
2011 and employs a total of 150 employees (CS7, 2011: 2).  The owner, a successful entrepreneur, 
migrated to Australia after the establishment of his firm‟s Australian affiliate (X1, X2). 
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5.7.3 CS7’s Pre-Australian International Activities 
CS7 had no previous international investment before that in Australia.  As the world‟s largest wool 
producer and exporter, with increased demand for supplies, it is not surprising that the company‟s first 
foreign investment took place in Australia.   
 
5.7.4 CS7’s Australian Direct Investment 
Although CS7 started trading with Australia for raw materials and technical support in 1999, the 
company‟s Australian subsidiary was not established until 2006.  According to MOFCOM records 
and the company‟s profile, CS7 fully acquired a local Australian plant to make it their WOS, and the 
Australian affiliate was set up to facilitate the export of sheep skin and chemicals necessary for 
product processing in China (MOFCOM, 2013; X1; and X2).  Another reason for establishing a 
subsidiary in Australia rather than continuing with the cheaper option of directly importing the 
materials was that the owner wanted to gain PR in Australia, and the investment and jobs created in 
the Australian market helped the owner meet the required criteria for PR, the same motivation as for 
the owner of CS4 as discussed above (X1, X2).  
 
5.7.5 CS7 and Research Questions 
5.7.5.1 Research Question1: Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia through OFDI? 
As noted above, based on the interviews with the owner and the manager, the impetus for CS7‟s 
investment in Australia was twofold.  First, the company wanted to secure supplies of wool and 
sheepskins from Australia.  “Australia is very developed in fur and especially sheep skin processing 
areas, the country has lots of advanced technologies, and the sheep skins they produce are of top 
quality… we need their sheep skin to meet the increasing domestic demand for high quality sheep 
skin products… we also want to absorb such advanced technologies and apply them to our local 
plants in China…” (X2).  “Australia is known as the leading country in wool products production… 
165 
 
 
therefore I decided to invest in Australia to import good quality Australian wool for further production 
in China, a big brave attempt but definitely worthwhile” (X1). 
A second reason is that the owner wanted to gain Australian PR status. “Our boss himself is a very 
successful entrepreneur… he was thinking of migrating to Australia through investments, so he had 
decided to set up a local company to purchase the raw materials and engage in manufacturing and 
exporting activities more easily and on a larger scale… it‟s good for both the company and himself 
personally” (X2).  This PR-seeking motivation coincides with that of CS5‟s motivations, and will 
receive further elaboration in Section 5.9 „Summary of Findings‟, below.   
 
5.7.5.2 Research Question 2: What factors have influenced Chinese MNE’s choice of entry mode 
for Australia? 
According to the interviewees, the factors that influenced their entry mode choice included their 
investment motivation and corporate size.   
X2 indicated that, as a private enterprise “with the boss overseeing everything”, “the entry mode was 
only decided by the boss himself… he was somewhat conservative towards the foreign investment 
because he was already quite successful locally… so it was not surprising for him to choose a perhaps 
less risky method of acquiring a local firm and make it his own WOS.  The local firm has the supply 
channels and technologies we wanted, and since we were purchasing the whole company, we didn‟t 
need to worry about the compatibility and cooperation issues which might otherwise bother us had we 
established a JV” (X2).  This was confirmed by the owner, “WOS is more efficient… It was not 
possible for us to start everything from scratch when we entered Australia, we needed the local 
connections, we focused on whether our suppliers were reliable, and whether the quality of raw 
materials they supply are constantly of high standards, so the focus of our Australian investment has 
resulted in the entry mode we chose, purchasing and wholly owning a local producer to secure our 
domestic production”. 
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The interviewees indicated that size was a significant factor influencing their entry mode choice.  
“Our company of course is not a big corporation when compared to large SOEs, but we are one of the 
most significant corporations regionally in terms of tax payment… Our sound financial structure 
ensured that I could go ahead with WOS, which usually acquire more initial monetary input than 
setting up JVs” (X1).  “The logic is that we wanted to set up a WOS through acquisition which 
generates minimal uncertainty, and our size, or the financial capability directly correlated with our 
size, has contributed to the final decision of wholly-owning a local firm” (X2). 
Because there was no previous international experience associated with CS7, both X1 and X2 thought 
it had no influence in the entry mode decision.  However, they did indicate that previous experience in 
international operations would have made them “more confident to set up this WOS” (X1).   
The interviewees indicated that goodwill capital was not a relevant factor for the entry mode choice. 
They also indicated that neither Australian nor Chinese government policy or had any significant 
influence on entry mode choice, with X1 noting that “… the reviewing process was not that long or 
complicated as many people might have imagined”. Similarly, they felt that cultural distance had had 
no influence. 
 
5.8 Case Eight (CS8) 
5.8.1 Background: the Chinese Dairy Industry 
The Chinese diary industry has experienced tremendous growth since the country adopted a market-
oriented economy.  Though drinking animal milk was not a dietary tradition for generations of 
Chinese, nowadays, the younger generation is picking up on this habit and planting it rather firmly in 
their lives.  Specifically, the yearly production of cow‟s milk in 1978 was merely 1 million tons, and 
the figure soared to more than 30 million tons in 2009 (Qiu, 2009).  By the end of 2010, annual 
Chinese dairy industry production was 38 billion litres of milk, representing a per capita milk 
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consumption of 28 litres a year, making China the third largest producer of milk (Chinese Investment 
Consultancy, 2012).  However, domestic confidence in local dairy products was severely and 
adversely impacted by a number of scandals involving adulterated dairy products. In 2008, for 
example, tainted local milk killed six babies and poisoned 300,000 (Chinese Investment Consultancy, 
2012).  As confidence in the products of the local dairy industry fell demand for imported powdered 
milk and dairy products grew rapidly.  As a result, several dairy producers have urgently sought and 
developed foreign suppliers of milk and dairy products with the aim of convincing Chinese consumers 
as to the quality and purity of their products (Chinese Investment Consultancy, 2012). 
Australia, with a good international reputation for the quality of its dairy products, was, as a result, an 
increasing target for Chinese dairy producers.  As indicated by Dairy Australia, the Australian dairy 
industry produced 9.2 billion litres of milk in 2007/08, falling slightly to 9.1 billion litres in 2010/11, 
suggesting a saturated domestic market (Dairy Australia, 2012).  Australian per capita milk 
consumption averages 450 kilograms, which is 16 times higher than in China.  
Flat demand in the domestic Australian market has, in part, resulted in an intense price war.  Since 
2011, the duopolistic Australian retail giants Coles and Woolworths began to sell milk at a loss in 
order to increase demand and as a „loss leader‟, to encourage sales of other products (Henshaw, 2012).  
Since the end of 2012 until now (end of 2013), a litre of milk has been cheaper than a litre of spring 
water. The low prices being received by dairy farmers stimulated greater efforts to find export 
markets, at much the same time as Chinese (and other Asian) producers were looking for foreign 
suppliers (Henshaw, 2012; and Neales, 2012). 
 
5.8.2 The Company (CS8) 
CS8 is a conglomerate formed jointly by four publicly listed companies in August 2006 in Shanghai.  
It is a state-owned enterprise.  The largest one of the listed companies produces dairy products and 
beverages; another is involved in property management and also produces canned meat and bottled 
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water; another runs taxi services in Shanghai; and the fourth engages in food processing, particularly 
sugar processing.  In addition, the group has 15 other unlisted local companies, with the group‟s 
activities covering agriculture, food manufacturing, logistics and asset management.  In 2011, its sales 
exceeded RMB120 billion, ranked it 77
th
 in the top 500 Chinese enterprises. 
 
5.8.3 CS8’s Pre-Australian International Activities 
Ever since its establishment, CS8 has actively sought overseas investment opportunities to expand its 
production and trading capacity (CS8, 2013).  In 2010, CS8 engaged in an AUD1.7 billion tender for 
acquiring shares of a sub-entity of CSR (Sucrogen), Australia‟s largest refined sugar producer (CSR 
Sugar, 2012).  It also made a bid of GBP2 billion for United Biscuits in Britain, a bid of USD2.5 
billion to acquire the world‟s largest vitamin retailer, GNC, a bid of EURO17 billion to acquire 
Yoplait the French yoghurt manufacturer, and a bid of NZD82 million to acquire Synlait, the New 
Zealand milk powder producer.  However, these ambitious attempts at rapid globalisation were 
largely unsuccessful, with only the bid for Synlait succeeding (CS8, 2012).  Thus, while CS8 has 
clearly gained substantial experience in planning international activities, focused on overseas share 
purchases, it is only recently that it has gained experience in owning and operating overseas 
enterprises.  
 
5.8.4 CS8’s Australian Direct Investment 
CS8‟s unsuccessful attempt to invest in CSR‟s Sucrogen commenced in 2010, only four years after 
the establishment of the conglomerate.  While ultimately unsuccessful, possibly, in part, as a result of 
FIRB‟s concerns for its SOE status, valuable experience was gained regarding the requirements for 
successful investment in the Australian market, experience that proved valuable in its later acquisition 
of Manassen, another Australian firm. (Smith & Kokin, 2010).  Despite the failure, CS8 was still very 
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positive towards investment opportunities in Australia, and commenced moves to acquire shares in 
Manassen one year after the CSR failure.   
Manassen Foods was a privately-owned Australian company established in 1953.  Currently it 
employs 350 staff, and has a wide and diverse brand portfolio covering dry groceries, confectionery, 
biscuits and cakes, perishables and frozen foods.  In Australia‟s fast-moving-consumer-goods (FMCG) 
industry, Manassen Foods is ranked in the top 40 suppliers and has been providing one-stop-shop 
solutions for brand owners across the globe, suggesting its wide product range.  The distribution 
channel Manassen Foods has established between a wide range of suppliers and customers is as 
equally important a resource as their own various brands (B1).  CS8 acquired 70 per cent of 
Manassen‟s ownership in 2011 and took over with dominant control. 
 
5.8.5 CS8 and Research Questions 
5.8.5.1 Research Question1: Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia through OFDI? 
As described below, there were two major reasons for CS8‟s investment in Australia: to acquire 
supplies of key resources; and to acquire overseas retailing networks. 
Interviewee B1 explained that it was CS8‟s “strategic aim” to penetrate the international food industry 
since that is the industry the conglomerate majors in.  “We intended to acquire an Australian sugar 
refining enterprise [CSR] a couple years ago, because our domestic supply of sugar cannot match our 
production needs, so as a food processing enterprise, we have to have a steady supply over some basic 
materials such as sugar to ensure smooth processing.  That company is Australia‟s largest sugar 
producer, and for sure by forming a union we could secure our sugar supply to some extent.  Not only 
for sugar, we are hoping to see us acquiring resources through some other Australian based companies 
since the country has an abundant collection of various resources, including dairy products, which is 
the main business of our group… hence our cooperation with Manassen” (B1). 
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In addition, the retailing and distributional networks of Manassen were attractive as “The most 
important objective of our Manassen‟s acquisition was to make it as a platform for our product 
distribution within Australia and New Zealand.  Manassen holds connections with over 50,000 retail 
outlets within and without Australia, which if we could utilise upon acquisition would significantly 
facilitate our overseas distributional channels and promote our international brand image very quickly. 
Also, Manassen could use our domestic distributional channels to gain access to the Chinese market, 
which offers great opportunities for the import of overseas food products, especially when there is a 
lack of confidence in China towards locally produced food” (B1). 
 
5.8.5.2 Research Question 2: What factors have influenced Chinese MNE’s choice of entry mode 
for Australia? 
According to the interviewees, factors that influenced CS8‟s entry mode choice include: their 
investment motivation, size, and their previous investment experience (or attempts). 
According to the interviewees, CS8‟s investment aims definitely influenced the mode of entry they 
selected.  As noted above, CS8 entered Australia with two aims: to acquire natural resources (sugar, 
dairy, and other commodities for their processing in China) and to acquire channels and networks to 
retail terminals for distribution of their products.  “It is our aim [to acquire networks], we cannot 
possibly realise that if we are just starting off a new plant or company by us on our own, we have to 
have someone who already has that information on hand to be our partner, hence no Greenfield.  In 
terms of the choice between WOS and JV, although we would surely prefer to acquire full control of 
the company given that their existing management team would stay, it was more of a negotiation 
outcome” (B1).  “No wonder having full control over the foreign company would enable us to get 
access to their products, or what we might view as raw materials, as well as their networks with 
business partners in a more efficient manner… We also need to contemplate the management issue 
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and conflicts of thoughts between cultures.  The success of the investment really depends upon the 
synergistic effects that follow on” (B2). 
As indicated by B2 it is apparent that CS8 thought that in order to gain the raw material increasingly 
necessary for their domestic production and for access to distribution channels within Australia, it 
needed to become at least the dominant shareholder in an existing enterprise, which would be the best 
entry mode choice, though it recognised the challenges involved in integrating the different cultures if 
its acquisition was to be successful.  
Both B1 and B2 indicated that the large size of their group influenced their preference for the WOS 
mode of entry. They thought that establishing a WOS would achieve a best solution.  “Considering 
our size, we would  prefer a full or at least dominant control over a foreign company, that way we can 
get the resource we want, and have a say in any major strategic decisions within the firm” (B2).  “Our 
large corporate size ensures that we have sufficient funds to make all sorts of investments, Greenfield 
or Brownfield, wholly-owned or jointly-owned, we just need to choose the method which is more 
suitable for us and can help us to achieve our strategic goal more efficiently.  Considering our 
investment impetus for the Australian and also New Zealand projects [to acquire resource and 
networks], we figure acquiring the majority of shares of these firms would be more appropriate, hence 
our decision” (B1). 
Both interviewees greatly valued their past international investment experience, regardless of the 
often unsuccessful outcomes of their investment efforts.  “Although we only succeeded in the Synlait 
proposal and purchased 51 per cent of its shares, all the money paid in the past few investment 
attempts were tuition fees for us to get through this Manassen investment more confidently… For 
example, in our Yoplait case, one of the factors that caused the failure was that the French side were 
concerned that the reviewing process in China would be too lengthy, especially considering the large 
amount of shares we proposed to acquire, which obviously was a misunderstanding and a result of 
lack of communication. So in our Australian investment, we have explained that bit with our potential 
partner beforehand to convince them that would not be a problem…” (B2).  “When we approached 
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the previous companies, we not only needed to communicate with local shareholders and boards, but 
bureaus like overseas agencies and consultants from finance, law, commerce, taxation, environment 
were also involved.  The way we think and value things therefore evolves with the experience we 
have accumulated”.  The interviewees recognised that by the time CS8 got to their Manassen case, 
they have transformed from “I don‟t know, we just want to have dominant share control” to a status of 
“Yes, we know what we are doing, having dominant share control is definitely more efficient for our 
company to achieve our corporate goals” (B1).  This attitude, they felt, also contributed to the success 
of the investment attempt. 
In short, both interviewees felt that the experience they had accumulated in negotiation in their 
previous investment attempts had strengthened their confidence in moving to gain a majority share 
owning in Manassen. 
CS8‟s interviewees felt that goodwill had little, if any, influence on entry mode choice.  “Clearly 
some other factors that we have discussed [such as investment motivation, experience and size] are 
more influential towards our final choice.  We are not seeking to opening up the Australian market 
with our products from China at this early stage, although down the track that is definitely what we 
want to do.  So the preservation of our existing culture or goodwill was not our top priority, and we 
didn‟t worry too much about the effect of that in our entry mode decision” (B1). 
The Australian government may not have directly influenced their entry mode choice regarding 
Manassen, but attempting to invest in Australia has certainly taught CS8 some lessons in how to deal 
with local governments.  “We have not encountered specific problems with the Australian 
government in this Manassen case, but in our previous case with CSR, FIRB held up our investment 
application so as  to „further consider the offer‟ according to them, and which we have no doubt 
created some negative speculation in the related field and hence resulted in our failure in that 
acquisition …  So in this Manassen case, we remained quite low profile before everything was settled, 
there was a limited amount of media coverage involved, and we showed the government that we were 
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not aiming to „steal Aussie brands‟ as was the concern of the French government with our Yoplait 
proposal” (B1). 
Based on their experience so far, both interviewees thought that the Chinese government had laid no 
obstacle on their path towards FDI, at least not intentionally.  However, “some current [Chinese] 
legislative practices are pretty out dated and do not reflect how business is done in the developed 
world, particularly concerning SOEs.  For example, the state requires that a parent SOE should have a 
proportionate financial guarantee or pledge towards the overseas subsidiary which the entity is 
intending to acquire, but in this investment, we financed through private equity funds, which the 
legislation did not state clearly enough about the exact procedures involved, so there was a hiccup” 
(B1).  However, as regards Manassen, the government had no specific requirement limiting CS8‟s 
entry mode choice for their Australian investment. 
B1 and B2 recognised that culture could impose significant barriers towards the operation of the 
business once the company‟s acquisition of Manassen had been completed.  Nonetheless, the 
interviewees did not see this issue in itself as directly influencing the company‟s entry mode choice.  
“We know that for the type of business we have and given our strategic aims, acquiring shares from a 
prestigious local enterprise would be a most valuable and time efficient option in order to penetrate 
the Australian market.  So every other consideration is based on this assumption that a Brownfield 
acquisition would be carried forward.  So really when we say we realise the difficulties large cultural 
distance between China and Australia can bring, we are thinking of ways to overcome these 
difficulties rather than compromising on our existing choices for the sake of that factor in particular…” 
(B1).  B2 concluded that “we just need to be prepared for such cultural distance.  This means our 
manager needs to be inclusive towards a different culture, and willing to accept what has been 
practiced over there for decades; how the management level deals with the cultural issue is crucial in 
the long-term success of the overseas investment, but perhaps it did not worry us too much in the 
start…  Coordination and harmonisation is what we consider in the second stage after the transaction 
was completed” (B2). 
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5.9 Summary of Findings 
This section discusses the findings generated from each case studied.  Details of the interviewees are 
summarised in Table 4-11, which first appeared in Chapter 4 Methodology.  The remaining 
subsections discuss the general findings regarding the two research questions. 
Case No. Industry Size Ownership Type FDI in Australia since Interviewee Codes 
CS1 Biochemistry Large SOE 2008 T1 
    
T2 
T3 
CS2 Mining Large SOE 2009 V1 
     V2 
CS3 Mining Large Public 2009 C1 
     C2 
     C3 
CS4 Manufacturing Large Public 2006 H1 
     H2 
     H3 
CS5 Livestock Small Private 2008 S1 
     S2 
     S3 
CS6 Pharmaceutical Small Private 2006 Z1 
     Z2 
CS7 Fur & Leather Small Private 2006 X1 
     X2 
CS8 Dairy Large Public 2010 B1 
          B2 
Australia Government Official   G1 
Chinese Government Official   G2 
  
5.9.1 Research Question 1: Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia 
through OFDI? 
Market-seeking 
Out of the 20 interviewees from all eight Chinese corporations, ten (T1, T2, T3, H1, H2, H3, S1, S2, 
B1, and B2) indicated that their investment was at least partially driven by their desire to penetrate the 
Australian market and expand their business in this country. 
T1 noted that “while Australia‟s population is relatively small, it has a large and advanced agricultural 
sector”, which is beneficial for the growth of their business since “we want to attract more market 
shares [in the country]”.  H1, representing the national consumer electronics manufacturer, also 
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acknowledged that acquiring Australian market share was the main purpose of their Australian 
investment.  The interviewee noted that Australia had almost no national brand in the white/ black 
goods sector, so its market “was bound to be shared by those foreign brands which offer outstanding 
quality and service” (H1).  S1 in the livestock and agricultural industry entered the Australian market 
for similar reasons, “Although Australians eat lots of beef and lamb, pork is still a quite important 
component of their dietary consumption”; besides, pork raised and slaughtered locally “tastes 
differently to that of the Chinese breed”, which is more welcomed by “an increased number of 
Chinese in Australia”, so to “bring tastier pork to Australia” formed one of their incentives to invest in 
Australia.  B1 and B2, in addition, acknowledged that as well as their aim to source local ingredients 
to support their dairy production in China, they were also keen to use “the distributional channels the 
local firm possess” to introduce their products to the larger world.  However, none of these ten 
interviewees felt that market-seeking was the only motive for their Australian investment, with a 
range of other motives also being influential, as discussed below.   
The remaining ten interviewees (V1, V2, C1, C2, C3, S3, Z1, Z2, X1, and X2) representing firms 
from the mining, pharmaceutical, and fur and leather product industries indicated that market-seeking 
was not a significant factor.  In regard to CS2, for example, the interviewee pointed out the limited 
size and maturity of the Australian market in noting: “How large is the Australian market? And it is 
already a developed country with relatively complete infrastructure construction, how large can its 
demand for steel be?  Not much really, at least as compared to our domestic demand” (V1).  Rather, 
CS2 was far more concerned with fulfilling the Chinese domestic market demand for steel, and then 
maybe “exporting the steel made from the raw materials in Australia to other parts of the world… and 
integrate into the global steel production cycle” (V2).   
This view corresponds to that of the Chinese government interviewee, G2, who also felt that 
companies do not often come to Australia for the sole purpose of acquiring market shares.  “I think 
the market in Australia is moderately small… Australia has a population of a mere 20 million, which 
is even smaller than one province in China, the market potential is frankly quite limited, especially for 
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some industries… like manufacturing and mining… In the case of Chinese investments, what happens 
more often… is that they prefer to use the Australian market as a platform for their expansion into 
larger markets eventually” (G2); “for some large firms, Australia serves more of a test field for their 
products and services before expanding into the US or Europe – it‟s social and economic environment 
is as advanced, and yet it‟s smaller in size which makes it ideal for the purpose of such activities” 
(G1).  This idea of „using Australia as a test field‟ is more common among large Chinese MNEs, for 
they have the resources and capabilities to internationalise on a global scale in a set time frame, as 
discussions regarding CS2 and CS4 has shown. 
For Chinese mining companies and some manufacturing companies, acquiring resources and local 
ingredients composed their main investment purpose, as is examined below.  
 
Resource-seeking 
Among the 20 interviewees from Chinese corporations, eight indicated that the pursuit of tangible 
resources in Australia was their major investment motivation, and often, it was their major concern 
(V1, V2, C1, C2, C3, X1, X2, and B1).  Not surprisingly, the two mining firms studied both ranked 
this as their primary motivation. 
V2 indicated that “…our company decided to go to Australia because we were attracted by their 
(natural) deposits”.  C1, C2 and C3 expressed similar points, “our group has an interest in mining, no 
doubt we are interested in the mines in Australia and the resources in Australia” (C1).  X2 also 
considered Australia as a strategic source for supplying resources.  “Australia… has… top quality 
sheep skins… our company needs the outstanding sheep skins” (X2).  “Australia is known as the 
leading producer for wool products… therefore I decided to invest in Australia to import good quality 
Australian wool for further production in China” (X1). B1 from the dairy company also 
acknowledged that “due to increasing domestic concern about Chinese dairy products, we believe that 
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having some ingredients imported from Australia may help us to strengthen our brand image, because 
our domestic customers are anxious to get safe, natural, and fresh products” (B1).  
The two government interviewees made similar points. “[the major reason for Chinese firms to choose 
to invest in Australia is] to secure resources, not only coal or iron ore… but agricultural upstream 
products, such as fresh milk and even chemical products… We‟ve got enquiries about Chinese 
companies buying dairy farms so that they could secure fresh milk supply, etc” (G1).  G2, a Chinese 
official, noted that “Chinese investments in the resource and extraction industry represent the largest 
stake of Chinese OFDI in Australia… Australia is rich in those natural resources that China is in 
desperate need of; the political environment is very stable, and the regulation system is relatively well 
developed… so it is very advantageous compared to other countries [such as resource-rich but 
politically-unstable African countries], which makes Australia irreplaceable for Chinese investors.” 
 
Strategic asset-seeking 
In contrast to tangible resources such as iron ore, lithium ore, sheep skin, and dairy products the cases 
examined also indicated that Chinese companies were interested in gaining access to intangible 
resources, with 15 out of 20 interviewees (T1, T2, T3, V1, V2, C1, H1, H2, S1, S2, Z1, X1, X2, B1 
and B2) stating their companies invested in Australia, at least in part, to acquire intangible assets of 
strategic value, in other words, to seek strategic assets. 
The intangible assets sought fell into three broad types. The first and foremost type of strategic asset 
sought was operating experience.  T1, T2 and T3 thought that the experience gained by CS1 in 
operating in the Australian investment would assist it further develop the quality of its products and, 
as a result, help it‟s long term plans to enter other, larger, but more remote developed markets.  The 
experience gained, it was hoped, would be of two major types: one, management experience through 
managing in an unfamiliar and culturally remote business environment; and two, exposure to new 
production technologies, for example those related to pesticide production.  Similarly, CS2 and CS3 
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from the mining industry recognised that investment in Australia could help them to build their global 
procurement and distribution network, and play a more significant role in global economic 
development as individual corporations.  B1 and B2 also stressed the importance of networking and 
distributional channels in promoting their products to the greater world, which is what their Australian 
partner could offer.  CS4 wanted to both add to its international experience and also felt “Australia 
provides us with a very good platform to test our products – it has a moderate size market; and shows 
whether our service can survive fierce competition in the context of a developed market before we go 
into Europe, a much larger market, to confront with all those global brands” (H1).  Again, the Chinese 
Consular General in Melbourne made a similar point, “Australia is a developed country with a small 
but mature market…  Many Chinese firms seek to get some training in this market before they move 
on to some larger and more challenging markets such as Europe and the US” (G2). 
The second type of intangible strategic asset Chinese firms sought is represented by CS6, in the form 
of research assistance, especially as regards clinical trials.  As a pharmaceutical company at the early 
stage of its corporate lifecycle, CS6‟s investment in Australia was triggered by their desire to 
complete the clinical trials necessary for their new drug before it can be commercialised.  As stressed 
by Z1, “if we want to promote such a new product overseas, for sure we need to have some overseas 
related clinical trial experiences to convince local drug administrators, US is one side, and Australia is 
another”; “the founder of our company… has been maintaining good relationships with the Australian 
side… So whenever we have demands for new technological development… Australia is always 
among the top choices” (Z2).  While in one sense this was akin to using Australia for a testing 
function, as noted for CS4, CS6 stressed the value of support and assistance from the Australian 
research-related professions for the development of the new drug formed CS6‟s specific strategic 
asset-seeking motivation. 
The third type of intangible strategic asset sought was very different and not directly related to the 
firms that indicated its importance, CS5 and CS7.  It was permanent residency for the owners and 
family members.  PR, at least in these two cases was not sought as an intangible asset for the firms, 
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but as personal goals for the owners.  It might be described as a welfare-seeking motivation aimed at 
improving the quality of life for the owners and their families.  The firms might benefit, ultimately, 
from, for example, an increased quality and quantity of inputs from the owners as a result of the 
latters‟ satisfaction at gaining PR, but this was not the prime motivation.  S1 explained that Australian 
PR was very tempting.  As the owner of the business, S1 and the family had the necessary funds and 
just wanted a better place for living.  CS7‟s case was similar.  “Our boss himself is a very successful 
entrepreneur… he was thinking of migrating to Australia through investments, so he had decided to 
set up a local company to purchase the raw materials…  Now he resides in Australia most of the time, 
his child goes to local schools, and he can sit at home and still have his business up and running well 
in China” (X1).  While further research is needed to substantiate the point, arguably, this welfare-
seeking, largely personal motivation might be quite common among small to medium scale Chinese 
private firms investing in Australia.  Indeed, as a matter of speculation, it might be a factor motivating, 
in part, senior management in larger Chinese firms in investing in Australia, though they would find it 
more difficult to gain PR status as different immigration criteria would apply to them.   
In summary, Chinese firms investing in Australia are driven by an array of motivations including 
market-seeking, natural asset (resources)-seeking, strategic asset-seeking, and welfare-seeking.  
Chinese mining firms are predominantly, if not solely, resource-oriented; small to medium scale 
private firms established by successful entrepreneurs tend to enter Australia as much for personal, 
welfare seeking reasons in addition to business concerns – that is to obtain Australian PR.  
 
5.9.2 Research Question 2: What factors have influenced their choice of entry modes for 
Australia? 
Investment Motivation 
All four types of motivation (that is, including the welfare-seeking motivation identified in this study) 
can be seen at work in the cases, but not to the same extent.  Companies, for example, with largely 
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asset-seeking motivations (both tangible and intangible) were more inclined towards the full control, 
WOS mode, with only H1 and S1 (out of 20 people) regarding asset-seeking as irrelevant.  On the 
other hand, among companies with a primarily market-seeking motivation, only interviewees T1, T2, 
H1, and S1 (out of 10 people) stated that their market-seeking motivation had contributed to the 
choice of a WOS. 
Regarding the asset-seeking motivation, the mining companies indicated a straightforward reason, 
“this resource in Australia is what we value the most in this investment.  If considering no other facts, 
we would definitely prefer to establish our own WOS” (V1).  X1 also admitted that “WOS is more 
flexible… we need the local connections, we focused on whether our suppliers were reliable, and 
whether the quality of raw materials they supply us would be reliable, so… wholly owning a local 
producer to secure our domestic production is the choice”.  A greater level of control in a foreign 
subsidiary gives investors a greater level of control over the resources they are interested in, hence the 
inclination towards a WOS mode. 
Regarding the market-seeking motivation, H1 recognised that since Australia has almost no local 
brands in consumer electronics, setting up a WOS was almost inevitable if the company wanted to 
penetrate the Australian market.  S1 also revealed that because they wanted to introduce their pork 
products to the Australian market and therefore gain market shares, they would prefer to establish a 
WOS.  Other interviewees did not see a causal relationship between their market-seeking motivation 
and the entry choice of full control mode. 
In short, the influence of investment motivation upon firms‟ entry mode choice varies.  The majority 
of interviewees from firms who invest in Australia for asset-seeking purposes (both tangible and 
intangible) felt that this motivation has encouraged them to use the WOS mode of entry.  Meanwhile, 
only some interviewees whose company invested in Australia for market-seeking purposes felt that 
they were more inclined to choose WOS given their particular investment motivation. 
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Size 
Corporate size definitely influenced the entry mode choices for most of the cases examined. 15 out of 
the 20 interviewees from corporations, representing seven of the eight cases examined noted it as the 
important factor in the selection of the WOS mode (T1, T2, T3, H1, H2, H3, B1, and B2).  Even those 
selecting the JV mode felt that if there had been no government influence, then WOS would have 
been their preference (V1, V2, C1, and C2).  The interviewees from smaller firms also indicated that 
if their corporate size had been larger, they would prefer to set up WOSs (S1, S2, and Z1). 
As T2 and T3 explained, “… we are a large group company, so we have the capability to transform 
and utilise the knowledge accumulated elsewhere and apply it in the Australia project… so we prefer 
WOS rather than interest sharing JVs”, which allows them to “start operations immediately” with 
“almost no third party except the Australian government involved”.  It was also argued that the 
company has enough capacity to “be able to deal with the troubles” associated with running a 
company with full overseas ownership (T1).  H1 from CS4 also suggested that their Melbourne-based 
WOS might not have been established if the company had been of a smaller size and indicated that the 
corporate culture rooted in a large corporation would be hard to adjust if a JV was to be set up, 
leading to a lengthy adjustment period for both parties to the venture. 
The two mining cases both selected JVs, but largely as they felt constrained to do so by Australian 
Government policy. V1, representing CS2, a large conglomerate, stated that “if we were able to 
possess the mining rights of some iron ore deposits and transportation channels, then setting up a 
WOS is definitely a top choice”.    
CS3‟s decision to set up a JV with Galaxy Resources despite being a large company may be explained 
by their long-term strategic plan.  As noted, the investment vehicle for the purchase of Galaxy shares 
was Creat Resources Holdings, an Australian company listed on the London Stock Exchange and 
fully owned and controlled by CS3 China, following its purchase of its shares in 2007.  Therefore, 
there are two sequential investments involved here, with CS3 acquiring full control of Creat 
182 
 
 
Resources Holdings in 2007, and Creat Resources Holdings taking over partial control of Galaxy in 
2009.  The series of investments were deemed to have made an appropriate balance between cost and 
control, and most importantly, it enabled CS3 to secure the resources they are interested in.  In 
essence, CS3‟s large size and perhaps its pure private ownership structure have contributed to the 
decision to fully acquire former Zeehan Zinc, and consequently owning a significant part of Galaxy‟s 
shares. 
Most, if not all of smaller firms in this study revealed that they would choose to set up WOSs had they 
had sufficient capital.  For example, S1 revealed that “as a local private enterprise with our current 
size… we didn‟t really have the initial investment needed to bring such a choice [WOS] into reality… 
in cases where money is not a concern, and if our company was large enough in size, we would 
definitely incline towards setting up a WOS”.  CS6‟s interviewee Z1 also mentioned that if the 
company had a larger capital base, it would prefer to establish a WOS which, provided that the 
managerial team was familiar with western practices, would help them avoid all sorts of 
inconveniences that a foreign WOS set up in a strange environment would encounter. 
To conclude, larger firm size, notably capital resources, was felt to be an important factor in entry 
mode decisions, with a marked preference for the WOS.  
 
Experience 
Almost every interviewee recognised the importance of experience when it came to their entry mode 
decision making.  Specifically, all eight cases examined disclosed that either their previous 
international direct investment experience had stimulated their WOS mode of entry, or that had they 
had previous international direct investment experience, they would have preferred to set up a WOS.  
This is because when they have practiced FDI through their prior experience, they would have 
accumulated knowledge necessary for conducting business activities in a totally unfamiliar 
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environment, then they would be more equipped to carry out another FDI with majority control, 
which allows them to exercise more power towards the operation of the new business. 
For those firms who did set up WOSs such as CS1, CS3, CS4, and CS8, the influence of previous 
experience upon their entry mode decision seemed to be obvious.  For example, while CS1 did not 
have any previous overseas direct investment experience, they did set up a JV with a Singaporean 
company in China.   T1, T2 and T3 from CS1 admitted that although it did not directly count as their 
FDI experience, it has still exerted a positive influential power towards their final entry mode choice 
of WOS in Australia.  “We have… drawn on the investment experience in the Singaporean project 
before establishing our own Australian branch without the help of local partners” (T1); “we learned, 
through our cooperation with the Singaporean company how to deal with foreign stakeholders, how 
different firm culture from advanced economies could be, and how to operate in an unfamiliar 
institutional environment” (T2).  CS3 acknowledged they were stimulated to choose WOS 
considering the level of experience they have accumulated in previous overseas direct investment 
activities, despite the case examined in this thesis was about a JV they have set up subsequent to their 
initial WOS in Australia.  H1 from CS4 also recognised that “our investments in those areas [America, 
Italy, and Hungary] have given us the courage and ability to land in Australia and compete with other 
big global brands here; we have certainly learned from our investment experience in other countries to 
set up this WOS in Australia”.  In addition, B1 and B2 from CS8 greatly valued their past investment 
experience regarding the formation of their Australian WOS.  Although some of their investment 
attempts failed eventually, they were still able to learn from their failures (B1, B2). 
For those companies which selected JVs, all indicated that greater international experience would 
have led them to select the full-control WOS mode of entry, provided that local factors such as 
government regulations allowed this choice.  For instance, CS2 had limited overseas operating 
experience despite its large corporate scale, and this led to its selection of the JV choice of entry mode 
(V1, V2).  The smaller private enterprises cases experienced similar views.  CS5 interviewees 
indicated that their lack of experience in foreign markets was a major reason why they chose to set up 
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a JV rather than a WOS.  “We didn‟t have the experience and knowledge needed to operate a business 
in Australia… If we had relevant FDI experiences, setting up a WOS would be much more practicable” 
(S1).  Much the same view was expressed by Z1 and Z2 regarding CS6.  
To sum up, interviewees in all eight cases studied found that either their previous overseas investment 
experience had stimulated their adoption of the WOS mode in Australia, or that had they had more 
experience in overseas direct investments, or had government policy allowed it, they would have 
established WOSs. 
 
Goodwill 
Only three interviewees from two companies suggested that the company‟s goodwill capital had 
influenced their entry mode choices.  However, the influence acted in quite opposite directions 
regarding the two companies, as perceived by the interviewees. 
Specifically, T1 and T2 saw greater risks involved in a joint venture considering the relatively high 
level of goodwill capital the company possessed.  “I think considering the scale and reputation of our 
business, it must be more effective and efficient to establish a WOS, because that‟s [goodwill capital] 
what we want to preserve, and that could only be best kept if no external influence was exerted upon 
our daily operation, and that‟s what is unavoidable in a JV” (T1); “It was because we have a strong 
and sound goodwill capital, that we have managed to get into the Australian market on our own” (T2).  
However, H1 felt the opposite, arguing that although CS4 had selected a WOS, the sound goodwill 
capital the company possessed would have stimulated the company to choose a JV mode of entry, 
“We have to strive to avoid anything that could negatively impact our brand image to happen… From 
this aspect, when operating in a completely strange environment, we would prefer to find a local 
partner, who has a good brand image and reasonable familiarity towards the institutional relationships 
in this environment… But… there is no match in Australia, so we just have to rely on our previous 
overseas FDI experience to set up a WOS” (H1). 
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The rest of the six companies did not think that goodwill had any marked influence on their entry 
mode decision making, with factors such as investment motivation, size, international experiences, 
and governmental support being more influential. 
 
Australian Government  
In general, most interviewees did not see the Australian government as being overly restrictive 
regarding their investment attempts in Australia. However, concerns were raised by the interviewee 
from the state-owned mining firm CS2, who thought that “considering the barriers that were set up by 
the Australian government as Chinalco [failed to acquire Rio Tinto] has experienced, we would 
incline to choose JV” (V1).  In contrast, CS3, the private group company also interested in the mining 
sector, was able to fully purchase a local mining company, before setting up a JV with another local 
company, felt that “local government was not as sensitive towards our investment proposal as they did 
with some investments made by Chinese SOEs” (C3). 
To conclude, the interview results show that Chinese investors in general found the Australian 
government quite supportive of their investment efforts. However, larger SOEs investing in sensitive 
industries (such as mineral extraction) had to face a prolonged examination period amidst public 
controversy before the approval of their investment proposal, feeling pressured, if only indirectly, to 
select the relatively low-profile strategy of joint venturing with local firms rather than setting up 
WOSs. 
 
Chinese Government Support 
All but two interviewees from CS8 (B1 and B2) acknowledged that the Chinese government had 
provided the companies with reasonable support, through means of policy incentives, financial 
support and complementary consultations regarding their proposed investments into Australia.  Most 
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of them including T1, V1, V2 and H1 said that the Chinese government had no explicit rules limiting 
the type of entry mode specific companies should choose.  As long as the application for an overseas 
investment was supported with appropriate materials and reports, companies could get approvals, and 
sometimes financial and policy supports in a relatively short period of time. 
For instance, H1 disclosed that “we have had several WOSs around the world already… so the 
government welcomed our proposal for the Australian investment… we did not encounter any trouble 
[to establish the Australian WOS]… and the government was very supportive in this regard”.  Also, 
the Chinese government was very supportive to CS6 especially when they were facing financial 
difficulties.  The supportive attitude of the government towards CS6 was a major reason why the 
company engaged in FDI and started their foreign clinical trials.  If considering solely the home 
governmental support, Z1 from CS6 also suggested that they would opt for WOS since it enabled 
greater flexibility.  However, Z1 was the only interviewee who indicated that there was a relationship 
between home government support and entry mode choice.   
In summary, it seems that while home government support serves as a strong backup for any Chinese 
corporations investing abroad, it does not have determinant power upon their entry mode choices.  In 
other words, firms will not make their relevant decision based solely on the level of support they are 
receiving from the Chinese government.  As V2 concluded, “the supportive attitude of the 
government… has given the enterprise some confidence in doing the business the way they like”, 
perhaps not more than that.  This is especially the case with smaller firms, “I think the government 
also knows the most suitable mode for a corporation is different in each case, and the corporation 
itself knows which entry mode suits them best” (S1). 
 
Cultural Distance 
Only T1 from CS1 suggested the influence of cultural distance upon their entry mode decision.  It was 
indicated that setting up a WOS could “minimise” those cultural problems, so that no extra effort 
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would be needed to “accommodate your partner” as was necessary with a JV (T1).  However, the 
interviewee also stated that cultural distance was not a key or determining factor in their overseas 
investment decisions. 
The interview results from the government officials suggested that while cultural factors are an 
important issue that companies need to deal with once the subsidiary is established, it does not very 
much shape their entry mode choice which tends more to be influenced by other factors.  “They 
[Chinese investors] tend to do things the way they will do in China, which normally doesn‟t work 
here… the communication between the local staff and their overseas managers may also cause 
disputes… nevertheless, the precise entry mode is more dependent upon the industries those 
companies are in, their firm specific characteristics rather than anything else” (G1). 
To conclude, while the issue of cultural distance may pose challenges for outbound Chinese MNEs in 
their daily operations, it does not seem to have played a major role in their entry mode decision 
process.  
 
5.10 Conclusions 
This chapter discusses the results and analysis of the study.  Sections 5.1 to 5.8 provide the details of 
the eight cases studied.  Each of these sections are further divided into five subsections, introducing 
the industry the firm concerned is in, the background of the firm, and their previous overseas 
investment experience, if any.  Interview quotes relating to relevant research themes are also 
classified and discussed in those subsections.   
Section 5.9 summarises the interview results in accordance to the research questions.  More in-depth 
discussions related to these findings are set out in the following chapter, Chapter 6, Discussion.    
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Chapter 6 Discussion 
This chapter provides a discussion of the findings of this study.  It is broken down into three main 
parts. Section 6.1 discusses the findings regarding the first research question, „Why do Chinese firms 
invest in Australia?‟, and associated propositions.  The findings suggest that while many of the 
motivations are the same as those driving Chinese investment in other markets, owners of smaller 
Chinese firms in Australia were driven, at least in part, by the aim of gaining permanent residency 
status, a motive not identified in most earlier studies and in none of the studies of Chinese investment 
in Australia.  Section 6.2 discusses the findings in relation to the second research question: „What 
entry modes have Chinese firms selected for their investments in Australia?‟  It is found that while 
some factors such as corporate size and previous international investment experiences do have an 
influence on a Chinese firm‟s entry mode choices for Australia, a number of other factors which were 
deemed important in previous FDI entry mode studies were not as significant in this context.  This 
chapter concludes in Section 6.3. 
 
6.1 Research Question 1: Why do Chinese firms invest in Australia?  
This section discusses the study‟s findings in relation to Research Question One and the related 
propositions one and two.  
 
6.1.1 Proposition 1: Chinese firms invest in Australia for primarily market-seeking and 
asset-seeking motivations 
As regards Proposition 1 that Chinese investors invest in Australia primarily for both market-seeking 
and asset-seeking purposes, the findings from this study provide some support for this proposition, 
notably in regard to iron ore and good quality sheep skins, both in short supply in the Chinese 
189 
 
 
domestic market.  The motive was primarily that of asset-seeking. This has been typical of Chinese 
OFDI since the start of Chinese OFDI in the late 1970s. 
The predominance of the asset-seeking motive has been noted in the literature.  In fact, as noted by 
Taylor (2002), ever since the start of Chinese outward FDI in late 1970s, this natural resource-seeking 
motivation has been the predominant driver for Chinese firms.  It is a major reason for Chinese OFDI 
in Africa and Central Asian countries, given their often  rich natural resources endowments (Larum, 
2010).  Although the often high levels of political and economic unrest in these countries tended to 
deter firms from other countries, it does not seem to be a major deterrent for Chinese firms (Kolstad & 
Wigg, 2012).   
Existing literature suggests that a major reason for such relatively high risk investments by Chinese 
firms is that the majority, if not all of the firms involved are SOEs.  As SOEs they can gain financial 
support for such high risk investments from state-owned banks and investment funds at less than the 
cost of obtaining such funds from privately owned banks or investment funds.  The latter would 
charge substantially higher premiums for such high risk loans, or, in the riskiest cases, reject the 
relevant applications.  In addition, SOEs may gain extensive, high-level, political support in 
negotiating access to the resources in question, sometimes under the umbrella of bilateral investment 
treaties (Buckley et al., 2008; and Buckley et al., 2007).   
In contrast, Australia is not a high risk market and, in addition, only one of the three enterprises in this 
study that invested in Australia to secure the supply of natural resources or commodities is a SOE 
(CS2), with the second being a publicly listed company (CS3), and the third a small private company 
producing sheep skin products (CS7).  Indeed, it is because Australian markets are relatively low risk 
and stable that smaller Chinese firms with limited capital and risk tolerance find it an attractive 
investment market.  In this sense Australian markets are broadly similar to those that have attracted 
Chinese investment in North American and Europe. 
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In addition to the motivation to acquire natural resources and commodities, three of the companies in 
this study (CS1, CS4 and CS5) indicated that at least part of their motivation to invest in Australia 
was to “attract more market shares” (T1), in line with Dunning‟s market-seeking motivation (Dunning, 
1993).  However, the majority of the interviewees from these three cases indicated that market-
seeking was not the sole or sufficient motivation, especially CS5.  Rather, they also indicated one or 
more additional motivations for their investment decision, notably asset-seeking, with at least one 
interviewee from each of the eight companies indicating that their companies invested in Australia to 
acquire intangible assets of strategic value.  The types of assets sought included that of operating 
experience in a relatively mature Australian market so as to facilitate their possible future operations 
in other developed nations; another was to secure technologies necessary to upgrade their products 
that, in turn, would enhance their brand image and sales.  While both points are important for all of 
the Chinese investors examined, the larger firms with larger capital resources and comprehensive 
overseas investment plans were motivated more by the experience they could accumulate by operating 
in Australia.  Interviews with staff in both Australian and Chinese government also confirmed this 
point, with those interviewed indicating that larger Chinese firms often viewed Australia as a valuable 
“testing field”.   
Taylor (2002) was the first researcher who linked strategic asset-seeking motivation to the investment 
activities of Chinese investors.  She recognised that a country‟s OFDI can be regarded as a quest for 
market information aimed at improving domestic exports, and thus could be construed as a type of 
strategic asset-seeking motivation.  The findings of Deng (2004, 2007), Rui and Yip (2008), and Luo 
and Rui (2009) have also confirmed the importance of acquiring strategic assets in Chinese MNEs 
overseas investments.  Regarding the type of strategic assets gathered through this type of investment, 
Taylor noted that information was the principal type of such intangible assets when conducting FDI.  
Similar evidence could be found in Lu (2002), Sauvant (2005) and Buckley et al. (2008), who all 
confirmed that in the early stage of Chinese OFDI, Chinese MNEs with a strategic asset-seeking 
motivation internationalised mainly to “acquire information and learn about operating abroad for the 
benefit of other domestic enterprises” (Buckley et al., 2008: 722).  However, more recently, the type 
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of strategic assets pursued by Chinese enterprises have increasingly switched from that of general 
market information to the specific production knowledge of technology intensive advanced foreign 
firms (UNCTAD, 2003).  While general information gathering may refer to the collection of 
information regarding market condition, consumer preference, operation strategy and production 
method of established firms in the same industry, this shift shows that Chinese MNEs are particularly 
interested to know the advanced practices of local firms at the current stage.  This trend was also 
identified in this study with CS5, CS6, and CS7.  In other words, Chinese MNEs are progressing from 
absolute new hands in FDI activities to the next stage, where they have already grasped the general 
conditions of the overseas markets and know what they want to get from them.   
Both market-seeking and strategic asset-seeking motivations have been identified in a number of 
studies concerning Chinese FDI in other countries.  Nicolas (2010), for example, found that market-
seeking and strategic asset-seeking were the major forces that motivated Chinese firms to invest in 
France.  The growing significance of strategic asset-seeking among Chinese outward investors was 
also found in Pietrobelli et al. (2010).  In addition, Liu and Tian (2008) suggested that market-seeking 
was the dominant driving force for Chinese direct investment in the UK after 2006, but it is arguable 
that many of the firms they studied had an underlying intention of seeking access to the much larger 
EU market from their UK base, a type of strategic asset-seeking motivation, as noted by Mintzberg 
(1987).  Moreover, Cui et al. (2011), Buckley et al. (2008), and Zha (2013) have also identified 
market-seeking and asset-seeking motivations among Chinese MNEs.  However, all the above 
mentioned studies, while recognising the existence of these two investment motivations, did not 
investigate their relative importance in Chinese MNEs‟ investment decisions.  The findings from this 
study make it clear that that individual Chinese MNEs may not be motivated by a single motivation, 
so that, for example, the desire to acquire market shares in foreign markets may very likely coexist 
with a need to acquire strategic assets, and natural resources. 
Apart from market-seeking, resources-seeking and strategic asset-seeking as indicated in the interview 
results, the study also identified another type of motivation which has motivated at least two of the 
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entrepreneurs (CS5 and CS7) to carry out their FDI attempts in Australia.  That is to use their 
investment as a means of gaining PR in Australia.   
Previous research concerning business migrants in Australia or the western countries in general tends 
to focus from a cultural perspective (see Selvarajah & Masli, 2011; Gao, 2003; and Rauch & Trindade, 
2002).  However, only a very limited number of studies have linked the motivation of Chinese 
investors or even corporations from emerging economies at large to engage in FDI with the purpose 
of gaining PR in the countries concerned.  Antkiewicz and Whalley (2007) for example, were among 
the first to discuss the possibility that an important motivation for investors from less developed 
regions to invest in developed countries was to enjoy the social benefits of Western welfare states by 
gaining residence rights in those nations.  Similarly, Deng (2004) indicates that the social benefits 
concerned could include legal protection, social security, free or cheap quality education and health 
care services, and a safe and clean environment for family life.  In a study investigating and 
comparing motives of Chinese OFDI in the small developed economies of Finland and Sweden, 
Lintunen found this to be a relevant motive particularly for smaller Chinese family companies 
(Lintunen, 2011).  According to Lintunen (2011: 94), their relatively lax immigration policy has 
“plainly increased the interest of the Chinese towards the immigration motive for FDI in the country 
(Sweden)”.  It is apparent from this study of Chinese investment in Australia that some Chinese firms, 
especially family-run private businesses, at least in part use FDI as a vehicle to access PR, where the 
investment and immigration policy permits.   
To sum up, on the basis of the cases in this study four related reasons seem to largely explain the 
attraction of PR for family-run private businesses in Australia.  First, interviewees suggested that 
living in China makes those individual investees “feel less secure” materially, whereas living in 
Australia could largely, if not altogether, eliminate the concerns about food, drink and air safety.  
“Almost every week, you can hear outbreaks about illegal additives in the processed food you buy in 
supermarket, and the food you consume in a restaurant… it almost feels that you can no longer have a 
193 
 
 
sense of security here [China], no matter how much money you have” (X1).  “At least we know what 
we are eating will not cost our lives here (in Australia)” (S1). 
Second, the interviewees also expressed a lack of a psychological sense of security when doing 
business and living in China.  “For businessmen like us, we have some money, but we do not have the 
privileges  that civil servants [of China] enjoy, we are thus more vulnerable than ordinary people who 
at least do not possess the great deal of wealth to be „averaged‟ in any political turbulence” (X1); “the 
general public in China are getting more and more frustrated with inflation, rocketing property prices 
and food security; who knows what would happen tomorrow… investing in Australia although it does 
not guarantee any return, at least it is a stable environment and we do not need to worry about the 
repercussions of an unstable political institution” (X1).  To these investors or perhaps the majority of 
Chinese individual businessmen who invest in Australia to gain PR, Australia is somewhat like a fund 
management institution where they can safely allocate some of their capital, a type of haven for 
capital. 
The third reason relates to the children of the investees.  As two interviewees noted “It is just too 
competitive in China.  If my kid was to be left in China and follow the traditional educational pathway, 
he would never be able to get an admission to university, and that means he would never get a decent 
job and would be looked down upon by his friends and my friends” (S1).  “Australia is different, there 
is less competition here, and university is not a luxury, even if you are a plumber here you earn good 
money, which is completely different compared  to the case in China” (X1).  The desire to ensure the 
best possible education for children was definitely a concern for the relevant interviewees, perhaps 
intensified by the one-child-policy implemented some thirty years ago.  Hence the desire to make sure 
he or she gets the best quality education, food, social welfare, and an “opened up mind”, overseas.  A 
recent Bank of China paper also noted this trend, indicating that more than half of Chinese 
multimillionaires invest overseas to achieve their educational purposes for their children (Bank of 
China, 2011: 2).  This confirms the interviewees‟ view that investing overseas may not only benefit 
the business, but children of the business owners. 
194 
 
 
In addition, this study has also tentatively identified another factor which might encourage Chinese 
firms, particularly those family-run private business to invest in Australia; that is the social network 
for businessmen is much simpler than that of China, so doing business in Australia involves less 
entanglement with a complex network of relationships.  “Most of the contracts do not get settled on 
the negotiating table; rather they get settled in restaurants, on drinking tables… if you do not smoke 
more than the others, you do not drink more than the others, you will not get the contract and you 
cannot do the business… It is a weird philosophy, but it is how it works at home” (S1); “There are lots 
of things that if you do not give responsible officials some benefit [bribing] your contract or operation 
would not get done successfully, it‟s like an implicit rule which really complicates all the networks in 
business” (X1).  Individual investors who do not have deeply rooted governmental relationships may 
be vulnerable in situations of even minor political unrest or personnel changes.  Although they do 
know the possible repercussions of having illicit relationships with government officials, they still 
have to work to expand such connections in order to operate successfully.  Also, the larger your 
business gets, the more likely you are to have intensive connections with government authorities such 
as local council and tax office, hence the more unavoidable this problem becomes. 
In addition to the above points, on a speculative basis, China offers a number of preferential policies 
to foreign enterprises and foreigners who work in China.  Specifically, these preferential policies 
include discounted tax rates, concessions on the purchase (or renting) of land, a variety of regional 
preferential policies offered to qualified enterprises, and free technical support for incoming investors 
(see details in MOFCOM, 2013b; and State Council Information Office, 2013).  Although some 
preferential policies have been removed in recent years regarding incoming foreign entities, as an 
individual investor, one is still entitled to some tax advantages that local, Chinese entrepreneurs may 
not be able to enjoy (State Council Information Office, 2013).  Thus, Chinese entrepreneurs may find 
it practicable and beneficial to invest back into China as a foreign investor after gaining foreign 
citizenship in order to take advantage of the preferential investment policies.  This point may also 
explain, in part, their aim of gaining Australian PR, followed later by possible citizenship after 
meeting further requirements.  
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Since this PR seeking motivation cannot be classified into know-how, technology, or operational 
experience which are strategic to the firms‟ (rather than the owners) future development and therefore 
form the basis of strategic assets, the PR seeking motivation is not a subclass of the asset-seeking 
motivation.  Rather, it forms a separate type of investment motivation that deserves additional 
research.   Identifying this motivation may contribute to the body of knowledge in such a way that it 
may not only explain the FDI practices of Chinese family-run private businesses in Australia, but 
perhaps also gives a possible explanation for  emerging market FDI into industrialised countries in 
general.   
The incentives for Chinese firms to invest in Australia involve market-seeking, asset-seeking, and 
strategic asset-seeking, as indicated by Proposition 1.  However, for some private firms PR, or 
welfare-seeking, is an additional motivation.   Hence, Proposition 1 provides only a limited, partial 
explanation of the motives driving Chinese investment in Australia and, possibly, in a range of other 
developed countries.  This point has rarely been addressed in the existing literature 
 
6.1.2 Proposition 2: The motives driving Chinese firms to invest in Australia are 
different from those which drive Chinese investment in other countries.  
The main factors that have driven Chinese MNEs‟ investments in Australia are natural resource-
seeking and what often tends to be a combination of market and strategic asset-seeking.  This result 
differs from the findings of Chinese MNEs‟ investment motivations as revealed in the UNCTAD 
(2006) and CCPIT (2009) studies.  In these studies, market expansion was deemed to be the main 
driving force for their internationalisation, followed by strategic asset-seeking and, to a limited extent,  
transaction cost minimisation (UNCTAD, 2006: 171; CCPIT, 2009: 16).  Even in the limited number 
of studies which looked at Chinese MNEs‟ internationalisation motives in a specific country setting 
the results do not resemble what has been found in this study.  For example, Zhang and Van den 
Bulcke (1996) and Liu and Tian (2008) all found that market potential or market-seeking was the 
primary reason for Chinese MNEs‟ FDI in the UK. 
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Proposition 2 is therefore supported, as the cases studies show that  the motives for Chinese MNEs‟ to 
conduct OFDI in Australia do show a different pattern as compared with most other, previous studies 
identified. In part, this is not surprising as all countries are likely to display a variety of differing as 
well as similar characteristics, so that, in turn, they stimulate somewhat varying motives for 
investment. Australia, for example, has major reserves of natural resources, so is likely to attract firms 
with a resource-seeking motivation, which is not the case for even a number of major developed 
countries such as Italy. However, the importance of the “test bed”, and welfare seeking motivations 
have only rarely been identified in earlier studies and warrant further investigation, not only in 
Australia, but in other developed countries.  
 
6.2 Research Question 2: What factors have influenced Chinese MNE’s 
choice of entry mode for Australia? 
This section discusses the study‟s findings in relation to Research Question Two and the related 
propositions three to ten.  
 
6.2.1 Proposition 3: Chinese firms with a market-seeking motivation tend to choose the 
WOS mode of entry for the Australian market.  
The interview results suggest that CS1, CS4 and CS5 invested in Australia, in part for market-seeking 
purposes.  Out of the three companies, CS1 and CS4 ended up with a WOS; while CS5 chose to set up 
a JV with a local partner.  The reasons for CS1 and CS4‟s choice were that: one, it takes time for both 
parties to get familiar with each other in a JV context, which may be more time consuming than for a 
WOS given they wanted to acquire market shares in a given period of time; two, a WOS enables more 
flexibility in decision making, obviating any need to discuss matters with JV partners, and a WOS  
can get access to advanced marketing strategies without the assistance of JV partners; and three, there 
was no appropriate local partner to partner with.  On the other hand, in contrast, S1 and S2 from CS5 
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felt that because they wanted to learn from the advanced technology of local Australian companies, 
and since they had no previous experience in business overseas, they would prefer to, and did actually 
set up a JV to help guide them through the process.  Therefore, Proposition 3 is not fully supported.  
As explained in the above section 6.2.1, all three companies invested in Australia on the basis of a 
number of motives, not for the sole purpose of market-seeking; they also wanted to accumulate 
experience, gain access to the advanced technology, or obtain PR for the owner managers. Hence, 
given that market-seeking was not the sole or predominant motivation for the cases, no final 
conclusion as to the validity of Proposition 3 can be offered, although two of the three cases did select 
the WOS entry mode.  
Unlike most Chinese MNEs in this study who expressed a preference towards full control ownership 
type, the findings of previous research suggest that investors often do not have a clear preference as 
regards their entry mode choices.  For example, Kogut and Singh (1988) and Kim and Hwang (1992) 
studied the FDI activities of US MNEs; Hennart (1991) investigated Japanese MNEs‟ investment 
activities in the US; and Larimo (1993) analysed Finnish direct manufacturing investment in OECD 
countries – none found a clear preference as regards entry mode choices.  More recent studies such as 
Demirbag, Tatoglu and Glaister (2009), which looked at the FDI activities of Turkish MNEs, and Ang 
and Michailova (2008), who examined such activities among the BRIC countries, provided similar 
findings from the developing world.  Gao (2009: 1), and Cui et al. (2011: 495) on the other hand, 
found that where a Chinese firm aimed to gain market shares in a new market, there was a preference 
for using WOS rather than JV.  This suggests a change in investors‟ preferences across time, 
compared to the findings from the other studies, or different perceptions of the value of the WOS and 
JV modes among developed and developing country MNEs, or both. 
While Gao (2009) and Cui et al. (2011) found a positive relationship between market-seeking 
motivation and the preference for WOS among Chinese MNEs, this was not the case in the findings 
for this study, so Proposition 3 is not fully supported.  This may be attributable to the methodology 
used.  Both Gao (2009) and Cui et al. (2011) used a primarily quantitative approach, which is 
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appropriate “for testing well defined relationships and concepts” (Jormanainen & Koveshnikov, 2012: 
712).  However, the quantitative method only allowed them to fit the identified pattern into a defined 
mathematical model, in this case a linear regression relationship; whereas in reality the causal 
relationship may not be able to be sufficiently comprehended by a model, which is a simplified 
relationship of what is happening in an ideal world.  As revealed earlier, most interviewees think other 
factors, including corporate size, previous international experience and host government regulations 
are more relevant to their entry mode decisions, so the proposed relationship is not identified in this 
thesis, using a qualitative case study method.  The use of case studies is a technique that has proved 
useful in providing an in-depth understanding, revealing what cannot be observed statistically. 
 
6.2.2 Proposition 4: Chinese firms with an asset-seeking motivation tend to choose the 
WOS mode of entry for the Australian market.  
Cui et al. (2011) found that the WOS is preferred by Chinese MNEs with an asset-seeking motivation 
(for both tangible and intangible assets).  However, in the CS2 and CS3 cases of this study, while both 
firms gave asset-seeking a high priority and indicated that they would have preferred to establish a 
WOS, they selected the joint venture mode. The reason given for this decision was the interviewees‟ 
perception that a WOS would not be viewed favourably by the FIRB and the Australian Government, 
leading to public controversy and delays in the application process.  Hence, it is clear that had 
interviewees not perceived, accurately or otherwise, the possible opposition of FIRB and the 
Australian Government to Chinese ownership of major reserves of natural resources, especially by 
SOEs, then they would have selected the WOS entry mode for the Australian market.   
In contrast to the natural resource-seeking motivation, Chinese firms which are perceived by the 
interviewees as aimed at gaining overseas operational experiences and learning advanced technologies 
from the developed industry overseas, preferred to operate the new business with the guidance of 
local partners. The interviewees from CS5, CS6 and CS7 indicated that strategic asset-seeking was 
their priority in Australia, and also indicated that they preferred to have local help, either through 
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setting up a JV, or fully-purchasing an existing, local company to continue production.  This is 
because in order to learn advanced technologies from firms in the developed country, one has to 
immerse oneself in the environment, through operating with, or having guidance from local partners.  
Starting a Greenfield investment provides companies with a reduced chance of exchanging 
information and learning from advanced technologies that they are in need of.  From this perspective, 
Proposition 4 is not fully supported. 
 
6.2.3 Proposition 5a: Chinese firms with larger sizes tend to choose the WOS mode of 
entry for the Australian market; 
Proposition 5b: Chinese firms with smaller sizes tend to be indifferent as to their mode 
of entry for the Australian market. 
This study finds that firm size is a very influential factor in Chinese firms‟ entry mode choices for 
Australia, supporting, in part, Proposition 5a.  Interviewees from the larger firms (including CS1, CS2, 
CS3, CS4, and CS8) either agreed that their size had strongly influenced their final choice of a WOS, 
or that they would have preferred the WOS mode if there had been no countervailing pressure from 
FIRB and the Australian Government.   It was felt that greater size provided the capacity to finance 
large investments such as those involved with the establishment or purchase of a WOS.  Similarly, 
interviewees felt that larger size usually provided a greater capability to deal with the uncertainty and 
challenges that may arise with an international investment.  Interestingly, interviewees from smaller 
firms (such as CS5) indicated that if they had been of sufficient size, they also would have preferred 
to set up WOSs.  In other words smaller Chinese firms investing in Australia were not indifferent to 
their entry mode choice, contradicting Proposition 5b.  It seems that most firms, including smaller, 
family-owned firms, preferred to retain control over their firms rather than sharing it with external 
parties in a JV.  Also, the business culture of some smaller family-owned enterprises (in this case CS5 
and CS7) may be significantly different to that of a public enterprise in China, let alone a business in 
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Australia; and, knowing that, those entrepreneurs may choose to avoid cooperating with foreign 
companies to circumvent any possible conflict. 
Several earlier studies, including Kogut (1989), Gomes-Casseres (1990), Agarwal and Ramaswami 
(1992), Aulakh and Kotabe (1997) found a correlation between size and a preference for a full control, 
WOS. However, all of these studies focused only on FDI from the US.  It is worth mentioning that 
Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992) also classified the companies they studied according to their size. 
They found that larger firms demonstrated a higher propensity to choose a sole venture, WOS mode, 
and that smaller firms had a higher propensity for entry through a JV mode, in contrast, in part, to the 
findings of this study.   It might be that the smaller Chinese MNEs examined in this study, as noted 
above, lacked confidence in their capacity to collectively run a business with local partners due to 
cultural barriers and contrasting ideas as regards business management.  This was not a concern 
among the US firms studied in Agarwal and Ramaswami (1992: 13), which were all leasing 
companies and invested in countries with a similar level of industrialisation.  Acs, Morck, Shaver and 
Yeung (1997) studied the relationship between small and medium-sized US enterprises and their entry 
mode in countries with weak intellectual property protection (IPR).  They also found that those firms 
with smaller sizes would prefer a JV mode of entry, because the barriers imposed by poor IPR could 
be circumvented by cooperating with local multinationals (Ace et al., 1997: 17).  The contexts of the 
above mentioned studies are very different to that of this study, which may explain the contrasting 
findings.  Also, this preference of Chinese MNEs towards full control mode regardless of their 
corporation sizes is not fully explainable by the resource-based perspective, which assumes that firms 
would make an investment choice that best suits the resources they have on hand.  This suggests the 
limitation of the theory when applied in the peculiar Chinese context. 
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6.2.4 Proposition 6: Chinese firms with previous international experience tend to select 
the WOS mode of entry for the Australian market.  
Almost every interviewee recognised the importance of experience when it came to their entry mode 
decision making.  Specifically, interviewees from CS3, CS4, and CS8 indicated that their previous 
experience in outbound direct investments had  made them prefer to enter with a WOS mode (though 
for reasons explained earlier CS3 ended up choosing JV as its mode of entry); CS1 and CS5 had no 
previous experience in FDI directly, but they had had experience of JVs with international  firms in 
China, and the interviewees felt it had also contributed to their final choice of full control mode of 
WOS; CS2 and CS6 acknowledged that although JVs were eventually selected, the preference would 
have been for a WOS had they had sufficient size, capital or experience; and CS7 indicated had they 
had previous experience they would be more confident with their current mode of WOS.  The 
interviewees felt that while managing a WOS can bring substantial benefits, it required greater 
understanding of international operations, which could largely be achieved through the accumulation 
of experience.   
This perceived correlation corresponds to the bulk of previous research findings including Phatak, 
Muralidharan and Chandran (1996) which concerns global firm‟s entry mode choices into Thailand, 
Malaysia and Indonesia; Chen and Mujtaba (2007) which concerns US firms‟ entry mode choices; 
Yiu and Makino (2002) which examines Japanese MNEs‟ multinational experiences, and Ekeledo and 
Sivakumar (2004). This suggests that Chinese MNEs investing in Australia are no different to the 
other MNEs from the industrialised world when weighing previous international experience in their 
entry mode choice.  A study of Taiwanese firms‟ FDI entry mode patterns also confirmed that firms 
with more extensive international experience prefer to set up WOSs which offer full control (Tsai & 
Cheng, 2004).  Proposition 6 is thus supported, with the qualification that firms without direct OFDI 
experience but with JV experience in China also tended to select the WOS. 
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6.2.5 Proposition 7: Chinese firms who value their goodwill capital at a higher level tend 
to select the JV mode of entry for the Australian market.  
Only three interviewees from two companies suggested that the company‟s goodwill capital had 
influenced their entry mode choices.  However, the interviewees felt that its influence acted in quite 
opposite directions regarding the two companies.  One interviewee from CS4 felt that their 
outstanding level of goodwill indicated a JV would be more appropriate since establishing a WOS 
would involve greater risk to its goodwill capital and that it would be harder to taken any remedial 
action if the investment experienced serious difficulties.   However, the interviewee also indicated that 
as there was no suitable JV partner in the Australian market the WOS mode had been selected.  In 
contrast, interviewees from CS1 felt that in order to protect their strong goodwill capital, it would be 
more effective to set up an affiliate with full control.  The remaining interviewees felt that the issue of 
goodwill capital had not had an impact on their entry mode decision.   
In summary, only one interviewee in this study agreed to the findings of Cui et al.‟s Chinese study 
(2011: 492) that firms with strong goodwill capital would prefer to set up a JV.  While the bulk of 
literature suggests a positive relationship between firms‟ level of goodwill capital and the level of 
control they desire in their corresponding FDI as discussed in Chapter 3.3.2, the findings in this study 
suggest almost no support for Proposition 7.  It is possible that the difference between the findings of 
this thesis and those of Cui et al. (2011) is largely attributable to the sample sizes used.  In particular, 
the three small and private cases in this study had little in the way of goodwill capital; also, as 
indicated above, the interviewees from the two mining companies felt constrained to select the JV 
mode, even though their preference was for the WOS.  On the other hand, in Cui et al. (2011), their 
138-firm-sample included more Chinese firms with larger scales and longer operational history as 
compared to this study, which may imply substantial levels of goodwill capital, and, hence, its greater 
impact on the entry mode decision.  Hence, Proposition 7 is not supported in this thesis.  
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6.2.6 Proposition 8: Chinese firms who perceive Chinese governmental support as being 
helpful tend to select the WOS mode of entry for the Australian market. 
It is found in this thesis that overall, if conditions allow, Chinese MNEs in Australia would prefer to 
have full control over their affiliates.  Although the majority of interviewees acknowledged that the 
Chinese government had provided them with various types of support regarding their Australian 
investments, it seems that the factor of governmental support did not significantly influence their 
entry mode choices.  Rather, the supportive attitude of the government had encouraged their FDI, 
through the entry mode of either WOS or JV.  In other words, home government support is not one of 
those prominent factors (such as host government regulation, firm capacity, and previous international 
experience) that are more intensely related to firms‟ entry mode decision making process.  
Consequently, there is not enough evidence to support Proposition 8.  This is in contrast to previous 
studies such as Cui et al. (2007), who found that home government support is more likely to result in 
full control WOS mode.  One major reason for this inconsistency in findings may be that the research 
methods utilised are different.  While this study relied on comprehensive interviews where the relative 
significance of each potential factor may be identified, the survey method used by Cui et al. (2007) 
was weak in this regard, hence it was unable to identify that other factors carried more weight in the 
actual entry mode decision making process.  Hence, the relative importance among different factors 
was not observed, as is in this thesis. 
It is worthwhile to note that the relative popularity of the WOS and JV modes among outbound 
Chinese MNEs has changed over time.  In the early years of Chinese OFDI development, around 70 
per cent of overseas projects took the JV form of entry, and 30 per cent opted for WOS (Buckley, et 
al., 2008: 734; SAFE).  Ten years later, in 2001, 61 per cent of outbound Chinese MNEs chose to set 
up a WOS while 39 per cent selected the JV (Buckley, et al., 2008: 734); the relative proportion 
further evolved to 70 (WOS) to 30 (JV) by the end of 2011 (CCPIT, 2012: 26).  The change seems to 
be largely related to government attitudes towards entry modes to be selected by outbound Chinese 
firms.  Although the Chinese government has never put in writing that a JV mode was preferred for 
any outbound Chinese firms, it was largely an implied guideline that firms proposing JVs would pass 
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domestic scrutiny more easily.  This is especially the case in the early years where the only source of 
experience the government had accumulated regarding FDI at all is from incoming FDI, which largely, 
if not exclusively, took the form of JVs (Buckley, et al., 2007: 504).  It was not until 2004 that the 
government officially encouraged outbound investing Chinese MNEs to adopt “various ownership 
types” including WOSs (MOFCOM, 2004: 10). This more flexible policy was accompanied by a 
more liberal policy regarding the  capital raising requirements specified in “Issues relevant to further 
intensifying the reform of foreign exchange administration on external investment circular” as 
promulgated by SAFE in 2003. This provided Chinese firms with easier access to the larger capital 
required for establishing a WOS, perhaps, in part, leading to the increasing popularity of WOS among 
Chinese MNEs, as suggested by Buckley et al.(2008).   
From an institutional perspective, this thesis does recognise that the home country institutional 
environment is strongly related to the level of OFDI activities among Chinese MNEs, in which an 
encouraging government attitude would stimulate such investments.  However, as found in this thesis, 
there was no directly observable causal relationship between government support and Chinese MNEs‟ 
subsequent entry mode choices.  To conclude, there is not sufficient evidence to support Proposition 8.  
Nonetheless, this study has confirmed the discussion in the literature review section that the Chinese 
government‟s attitudes to outbound FDI are open and encouraging overall, regardless of the 
ownership type or origin or even industry of the businesses.   
 
6.2.7 Proposition 9: The greater the perception by Chinese managers that Australian 
regulations constrain investment in Australia by Chinese firms, the more likely it is that 
they will select the JV entry mode.  
Although the majority of interviewees did not indicate any explicit regulatory constraints when asked 
whether host government regulation or the regulatory reviewing process had in any way directed their 
entry mode choices, several interviewees clearly felt that influence was exerted, if only indirectly 
(CS2 and CS3).  Interviewees (V1, V2 and C3) indicated that while the Australian government may 
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be open to different types of investment modes by foreign firms, a WOS proposed by an SOE would 
certainly attract more stringent scrutiny, a lengthier application process, a possible rejection of the 
application, or a requirement that the entry mode be amended.  As a result the JV entry mode was 
selected in these cases to avoid the potential difficulties. A number of those interviewed in the larger 
firms indicated that a number of problems had been faced in the process of entering the Australian 
market but that, overall, the Australian government had welcomed overseas investment.  The one 
exception was CS5 though even here it was not suggested that government authorities had attempted 
to influence CS5‟s choice of entry mode.   
These findings tend to confirm Proposition 9 and also tend to confirm the findings of other Chinese 
FDI-related studies including Voss et al. (2011), Deng (2012) and Cui et al. (2007).  Voss et al. (2011) 
concluded that in most cases where the host country  regulatory barriers are higher for SOEs than for 
non-SOEs, then SOEs would tend to select the JV entry mode, „to exchange ownership for legitimacy‟ 
(Deng, 2012: 7).  Cui et al. (2007) also found that the JV mode is preferred in markets with excessive 
government regulations where more stringent scrutiny and restrictions are in place.  In addition, 
studies regarding developed countries FDI into China have similar findings.  For example, Sun, 
Mellahi and Thun (2010: 1167) found that the institutional constraint has influenced Volkswagen‟s 
Shanghai investment, which convinced it “to partner with an SOE, an entry mode that it never used in 
other countries before”.  Also, other studies regarding developed country MNEs including Osland and 
Cavusgil (1996); Bruning, et al. (1997); Demirbag, et al. (2008); and Tan and Meyer (2011) also 
confirmed the influence of host governments.   However, none of the above mentioned studies noted 
that larger firms, while preferring a WOS, sometimes felt constrained to select a JV because of 
perceived, or actual government pressure, which again is a novel point of this thesis, and which, can 
readily be explained by the institutional perspective. 
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6.2.8 Proposition 10: The significant cultural distance between China and Australia 
results in a tendency for Chinese firms to select the JV mode of entry for the Australian 
market. 
Somewhat surprisingly, none of those interviewed thought that their entry mode choice was in any 
significant way influenced by the cultural distance between China and Australia, with the result that 
there is no support for Proposition 10.  This is in marked contrast to previous research regarding either 
Chinese MNEs in particular, or the general population of MNEs engaging in FDI from the developed 
or developing world.  The bulk of such studies have found that cultural distance does influence firms‟ 
entry mode choice, although in a variety of different, sometimes opposite ways.  For example, 
Brouthers (2002), Brouthers and Brouthers (2000), Barkema and Vermeulen (1998) concerning 
MNEs from the EU, Japan, and the Netherlands all found that a large cultural distance tended to 
encourage investors to select the WOS mode of entry, in order to avoid culturally based difficulties 
with local partners; similarly, Cheng (2006) after investigating Taiwanese manufacturing firms 
investing globally reached the same conclusion. 
Kogut and Singh (1988), based on their study of US MNEs, found that JVs could lower the 
managerial costs associated with a high level of cultural distance by assigning managerial tasks to 
local partners who are “better able to manage the local labour force and relationships with suppliers, 
buyers and governments” (p.414).  Kim and Hwang (1992) and Erramilli and Rao (1993) also found 
the same relationship between entry mode and cultural distance for US MNEs; and Pak and Park 
(2004) found the same results regarding Japanese MNEs.  In addition to that, there is evidence 
regarding developing regions as well.  For instance, Filatotchev, Strange, Piesse, and Lien (2007) and 
Tsai and Cheng (2004), in investigating the FDI activities of Taiwanese MNEs, found that a WOS 
was preferred where cultural distance was small since firms can manage their new corporation with 
reference to their existing knowledge relatively easily.  More recently, Xu et al. (2011), who have 
examined the case of Chinese investors particularly, have also found that larger cultural distance 
promotes the choice of JVs while a smaller cultural distance between countries encourages the full 
control mode of WOS.   
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The author believes the difference in the findings of this thesis and those such as Xu et al. (2011), 
which also concerns Chinese MNEs, may be explained by the different methodologies applied.  Most 
if not all of the previously mentioned studies adopted a quantitative method.  Specifically, Xu et al. 
(2011) tested the significance of entry mode to cultural distance between home and host countries 
using logistic regression based on secondary data.  The authors identified firm size (approximated by 
annual sales), industry (classified by manufacturing or service industry), and ownership type 
(classified by state-owned or private) as control variables for their regression test.  However, the 
authors provided limited explanation as to how those control variables were identified (see Xu et al., 
2011: 71); also, it is reasonable to suspect that other factors such as previous international experience 
and host government constraints, which were not, and would be hard to quantify in their secondary-
data-based study, also have significant influence on firms‟ entry mode choices.  Whereas this thesis is 
largely constructed by semi-structured interviews, which was able to identify relative significance, 
being that factors including host government regulations, corporate size and previous international 
experience are of more significant determining power towards MNEs‟ final entry mode choices than 
cultural distance between China and Australia; consequently, the proposed relationship was hardly 
observed in this context. 
 
6.3 Conclusion 
In conclusion, Chinese FDIs in Australia, depending on their industries and ownership types, are 
generally driven by a combination of motives, including: natural resources seeking, market-seeking, 
asset-seeking, and welfare-seeking.  Except for mining companies (which tend to be very largely 
driven by Australia‟s natural resource endowments), the other motivations tend to appear in pairs or 
groups in driving the final investment decision.  Among them, welfare seeking is a little-researched 
phenomenon affecting small private enterprises. It might also be of importance, perhaps not only in 
Australia, but also in countries such as New Zealand and Canada, which both have investment 
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migration programs.  The bulk of the earlier, western-perspective oriented literature largely 
overlooked this issue.   
In terms of the preferred mode of entry of Chinese MNEs in Australia, while most enterprises 
preferred greater control or a WOS in general, they had to weigh other external factors (such as host 
government restrictions and, to limited extents, cultural distance) and internal factors (including their 
operational scale, financial capability, and previous international experience) before making their 
entry mode choice.  For the above mentioned reasons, some companies chose to set up JVs or fully 
acquiring a local company to continue their operation, despite the fact that they “of course preferred 
WOS for it allows… greater convenience and control” (S1).  Therefore, following Cui and Jiang 
(2009) who found that in general Chinese MNEs expanding overseas prefer WOSs against JVs, this 
study has at least partially confirmed their findings.  However, what is preferred in the way of entry 
mode choice was not always what was selected.  There are many factors influencing entry mode 
choices, rarely a single factor.  In fact, among the 8 propositions which predicted the entry mode 
preferences of the cases in this study, only three were supported or partially supported (Proposition 5a, 
Proposition 6 and Proposition 9). The remainder could not be supported or fully supported on the 
basis of the findings.  This result corresponds to what was observed by Fan et al. (2012), who in their 
study regarding the corporate integration of Chinese enterprises in Australia observed that neither 
WOS nor JV dominated when it comes to entry mode choice in Australia.  The findings also 
confirmed that none of the three theoretical perspectives adopted in this study, being the eclectic 
paradigm, the resource-based perspective, or the institutional perspective, could provide a sufficient 
understanding of the OFDI activities of Chinese MNEs in Australia; though they do have some 
explanatory power towards some certain aspects individually. 
Overall, this study suggests that the patterns of Chinese MNE investment motivations as well as their 
entry mode choices in Australia are different, at least in part, to those displayed in other national 
contexts.  
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Chapter 7 Conclusion 
This chapter provides a conclusion for this thesis.  It consists of four parts.  Section 7.1 provides a 
brief summary regarding the impetus of the study, theoretical underpinning, how the study was 
conducted, and the findings observed.  Section 7.2 discusses its contributions and implications for the 
literature as well as FDI practices.  Section 7.3 reviews the limitations of the study.  The chapter and 
therefore the whole thesis concludes in Section 7.4. 
 
7.1 Summary of Findings 
Since the Chinese government encouraged local enterprises to go global in 2000, Chinese MNEs have 
engaged in OFDI activities on an increasing scale.  However, due to its relatively short history 
compared to that of industrialised countries, there are still only a limited number of studies examining 
the characteristics of Chinese OFDI. In addition, perhaps not surprisingly, whether theoretical 
frameworks regarding MNEs‟ FDI activities developed from the experience of industrialised countries 
are fully applicable in the Chinese context is a question that still needs close scrutiny.  This thesis was 
aimed, in part, at furthering our understanding of the characteristics of Chinese OFDI and the value of 
existing theoretical frameworks for understanding those characteristics.  
In particular, there have been very few studies of Chinese investment in Australia, despite the fact that 
Australia has always been one of the most popular destinations for Chinese outbound direct 
investments since China liberalised its market in late 70s.  Therefore, this thesis also aimed at 
examining such investments, the motivations that drove them and the entry mode choices selected.  
Two research questions were developed: Why have Chinese MNEs chosen to invest in Australia; and 
what factors have influenced their choice of entry modes for Australia? Three theoretical perspectives 
were used to help provide a framework for the study: the eclectic paradigm for corporations‟ FDI 
activities; the resource-based perspective; and the institutional perspective.  In addition, a wide range 
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of studies that both drew upon these perspectives and, at times, were critical of their limitations, were 
also examined, including  Buckley et al. (2007 & 2008), Biggeri and Sanfilippo (2010), Moss (2008), 
Yang (2003), Lu et al. (2010), and Cui et al. (2011), to name only a few.  The studies were used to 
help develop the research questions. 
As the subject of research, Chinese OFDI entry mode choices for Australia was relatively novel, with 
little existing research to draw upon, the study adopted a case study based, qualitative research 
method as advocated by Yin (2003).  As Jormanainen and Koveshnikov (2012: 712) concluded after 
reviewing major studies concerning the OFDI activities of emerging markets, it is necessary to 
conduct explorative research designs (qualitative research) “to understand features and issues specific 
to the phenomenon of emerging market firms”.   A total of eight cases were examined in this thesis.  
Interview was the primary method used, supplemented by secondary data (notably annual reports and 
other publicly available documents) and archival references (documents made available for corporate 
internal reference only).  Interviews were conducted with 20 managers from Chinese corporations and 
two government officials from both the Chinese and Australian governments.  These data were 
codified and then analysed to draw conclusions. 
Regarding the first research question, it was found that Chinese firms invest in Australia for a variety 
of reasons, depending on the industry they are in.  Specifically, firms in the mining or resource 
industry entered the Australian market with a primarily resource-seeking motivation, and it tends to be 
the dominant, if not sole, motivation for their investments.  Manufacturing firms usually possess a 
different motivation for their Australian investments, and that is a market-seeking motivation, which 
sometimes co-exists with a strategic asset-seeking motivation as found in this thesis.  Considering the 
relative maturity of the Australian market in technology development and market regulation as 
compared to China, it was found that the aim to acquire advanced operational and technological 
know-how (strategic assets) was another important incentive for Chinese investments in Australia, 
especially among manufacturing firms.  An important finding in this thesis is that many Chinese 
entrepreneurs, who own and operate family-run small businesses, invest in Australia to get PR.  By 
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doing so, they have the right to reside in the country and enjoy the social welfare it has to offer.  The 
author summarises it as a PR or welfare-seeking motivation.  This welfare-seeking motivation has 
received very little discussion in the international business literature, despite its growing popularity 
among successful Chinese entrepreneurs as noted in a report published by Bank of China in 2011.  It 
is an issue worth further examining not only in the context of Australia, but in all developed countries 
which have a relaxed immigration policy for foreign investors.  In sum, firms with a resource-seeking 
motivation tend to view this as their sole objective for their Australian investments.  However, in the 
other cases two or more of the market-seeking, strategic asset-seeking and welfare-seeking 
motivations were of greatest importance.  
The above findings differ from previous studies regarding the overall pattern of Chinese MNEs‟ 
OFDI activities as revealed in UNCTAD (2006) and CCPIT (2010 & 2012).  In these studies, market 
expansion was deemed to be the main driving force for their internationalisation, followed by strategic 
asset-seeking and even transaction cost minimisation, all ranked more highly than natural resource-
seeking (CCPIT, 2009).  Given the fact that Australia has attracted the largest amount of Chinese FDI 
in recent years (with the exception of tax havens, MOFCOM, 2008-2012), this research has provided 
valuable insights regarding the internationalisation of outbound Chinese firms. 
In terms of Research Question Two, it is found that generally, regardless of what entry mode Chinese 
firms selected for Australia, it seemed that investors for the most part would have preferred to 
establish firms with full control – that is the WOS – in the first instance.  However, in practice, firms‟ 
final entry mode choices were influenced by a range of factors, and what they preferred was not 
necessary what they chose to set up in the end.  In particular, it was found that Chinese firms which 
have a larger corporate size, and which have accumulated some international investment experience, 
tended to choose the WOS mode of entry.  Those which perceived that Australian governmental 
regulations and policy, especially as regards Chinese SOEs, looked more favourably upon JVs tended 
to select the JV mode of entry for the Australian market.  A range of other factors identified as having 
an impact on entry mode choices by previous research regarding Chinese OFDI, including investment 
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motivations,  levels of goodwill capital, the regulatory environment in the home country, and cultural 
distance were found to be either not significant or of little significance.    
This thesis also found that the entry mode choices of Chinese MNEs‟ could be explained with 
reference to various factors by relying on a multi-framework perspective.  Developed based on 
practices of industrialised western countries more than 20 years ago, the eclectic paradigm, the 
institutional perspective, and the resource-based perspective can provide explanations of the 
internationalisation activities of developed country MNEs.  However, as a new player in the 
international market, whether these theoretical perspectives are sufficient in their own to clarify the 
internationalisation activities of Chinese MNEs are of question.  Therefore, a combined framework, 
which complements the limited scopes of individual framework, warrants the relative 
comprehensiveness of the perspective the author takes in this thesis.  The findings of this thesis 
confirm the relevance and explanatory power of each framework, but also their limitations: Chinese 
MNEs invest in Australia for various reasons (the eclectic paradigm); corporate size and previous 
international experience are significant towards firms‟ entry mode decision making (resource-based 
perspective); and host government regulation plays an important role in Chinese MNEs‟ 
internationalisation (institutional perspective).   
 
7.2 Contribution and Future Research Implications 
This thesis provides useful, exploratory insights regarding Chinese FDI activities in a single country, 
Australia.  Not only did it identify why Chinese MNEs choose to invest in Australia, what factors 
have influenced their entry mode choices, the study has also identified some interesting issues that 
may attract future research.  It demonstrates that Chinese firms invest in Australia for a variety of 
reasons, including achieving the investors‟ personal goals such as obtaining Australian PR.  This 
factor has received very little attention in the internationalisation and entry mode literature to date, so 
that its role and significance in firms‟ decision making warrants further, more systematic, national and 
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cross-national research. Does its significance, for example, vary by size of firm?  Are the factors more 
important in smaller and family owned firms?  Is it more common in firms from developing countries 
or certain types of developing country?  Is it only found where developed countries provide 
immigration incentives for business owners?  These are only a few of the questions which deserve to 
be addressed.  
Another novel finding is the fact that most Chinese corporations engaged in OFDI, regardless of  size, 
would prefer to establish WOSs if conditions permit.  This was not only apparent in the interviews 
with corporate managers, but the government officials interviewed recognised that point as well.  As 
far as the author recalls, there have been few earlier studies reaching the same conclusion, suggesting 
further research might be warranted.  This could include, for example, why this is the case among 
Chinese investors in Australia?  Do Chinese MNEs in other, developed or developing countries, have 
the same perception?  Does the level of industrialisation of host countries affect Chinese MNEs‟ WOS 
preferences?  Or is it more related to the cultural characteristics of Chinese corporations and therefore 
behaviour of Chinese investors?     
On a practical level, this thesis may provide some guidance on the internationalisation decisions of 
those Chinese MNEs who intend to conduct OFDI.  In addition, the significant effect government can 
bring upon towards Chinese MNEs‟ entry mode decisions as found in this study also signals that 
thesis is of value to policy makers. 
 
7.3 Limitations 
As discussed in Chapter 4 Methodology, this thesis shares the same limitations common to all case-
based, qualitative research. 
First of all, because this research relies heavily on interviews, it might be argued that the results thus 
generated are weak in internal validity.  This is because with a limited number of interviews, the 
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limitations of one observer may become the limitations of the whole study (Neuman, 2000: 125).  
Consequently, more than one interview was conducted in each case, and government officials who 
represent an external third party were also interviewed to provide extra references.  In addition, 
corporate documents relevant to the research were examined where available. All of these 
triangulation processes were undertaken to ensure that this vulnerability was minimised. 
Another limitation of this thesis is that, as an exploratory study, it provides only a limited, but 
hopefully useful basis for scientific and theoretical generalisation, particularly compared to 
quantitative studies which involve large sample pools.  In case study research, only one or a few cases 
are examined, so it cannot, without further study, produce findings which are universally 
representative (Veal, 2005).  Regarding this thesis, eight cases were examined, and instead of 
developing rigorous hypotheses ready for scientific testing, propositions were developed to see to 
what extent they were confirmed in the case study context of this thesis.  Whilst the generalisability of 
the research findings (as they relate to the specific environment and experience of the eight 
companies) may not be readily applicable to other contexts,  the findings developed may provide a 
useful guide to understand the activities of organisations that seek to penetrate the Australian market 
or even developed markets in general.  The findings can thus be used to inform future qualitative and 
quantitative research to achieve a greater degree of generalisability.  
A third limitation is that this research was able to analyse an organisation‟s initial entry mode choices 
into a developed market, but it was unable to consider, inter alia, other stages such as possible follow-
up entry mode amendments and subsequent performance.   
 
7.4 Conclusion 
The aim of this research was to investigate the reason for Chinese MNEs‟ Australian OFDI, and 
identify factors that have influenced their initial entry mode choices.  This research employed a 
qualitative method by conducting eight case studies focussed on Chinese MNEs with variant sizes, 
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ownership structures, and industries entering into the Australian market from mid 2000.  The findings 
of this thesis identified various motivations that have driven their investments, and three factors that 
were important to their entry mode decision making.  Theoretical contributions of this research 
include the recognition of a multi-framework perspective as a relatively thorough approach to 
understand emerging country OFDI into developed regions (in this case China to Australia), and the 
identification of a welfare seeking motivation among Chinese investors which stands out of the 
eclectic paradigm. 
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Appendix 1: Key OFDI Regulations from 1984 to 2007 
Time of 
Issuance 
Regulation Comment Enunciator 
May-84 
Circular concerning the approval 
authorities and principles for opening non-
trade joint venture overseas as well as in 
Hong Kong and Macau 
The first regulation on Chinese 
OFDI 
MOFCOM 
Jul-85 
Circular on the approval procedures for 
international economic and technical 
cooperation corporation to set up overseas 
subsidiaries 
Opened OFDI to all economic 
entities with financial resources, 
foreign joint venture partner and 
relevant capabilities 
MOFCOM 
Apr-90 
Administrative measures on overseas 
financial institutions 
Primary rule concerning OFDI by 
the financial sector 
PBC 
Jun-90 
Rule for the implementation of 
administrative measures for the investment 
of foreign exchange overseas 
Detailed regulation on what was 
required to apply for an overseas 
investment 
SAFE 
Aug-91 
Regulations on examination and approval 
of project proposal and feasibility report on 
FDI projects 
Sets OFDI approval procedures and 
fund limitation and allowed sixty 
days for an approval result which 
virtually restrict outbound 
investment 
NDRC 
1997 
Rules on foreign exchange administration 
of the People's Republic of China 
Outlines that when making an 
investment abroad, home institutions 
shall receive an audit on their 
investing capital 
State 
Council 
Sep-99 
Certain items exempted from paying 
security deposits for remittance of profits 
from overseas investment circular 
The threshold starts to get lowered SAFE 
Oct-02 
Comprehensive external investment results 
evaluation procedures 
Clarification of standards and 
procedures for evaluating OFDI 
applications 
MOFCOM 
Oct-02 
Joint annual inspection of overseas 
investment tentative procedure 
Post-investment regulation 
SAFE 
MOFCOM 
Mar-03 
Notice on certain issues relating to simplify 
foreign exchange fund source examination 
for overseas investment 
Foreign exchange obtained from a 
source outside of mainland China is 
no longer examined 
SAFE 
May-03 
Circular of the issues related to granting 
financing support to key overseas projects 
encouraged by the state 
Regulates financial supports 
provided to certain overseas projects 
NDRC 
ExIm Bank 
Oct-03 
Issues relevant to further intensifying the 
reform of foreign exchange administration 
on external investment circular 
Simplification of approval 
procedures; establishment of pilot 
areas for eased and extended local 
approval 
SAFE 
Jul-04 
Decision on reforming the investment 
system 
Major reform of the OFDI approval 
and departure of former practice 
which initiated subsequent reforms 
MOFCOM 
Ministry of 
foreign 
affairs 
Oct-04 
The interim measures for the administration 
of examination and approval of the 
overseas investment projects 
All kinds of companies are allowed 
to invest abroad; sets out the 
threshold values for examination 
NDRC 
Oct-04 
Provisions on the examination and approval 
of investment to run enterprises abroad 
National approval for seven regions 
are needed, remaining countries are 
approved at sub-national level; no 
feasibility study is required anymore 
MOFCOM 
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May-05 
Circular on expanding the trail regions for 
the pilot program concerning overseas 
investment 
Further decentralisation in approving 
process 
SAFE 
Jun-06 
Circular on revision of certain foreign 
control policies relating to overseas 
investments 
Lifts SAFE restrictions on using self-
owned foreign exchange to 
undertake offshore investments 
SAFE 
Dec-07 
Adjusting the relevant matters on the 
examination and approval of overseas 
investment 
Enlarge the scope of countries where 
the local enterprises may set up 
branches that is examined and 
approved by local authorities 
MOFCOM 
(Compiled based on Buckley et al., 2007) 
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Appendix 2: Categories and Definitions of Firm Types Used in 
China 
Companies with limited liability – limited liability companies are funded by no less than two and no 
larger than fifty shareholders.  These shareholders hold responsibility limited to their amount of 
capital contribution.  To set up a limited liability company, the capital investment must achieve the 
minimum amount required: for manufacturing and wholesaling companies, the registered capital 
should be no less than 500,000 RMB; for retailing companies, the registered capital should be no less 
than 300,000 RMB; and the threshold for R&D and service companies is 100,000 RMB. 
Companies limited by shares – in essence, company limited by shares is a special type of limited 
liability company.  As the Corporation Law specifies, the number of shareholders in a limited liability 
company shall be no larger than fifty.  This rule limits the ability of companies to raise funds.  
Companies limited by shares overcome such drawbacks, where the registered capital of the whole 
company is divided into small par value stocks.  The maximum number of initial shareholders 
allowed is two hundred, and the minimum registered capital required is 5 million RMB. 
Cooperative equity enterprises – this type of enterprise is based on a cooperative system, where 
employees of the enterprises and certain proportions of social capital form the basis of them.  They 
maintain autonomous management, and assume sole responsibility for profits or losses; profits or 
dividends are distributed according to labour or proportion of shares. 
Collective enterprises – there is no western correspondence for this type of enterprise, for it is a 
unique socialist economic organisation.  Collective enterprises (collectively owned enterprises) mean 
that the property of the organisation belongs collectively to the labours working in them.  In principle, 
the profits are distributed on the basis of working loads. 
